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MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

HISTORICAL INFORMATION ON CPSU CONGRESSES

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 1980 pp 10-12

[Article by V. Aidarov]

[Text]

In the USSR the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) fulfils the role of the people's vanguard, the leading and guiding force of society. It raised, organised and led the country's working people to the storming of the tsarist autocracy, organised and inspired the 1917 Great October Socialist Revolution, led the working people's struggle against internal and external counter-revolution and in the Civil War of 1918-20.

Social transformations, the like of which, in scale and depth, were unknown in world history, have been carried out under the leadership of the Communist Party. When in June 1941 nazi Germany attacked the Soviet Union with the aim of destroying the first state of workers and peasants in the world, the Communist Party stood at the helm of the nation and the army to repulse the aggression, rout the enemy and safeguard the gains of socialism. Since the end of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45), intensive creative work has been going on for 35 years on Soviet soil; the nation, under the leadership of the CPSU, is building a classless society in which social self-government will be developed. Public ownership of the means of production and genuine democracy for the working masses have become a reality in the USSR. A mature socialist society has been built for the first time in the history of mankind.

How does the CPSU fulfil its vanguard role? How does it effect leadership of society?

It does so through the network of Party organisations set up at Party members' place of work — plants, factories, state and cooperative farms and other enterprises, in Soviet Army units, organisations and educational institutions. The CPSU also fulfils its guiding role through the Party members in all state and public organisations (Soviets of People's Deputies, ministries and departments, the Leninist Young Communist League of the Soviet Union, trade unions, scientific research, cultural and creative associations, etc.).

The principle of the organisational structure of the Party is based on democratic centralism. This implies that all bodies of power, from the highest to the lowest, are elected; that they are periodically accountable to their own Party organisations and to the higher organs; it also implies strict Party discipline and subordination of the minority to the majority and that the decisions of the higher bodies are unconditionally binding on the lower ones.

The Party is built on the territorial and production principle, that is, primary Party organisations are set up at places of work of Communists and united in district, city, regional and other organisations in the territory. Primary Party organisations are autonomous in deciding local issues provided their decisions do not go counter to Party policy.

The highest leading body of a Party organisation is the general meeting (for primary organisations), the conference (for district, city, area, regional and territorial organisations), and the congress (for the Communist Parties of the Union Republics and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). In the period between meetings, conferences and congresses the bureaus or committees

elected by the Communists and which are their executive bodies, direct the current work of the Party organisations.

The supreme body of the CPSU is the Party Congress, convened by the Central Committee not less than once in five years. It hears and endorses the reports of the Central Committee, the Central Auditing Commission and other central bodies; it reconsiders, changes and endorses the Party Programme and the Rules; determines the Party line on issues of home and foreign policy and considers and settles important issues of communist construction; it elects the Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission.

Party congresses are events of considerable historical significance, which leave a deep imprint on the life and development of the country, on the international communist and working class movement and on the destinies of mankind. The congresses sum up the work done by the Party during the years since the previous congress, map out important economic, socio-political and international tasks of the Party and state in the forthcoming five-year period and adjust the correctness of their political course to the concrete and objective conditions of internal and world development.

This was the case, for example, at the 25th CPSU Congress held in 1976, from February 24 to March 5. 4,998 delegates, representing 15 million 694 thousand Communists,* were elected to the Congress. The Party organisations of the army and the navy were represented by 314 delegates. 103 delegations of Communist, Workers', National-Democratic and Socialist Parties from 96 countries of the world attended the Congress.

In the Resolution it adopted the 25th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union unanimously approved the political line and practical activities of the Central Committee headed by the General Secretary, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, and proposed to all Party organisations to be guided in their work by the principles and tasks laid down in the report of the CPSU Central Committee. After a business-like discussion the Congress adopted the report of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission and the "Guidelines for the Development of the National Economy of the USSR for 1976-80," submitted to the Congress by the Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, Comrade A. N. Kosygin.

The Congress gave much attention to the analysis of the Party's international position and its foreign policy. As a further step in the development of the Peace Programme advanced by the 24th CPSU Congress (1971), it adopted the Programme of Further Struggle for Peace and International Cooperation, and for the Freedom and Independence of the Peoples.

Today the CPSU foreign policy is directed at resolving these tasks and realising international détente. Expressing the will of the Soviet Communists and all Soviet people, the 25th Congress solemnly declared its fraternal and inviolable solidarity with the Communists of other countries and with all fighters against imperialism and reaction.

The foreign guests of the Congress noted that the CPSU was firmly and consistently carrying out its internationalist duty, its historical mission in laying the road for mankind to socialism and communism and in the struggle for peace, freedom and happiness of all peoples. The General Secretary of the Portuguese Communist Party Alvaro Cunhal, speaking at the Congress, said: "You are building a society that has put an end to all forms of oppression and discrimination, where the people's material welfare and its cultural level are being constantly raised. It is a society whose rate of economic growth has no equal in the world. It is a society where socialist democracy is being constantly broadened. Its political, economic and social content is the embodiment of real equality and freedom of the individual on the basis of abolition of exploitation of man by man."

From congress to congress the CPSU maintains its profound loyalty to the principles of Marxism-Leninism, to scientific communism and to the continuity of its general line. The Party congresses are landmarks on the great and unusually difficult but noble road to the society of the future, to communism. "The congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, from the days of Lenin and to this day are a rich source of experience which the whole revolutionary world is using," Fidel Castro noted in his speech at the 25th Congress.

At its congresses the CPSU devotes much attention to observing and developing Lenin's norms of Party life and principles of leadership, to deepening inner-Party democracy, to raising the responsibility of each member of the Party and improving its qualitative composition, and perfecting all aspects of the Party's guidance of society. In this the decisions of the 20th CPSU Party Congress (1956) play a principled role. The General

* Now the CPSU unites over 17 million Communists.

Secretary of the Central Committee of the Italian Communist Party Palmiro Togliatti said: "The methods you use in discussing problems facing you and in boldly subjecting to criticism the shortcomings of your work is an example of real democracy, when the interests of the people are placed above everything else."

The 22nd Congress (1961) adopted the CPSU Programme* which is in force today. "The people are the decisive force in the building of communism," it says. "**The Party exists for the people and it is in serving the people that it sees the purpose of its activity.**"

Guided by Lenin's directions on the inseparable unity of the Party Programme and the Rules, the 22nd Congress adopted new CPSU Rules. They consolidated the proposition that the supreme principle of Party leadership is **collectivism**. The Congress underlined the necessity for resolute struggle against both revisionism and dogmatism and sectarianism in the world communist movement.

An important feature of CPSU policy is that it is concrete and historical. It is worked out taking into account the concrete stage in the country's development and the internal and international situations.

The distinctive feature of the CPSU's policy, which was brilliantly manifested in the decisions of its 24th and 25th congresses, is the approach to the phenomena of public life according to a definite system — a complex approach. In discussing and adopting Party economic and socio-political strategy the delegates to the congresses proceeded from the fact that in an integral social organism, and mature socialist society is just such an organism, there is not and cannot be any decision regarding any single aspect of social life which does not affect to a greater or lesser degree, all its other aspects. It is precisely the Marxist-Leninist theory that allows the Party always to see the main objective, to subordinate to it the solution of all other tasks, to choose the right course in establishing favourable home and foreign policy conditions for the building of socialism and communism in the USSR and in the other countries of the socialist community, in strengthening peace throughout the world, in further consolidating the world communist and working class movement and in rendering support and assistance to the anti-imperialist and national-liberation forces.

The Central Committee elected by the congresses directs the entire work of the Party between the congresses and represents the CPSU in its contacts with other Parties. The Central Committee holds not less than one plenary session in six months. Between the plenary sessions, the work of the Party is directed by Politbureau, the Secretariate and the General Secretary elected by the members of the Central Committee. When necessary the CPSU Central Committee may convene an All-Union Party Conference to discuss urgent problems of Party policy.

The guidance of Party work in the Armed Forces is effected by the Central Committee through the Main Political Administration of the Soviet Army and Navy, which has the status of a department of the CPSU Central Committee.

The CPSU is approaching its 26th Congress in close unity with the people. The political course of the Party, charted by the 25th Congress, guaranteed the consolidation and development of the economic and defence might of the USSR and the perfecting of socialist public relations. The tasks of the concluding year of the Tenth Five-Year-Plan period (1976–80) are being successfully fulfilled and the people's welfare is growing.

Summing up what has been accomplished, the Party organisations are seeking to assess their results realistically, to analyse the shortcomings and difficulties and to learn from their own experience. This is necessary because objectively it turns out that the CPSU and the Soviet people are advancing through socio-historical virgin lands, being the first to resolve the tasks of building and defending the new society.

* See article "The Party Three Programmes." "SMR" No. 6, 1980.

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MILITARY-POLITICAL ISSUES

BELORUSSIAN MD CHIEF OF STAFF ON ARMED FORCES DAY

Minsk KOMMUNIST BELORUSSII in Russian No 2, Feb 81 (signed to press 10 Feb 81) pp 65-70

[Article by Lt Gen I. Gashkov, chief of staff of the Red Banner Belorussian MD: "The CPSU: Creator and Leader of the Armed Forces of the USSR"]

[Excerpts] The Soviet Armed Forces is 63 years old. Workers in town and country are honoring the armed defenders of the socialist fatherland now standing vigilant guard over its sacred borders, veterans of battles past, creators and developers of formidable military weapons and all who by their labors increase the defensive strength of the Soviet state.

Our people are celebrating the 63d anniversary of the Soviet Armed Forces on the day of the opening of the 26th CPSU Congress in an atmosphere of an upsurge of labor and political enthusiasm. The workers, peasants and intelligentsia of the Land of Soviets are inspired with enthusiasm by the far-reaching plans outlined in the CPSU Central Committee draft for the 26th Party Congress and filled with resolve to make them a reality.

The leadership of the Communist Party was the most important means and source of our victory in the Great Patriotic War. It was quite rightly referred to as a fighting party. By war's end as much as 60 per cent of the CPSU membership was in the army in the field. Every fourth serviceman was a communist. Communists and Komsomol members were always to be found in the front ranks, inspiring the masses of troops with their personal example on to great military deeds. Some 3 million members of our party gave their lives in battles for the motherland. The difficult tests of wartime tempered party ranks to still greater degrees and increased its authority and leading role.

The results of the Great Patriotic War constitute a rigorous and unforgettable lesson in history and a stern warning to any hankering after military adventures. The lessons of the past war at the same time teach the need for great vigilance against imperialism.

True to the behests of V. I. Lenin, the CPSU is continuously applying his teaching concerning defense of the socialist fatherland and devoting attention to increasing further the country's defense capability and insuring its security. At the same time, our country is not striving to achieve any military superiority; it is threatening no one and laying no plans to threaten anyone. This has been repeatedly emphasized in party and government documents and in speeches and works by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders.

Life has fully confirmed the correctness of the Soviet military policy and strategy flowing from decisions of recent party congresses and entirely in conformity with its Leninist course. The CPSU line on strengthening the defense of the Soviet land meets with the understanding and support of all peaceloving forces. It is in line with the fundamental interests of the Soviet people. After having paid such a high price during the last war for peace and freedom, our country cannot overlook the military preparations and plots of the aggressive forces of imperialism. To the positive processes of peaceful development they have now opposed a policy testifying to their unwillingness to take into account the realities of the world today.

Frightened by the scope and depth of positive change, imperialism would like to check the objective process of world renewal. The leaders of the NATO countries, those above all of the US, have taken up a course toward destruction of the world military balance and altering the relationship of forces in their favor to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries and the detriment of international detente and the security of the peoples. In pursuing this policy they are meeting with all possible support on the part of the present Chinese leadership. Hence the policy imperialism and its accomplices are following toward intensification of the arms race, the unleashing of provocations against socialist and other independent countries, the militaristic activities of NATO and the expanding scales and geographical scope of its activities as a tool of imperialist diktat.

The arms race poses an increasing threat to the cause of peace and national security. It has been sharply intensified of late, through the fault primarily of the previous American administration. Hypocritically taking cover behind events in Afghanistan and slanderous references to a "Soviet military threat," the Washington leadership has indefinitely postponed ratification of the SALT-II Treaty and launched an unprecedented new round of the arms race. The Pentagon's budget for the 1981 fiscal year, for example, is 171.5 billion dollars and in 1985 will reach the record figure of 250 billion.

The USA is continuing its intensified development of newer and newer military equipment and weapon systems. The overseas military clique is looking next to its MX mobile-based strategic missile system, the Trident submarine missile-carrying system, the deployment by the end of 1983 in a number of countries of western Europe of another 572 American intermediate-range nuclear missiles aimed at the USSR and its European allies and other military programs.

Pentagon strategists are once again nursing the dangerous notion of a "preemptive first strike" against the Soviet Union and fortifying it with feverish efforts aimed at the achievement of military superiority over the USSR. This policy is fraught with extreme danger for the peoples of the entire world. And it comes as no coincidence that the USA's latest militaristic step has encountered the angry condemnation of broad social and political circles on all continents.

US imperialists reserve a special role in their campaign to kindle antisovietism and heighten international tension to events surrounding Afghanistan. They are pursuing a clearly manifest class aim here: to tar peaceloving Soviet foreign policy, to divert attention from the imperialist policy of aggression and to justify a continuing arms race. As everyone knows, this is a total distortion of the essential nature of Soviet policy toward our southern neighbor. The entire course of Afghan events and the plots by enemies of the April revolution have confirmed that the decision to provide military assistance to this country is the only correct one. This action has resulted in the collapse of plans to draw Afghanistan into the orbit of imperialist policy and to create a new threat on the southern border of the USSR.

Life in the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan] is now gradually settling into a normal course. The large bands of counterrevolutionaries have been destroyed. Given these conditions, in agreement with the Afghan government the decision was reached and carried out to withdraw a number of units (chast') of our military contingent from the country. The Soviet Union will continue to assist the DRA build a new life and preserve the gains of the April revolution. In a speech in Alma-Ata Comrade L. I. Brezhnev declared: "Having responded to the call of the government of Afghanistan for assistance in repelling aggression, we will discharge fully our responsibilities in complete accordance with the Soviet-Afghan Treaty of Friendship and the Charter of the United Nations. Of this no one should have any doubt."

While rendering comprehensive assistance to Afghanistan, our country stands for political settlement of the situation there without outside interference. But the US, as well as China, have so far continued to create obstacles to such a solution. With anti-sovietism providing the basis, a rapprochement is being established between the aggressive circles of the West and the hegemonists in Beijing, who are striving intensely for cooperation from their imperialist partners in rapidly building up the military and economic potential of their country and transforming China into a strong militaristic power. They have stepped up their activities considerably in Southeast Asia and Japan. Especially calling attention to itself is the fact that increases in the military potential of this country are being accompanied by a strengthening of the Japanese-Chinese-American military-political alliance and growing revanchist demands upon the Soviet Union.

So as we can see, military danger remains the harsh reality of the present world situation. Under these conditions, the CPSU Central Committee and Soviet Government are demonstrating true Leninist steadfastness, firmness and devotion to principle and great vigilance against the intrigues of the imperialist and Maoists. The part and government concern themselves unflaggingly to strengthening the country's defense and upgrading our Armed Forces. Because of the party's concern and the heroic labors of the Soviet people the combat strength and preparedness of the armed forces are continually growing.

"The economy and science and technology in the Soviet Union," declared Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade D. F. Ustinov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and Minister of Defense of the USSR, "have achieved levels at which they are able to insure the development of any weapon upon which our adversaries would want to lay a wager." This is a fitting response to those striving to achieve military superiority over the Soviet Union. Marshal of the Soviet Union Comrade Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev, General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR and Chairman of the USSR Defense Council, demonstrates continuous concern for increasing the country's defense capability.

A priceless asset of our army and its main strength are embodied in the people who constitute it, people mastering to perfection the latest weapons and equipment, true patriots and internationalists. Like their fathers and grandfathers, the present generation of Soviet fighting men is prepared at any time to stand in defense of the gains of socialism. They work perseveringly to increase their political and military knowledge and devote themselves zealously to acquiring the knowledge required for discharge of their military duties. The results of the past training year provide convincing evidence of this. The ranks of the "outstanding" in combat and political training and of our rated specialists have grown substantially, and the number of "outstanding" subunits (podrazdeleniye) and units has increased. Socialist competition for a fitting salute to the 26th CPSU Congress has become a universally broad-based movement.

Soviet fighting men are marking the 63d anniversary of the Armed Forces with new successes in combat and political training. The Armed Forces have launched the current training year, the year of the 26th Party Congress, under the slogan: "For a high state of combat readiness and strict adherence to military procedure!" Troops throughout the Red Banner Belorussian MD these winter days, troops in the training class facilities and ranges and out on the tank courses and airfields, are improving their mastery of military skills and strengthening military discipline and organization. Socialist competition, in the vanguard of which are to be found our communists and Komsomol members, is developing extensively within our units and subunits. As models to be emulated in competition we rightly point to the Rogachevskaya Guards Division imeni Supreme Soviet of the Belorussian SSR, holder of three orders, and the motorized rifle regiment commanded by Colonel L. Kovalev, which has been entered on the Honor Board of Leading Ground Forces Units.

Soviet fighting men remain one in thought and interests with their people. They participate actively in the social and political life of the country and help in the accomplishment of national economic tasks. In helping gather in the 1980 harvest, motor vehicle subunits of our district transported many loads of agricultural products and provided substantial assistance to the workers of Belorussia's fields in bringing in the vegetable and grain harvest.

The Soviet Armed Forces also play an important educational role. Each year many thousands of our youth take their places in labor collectives after having passed in the course of their service in the armed forces through a school tempering them politically and developing in them courage and high moral qualities. By their conduct and conscientious attitude toward the tasks with which they have been entrusted they help tighten discipline in these collectives, improve organization and increase group solidarity.

As do all Soviet people, the members of our valiant Armed Forces unanimously support the domestic and foreign policy of the CPSU and Soviet Government and applaud the purposeful and fruitful work of the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Committee Politburo headed by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev. In the leadership of the party and in their inseparable ties with the people lies an inexhaustible source of the strength and invincibility of our Armed Forces.

The military community of socialist states, the Warsaw Pact Organization, plays a large role in the defense of revolutionary gains and the strengthening of peace. Close military collaboration between the socialist armies improves the mastery of combat skills on the part of Soviet personnel and strengthens and develops the indestructible friendship of brothers-in-arms and internationalist fighting men. The strengthening of this alliance is clear evidence of the faithfulness of the CPSU and the fraternal parties to Lenin's teaching concerning the defense of the socialist fatherland and of their concern for the international defense of the gains of socialism.

The Soviet people and their fighting men are greeting the 63d anniversary of the Armed Forces with an awareness of their growing strength and confidence in the triumph of their great cause. Emblazoned on our army's colors, colors covered with glory, are the stirring words of our military motto: "For our Soviet motherland!" Our heroic people, our laboring people can be confident that Soviet fighting men remain forever vigilant, that their constructive, creative labors enjoy the protection of a reliable defense.

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MORAL FACTOR IN WAR DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 1980 pp 14-15

[Article by Col (Res.) V. Zubarev, D. Sc. (Philosophy)]

[Text]

The course and outcome of any war are determined by a number of factors, both socio-political, economical and military proper, the moral factor being particularly important for achieving victory.

The moral factor is a combination of peoples' moral, political and psychological qualities in which the attitude to the war and its goals underlying popular masses' staunchness and determination to score victory manifest themselves. The moral factor in war expresses the spiritual and moral capacity of the people and the army to withstand the severest trials of the armed struggle, to retain self-possession and to fight to a victorious end.

In structure, the moral factor consists of two groups of elements, namely ideological and socio-psychological. The elements of the first group are predominant. They form the backbone of the moral strength of the country and its army, and also of the popular masses waging an armed struggle for their national and social emancipation. These elements reflect particularly deeply and forcefully the working people's consciousness of their class interests both in peace and in war. The elements of this group are characterised by a scientific view of war and its political purposes, they promote the nation's moral and political unity.

The socio-psychological elements in army conditions comprise mainly the aggregate of ideas and impressions originating under the direct influence of military service. More specifically, these include combat traditions and customs, habits, feelings and sentiments. However, if we compare the socio-psychological and ideological elements, the attitude to the given war and the discharge of one's military duty in the former case is formed on the basis of the current popular consciousness, which, nevertheless, in no way belittles the significance of the latter. However, the decisive influence on the development of servicemen's world outlook, as emphasised above, is that of political ideas, which give a spiritual impetus to the fighting men. Naturally, it may be positive or negative, depending on the ideas themselves, which may be progressive or reactionary.

The question of the role of the moral factor in war and its impact on the course and outcome of armed struggle has been examined by many bourgeois theoreticians and military figures. However, none of them succeeded in furnishing a scientific substantiation of the moral factor, because the majority of them ignored ideological and political trends, and tackled the problem in isolation from the social conditions.

Marxism-Leninism gives the only correct and scientific interpretation of the question of the essence and significance of the moral factor. Marxist-Leninist theory proceeds from the fact that the army's and people's forces are rooted in the type of socio-economic relations in a given country and are inseparable from them. The better the social system corresponds to the people's vital interests, the higher the people's and the fighting troops' moral condition and their resolution and selflessness in the struggle for victory.

As Lenin said, "holding out morally means not allowing oneself to become demoralized and disorganised, keeping a sober view of the situation, preserving vigour and firmness of spirit..."

Lenin elucidated the essence and origin of the army's and people's spirit and its influence on the course and outcome of war. He showed the increased importance of the moral factor in wars, and also the ways for strengthening the troops' morale.

The moral factor may play a mobilising role, it may even offset the shortage of personnel or equipment or, on the contrary, impair the army's combat readiness and sometimes even cancel out its superiority in manpower and equipment. The young Red Army's brilliant victories in the Civil War were a proof of the troops' high morale. Analysing these victories, Lenin wrote that the strength of the enemies of the socialist revolution exceeded that of the revolutionary forces. Nevertheless, the firmness of the revolutionary people's spirit helped them not only to hold out against the White Guards and foreign interventionists, but also to emerge victorious. "In the final analysis," Lenin said, "victory in any war depends on the spirit animating the masses that spill their own blood on the field of battle." This spirit depends on the nature of the war and the awareness of its aims on the part of those who wage it.

Confidence of the justness of the war and awareness of the necessity to sacrifice one's own life for the common cause raises soldiers' morale and makes it easier for them to overcome immense difficulties.

This manifested itself with particular force in the wars the Soviet people and other peoples had to wage more than once to defend their freedom and independence. Their moral strength was multiplied by high political consciousness and firm ideological conviction of the just aims of the struggle.

Lenin's propositions revealing the essence, sources and role played by the spirit of the people and the army in achieving victory in war were further developed in the resolutions and activity of the CPSU in military matters.

In the process of the moral and political education of the Soviet Armed Forces' personnel the Communist Party has always attached great importance to developing boundless devotion to the Soviet Homeland, loyalty to combat traditions and personal responsibility for the defence of the gains of the October Revolution. These qualities of the Soviet fighting man plus combat skills, strong discipline, mass heroism and commanders' competent troop control ensured the Soviet Army's victory in defending the Socialist Homeland.

The Great Patriotic War (1941-45) was a vivid testimony of the Soviet people's high moral qualities. The victory over nazi Germany convincingly proved the viability and invincibility of the world's first socialist state. It was the triumph of the new social and state system, of the socialist economy, Marxist-Leninist ideology and Soviet society's moral and political unity. In the long and difficult struggle against the enemy, servicemen of the army and navy displayed unprecedented courage and gallantry.

More than seven million fighting men were awarded Orders and medals for staunchness, courage and bravery in the war. Over 11,000 were honoured with the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union. Hundreds of servicemen who showed unparalleled courage and gallantry were entered forever in the rolls of units and ships. They include representatives of all nationalities inhabiting the Soviet country. During the war 10,900 Soviet decorations were conferred on units, ships and formations of the army and navy which distinguished themselves in battle.

The Soviet people's example in the Great Patriotic War convinced the whole world that it is impossible to break the will, staunchness and determination of a people which is fighting in the name of a lofty goal, for a righteous cause, for its own democratic power.

The boundless moral strength of the Soviet people and its army displayed in the war against the hitlerite invaders is a brilliant proof of the fact that these qualities depend directly on the nature of the social system and political content of the war waged by a country.

In the postwar period the moral, political and psychological training of army and navy personnel has acquired yet greater significance. This is due to a number of factors, e.g. more intense ideological struggle between the two opposite socio-political systems, the technological re-equipment of the army and navy and the radical changes in the methods of warfare. Another reason which considerably enhances the role of the moral factor is the collective character of the use of combat equipment, which calls for serviceman's competence and team-work, unconditional obedience, high efficiency and firm discipline. The influence of the time factor on fulfilling a combat mission is also of paramount importance. The essence of moral steeling and political education in these conditions consists in developing servicemen's firm convictions and spiritual stability, which ensure their constant combat readiness and insuperable will for victory over the enemy.

In recent time soldiers' morale is being given much attention in the West. The experience of the Great Patriotic War which demonstrated complete moral superiority of the Soviet people and its

army over the fascists, and the lessons of the armed struggle waged by the peoples of many countries for their social and national liberation prompt the Command of bourgeois armies to attach special importance to forming moral staunchness in servicemen. To this end, every possible means is used, including religion, brainwashing, repressions, bribery, etc. This naturally affects the morale of bourgeois armies. The individual consciousness of the majority of servicemen, owing to constant massive imperialist propaganda, cannot always realise the true essence of wars and armed conflicts in which they are forced to participate to defend the interests of big capital.

Since recently, mercenaries form part of some imperialist armies. Material reward is the main stimulus bolstering their morale, which, as a result, is not very high.

The great advantage of the army of the society of developed socialism consists in the fact that the policy pursued by the Communist Party, being inseparably connected with the norms and principles of Soviet morality, actively promotes the formation of a soldier's or a sailor's moral makeup. High political consciousness, ideological conviction, boundless devotion to the Party, the Homeland and the people, to the principles of internationalism, and unshakable confidence in the triumph of communism are the qualities underlying the moral and political superiority of Soviet servicemen over the personnel of imperialist armies.

The Vietnamese people's heroic resistance to American aggression may well serve as a graphic illustration of the role and significance of the moral factor in modern warfare. This war lasted nearly twenty years, but the aggressor failed to break the resistance of the population of that small country and its army, and thus suffered defeat.

Lenin's conclusion that in the final analysis victory in any war depends on the spirit animating the masses that spill their blood on the field of battle has a direct bearing on the armed struggle waged by the peoples in developing countries. Military violence or the threat of it on the part of the imperialists, zionists, Maoist hegemonists and internal reactionaries invariably meets with a rebuff of the popular masses and constantly growing opposition of the working people in the developing countries to imperialism's reactionary forces, which can be explained by their confidence in the justness of their struggle for national and social emancipation. Such was or is the case in Laos, Kampuchea, Iran, Afghanistan, Angola, Mozambique and other countries.

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MINISTRY OF DEFENSE AND GENERAL STAFF

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ARMED FORCES

GENERAL MILITARY AFFAIRS

Party-Political Work Reviewed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 21 Jan 81 p 2

[Article by Col Gen G. Sredin, first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy: "Improve the Effectiveness of Party Work"]

[Text] The report-and-election meetings and conferences in party organizations of the Soviet Army and Navy have ended. They resulted in a demanding review of party work in the units, on the ships, at educational institutions and military establishments. They were an important component of the multifaceted work undertaken in the Armed Forces by way of preparing a fitting reception for the 26th CPSU Congress. The meetings and conferences took place in a climate of vigorous political and service activity and large-scale national socialist competition in honor of the forthcoming forum of communists, with broad discussion of the CPSU Central Committee's draft program for the 26th party congress: "Main Directions in the USSR's Economic and Social Development for the Years 1981-1985 and Extending Through the Period to 1990." This important party document, which embodies the CPSU's economic strategy, received the unanimous approval of the entire Soviet people. It is evoking in the Soviet fighting men a new outpouring of patriotic feelings and pride in their homeland and the Leninist Communist Party.

The reports and elections in party organizations demonstrated once again the close solidarity of army and navy personnel round our Party's Central Committee, their unanimous support for the CPSU's foreign and domestic policy, the loyalty of Soviet fighting men to the principles of communism and international fraternity, their thorough understanding of the tasks assigned the Armed Forces by the party and government and the USSR minister of defense, and their desire to perform these tasks completely and well.

Participation by members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee V. V. Grishin, D. A. Kunayev, G. V. Romanov and D. F. Ustinov; candidate members of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee T. Ya. Kiselev, Sh. R. Rashidov and E. A. Shevardnadze; secretaries of central committees of Union republic communist parties and CPSU kraykoms and obkoms; and officials from the Party Central Committee, the Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate of the Army

and Navy contributed to the good ideological and organizational level of party conferences in the military districts, groups of forces and fleets.

As we sum up the reports and elections we should mention the high level of activity of participants in the meetings and conferences. Every third communist took part in the discussion of the accountability reports in the primary organizations, 75 percent of the party members and candidate members spoke at party organization meetings in companies and their equivalents, and 85 percent of the members and candidate members spoke in the party groups. The meetings demonstrated the increased militancy of the party collectives and the maturity of army and navy communists, who did an earnest job of analyzing and appraising their work during the period under review and offered numerous practical proposals for improving the work of bureaus, party committees and political organs. The reports and elections accomplished a great deal with respect to increasing the public and political activeness of the communists and served as a landmark on the path toward the further enhancement of party influence upon all aspects of the life of the forces and an important means of increasing the role of party organizations as the political nucleus of the military collectives.

It was stated at the report-and-election meetings and the conferences that the army and navy communists see their contribution to the overall national cause as one of further improving the combat readiness of the units and ship and the quality of combat training, strengthening organization and discipline among the personnel. The past training year produced improvement in the field, air and naval training of the formations, units and ship crews and in the ability of the fighting men to make effective use of the modern combat equipment and weapons. Socialist competition improved. The initiators of competition in the services of the Armed Forces and the majority of fighting men in the army and navy successfully fulfilled their commitments.

As the communists looked over their achievements in the vast majority of meetings and conferences they attempted to find unutilized reserves for improving the training and indoctrination of the personnel and tried to look ahead. Every party organization absolutely must pursue this course of self-criticism and working with a view to the future. Only by relying upon the experience and lessons derived from the work of the past and by deriving the proper conclusions therefrom can a collective precisely define the main focus for their efforts on the path toward new achievements.

Many of the speeches at the meetings and conferences stressed the idea that the party's job consists primarily in working with the people, in their political indoctrination. The party organizations have for good reason been assigned the important role of political nucleus of the military collectives. The political organ and the party organization influenced the accomplishment of the tasks required by combat readiness primarily by improving the awareness of the people, developing in them a sense of personal responsibility for socialism's armed defense, motivating them to perform their military work selflessly and uniting the fighting men to perform their work harmoniously and effectively.

During the report-and-election campaign the communists discussed in detail steps to further enhance the influence of party organizations with respect to improving the training and indoctrination of the fighting men and their influence on the organization of socialist competition. They feel that the key to the successful accomplishment of tasks set by the USSR minister of defense for the current training year lies in enhancing party influence upon all aspects of the life of the military collectives and in improving their organizational work. This will guarantee fulfillment of the large commitments accepted in the socialist competition, which this year has the slogan: "For A High Level of Combat Readiness and Stable Military Order." It is clear that only by appealing to the minds and hearts of the soldiers and sailors, sergeants and petty officers, warrant officers (praporshchik, michman) and officers is it possible to enhance the spiritual strengths of the people, to increase their enthusiasm in the work and their initiative, to reach a higher level of organization and efficiency.

The CPSU Central Committee turned the attention of party organizations to the need during the reports and elections to thoroughly review all aspects of party work--political, organizational and ideological. As the communists analyzed these in the meetings and conferences they noted that it is essential in the daily work to strive for close unity of all these aspects, to keep in mind the fact that the tasks involved in improving the combat readiness of the troops and indoctrinating the personnel are becoming constantly more complicated and that the requirements made of the end results of training and indoctrinational work are growing. Party work must therefore be vigorously improved, be closely linked to the specific tasks facing the unit or ship and involve the use of all possibilities available to the party organization.

Many of those delivering reports and those speaking at the party meetings and conferences mentioned the need to take a more differentiated approach in the party work to the accomplishment of the diverse tasks and the ability to detect the main elements and crucial areas and to channel their influence primarily into these areas. They stressed the fact that the most important thing at the present time is to prepare for the 26th CPSU Congress, to achieve greater results this training year than were achieved last year in all areas of our work--combat and mobilization readiness, the training and indoctrination of the personnel, discipline, material and technical support for the training process and the lives of the fighting men. In different subunits and units, naturally, efforts may not be focused upon the same problems at a specific point in time. In some places technical training matters will require intensified work, while elsewhere the unifying of the collective may be an urgent problem. The task of party committees and bureaus is one of insuring that a serious approach is taken to the resolution of every problem which arises, of helping the commanders and party activists correctly to determine the crucial points in their work with the fighting men, of focusing the efforts of the communists and the entire military collective upon those specific matters upon which the achievement of good final results depends.

Combat readiness is the main area of work, one requiring the application of particular effort by the party organizations. For this reason the matter of increasing party influence in this area of the work of military collectives was at

the center of attention in all the meetings and conferences. In their analysis of accumulated experience in party work the communists followed the instructions of Marshal of the Soviet Union D. F. Ustinov, USSR minister of defense, who stressed in his address at the party conference of the Moscow Military District the fact that combat readiness is based on a high level of training for the troops, which demands that the training and indoctrinational process be brought into maximum conformity with combat conditions and that indulgences and simplifications be resolutely eliminated. The principle of teaching that which will be necessary in a war has been and remains the basic principle underlying all the work of the Armed Forces.

The need for a high level of combat readiness on the part of units and ships gives priority in the training of the troops to tasks involved in improving the tactical and fire training and achieving skill in the handling of the combat equipment and controlling the subunits, units and formations in combat. And success in the accomplishment of these tasks, of course, is greatly determined by the professional training and the organizing role of the officers, the majority of which in the army and navy are communists.

Some of the political organs, party committees and bureaus, however, do not involve themselves in matters pertaining to the training of officers as commanders and do not demonstrate principle in dealing with deficiencies in the organization of the training process and ineffectiveness in the classes which they conduct.

At one of the district party conferences the workstyle of the party organ headed by Lieutenant Colonel V. Kochnev was criticized with perfect justification. The political organ has not done a satisfactory job of overseeing the primary organizations and lacks focus in its work with the officers. During the past training year certain of the officers and communists did not fulfill their personal commitments in the socialist competition, achieved poor results in their training as officers, did not bother to improve their professional skill and overlooked defects in the indoctrinational work. The primary party organizations and the political section did not take up these important matters, however. It is no surprise that some of the subunits there failed to fulfill their competition commitments.

This sort of attitude was correctly criticized during the report and election campaign. A determined effort must be made to overcome this deficiency in the work of party organizations, to improve the officer training so that the officers and communists actually perform their leading role in this area.

In their discussion participants in the report and election meetings organically linked the continued improvement of combat readiness to the strengthening of military discipline. And this makes sense. The demands made of combat readiness are growing, as are disciplinary requirements. Such is the dialectic of the Armed Forces' development today. We must therefore never forget about the need to strengthen military discipline, regulation order and organization. This matter must have an important place in all of the organizational, political and indoctrinational work of commanders, political organs and party organizations.

During the reports and elections cases were cited in which certain communists have made statements like the following: Gross violations are isolated incidents and do not define the state of discipline as a whole. Combat readiness is maintained and the combat training plans are still fulfilled. This sort of reassuring but discouraging attitude is harmful, because it does not focus the collective effort upon the determined elimination of those deficiencies in the political and indoctrinational work and in the internal service, which ultimately pave the way for gross infractions of discipline and accidents.

When party-political work to insure a high level of combat readiness was discussed during the report and election campaign many of the communists spoke of the need to increase party demandingness. And this was completely justified. Instructions issued at the November 1979 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee with respect to making stricter demands of every worker for the state of affairs in his section must be applied in all of our work. It would not be an exaggeration, however, to say that laxity can have more dangerous consequences in military affairs than anywhere else.

Commanders, political organs and all party organizations should work painstakingly every day to make the communists more responsible for the quality of the drills and for the way in which they combat shortcomings and attempts to make the situation appear better than it is and to falsify ratings.

The effectiveness of party work is clearly and visibly apparent in the avant-garde role of party members and candidate members. The report and election campaign conducted immediately prior to the 26th party congress added a special note to the collective discussion of the role and place of the army and navy communists. The Leninist rule "Raise the Party Member's Title and Importance Higher, Higher and Higher..." was the slogan for the report and election meetings and conferences.

Every party member and candidate member should commit himself totally to the cause, appraise the results of his own work self-critically and demandingly, always take an active position in life and keep his important title as a communist unblemished. It is only when everyone with the honor of belonging to the combat alliance of communists meets these requirements that the party organization is truly the political nucleus of the military collective. It is important constantly to maintain and develop in every communist a sense of party duty and a profound understanding of the fact that for the communists, as L. I. Brezhnev has said, there are no privileges except for one--to commit oneself more than the others to the common cause, to struggle and work toward victory for the cause, better and harder than the others.

The level of a communist's social activeness is indicated by how well he performs his service duty, takes part in the public-political life of his collective and conducts political-indoctrinational work among his comrades in the service and on the job.

A study of the results of the report-and-election campaign indicates that commanders, political organs and party organizations have accomplished a great deal toward fulfillment of the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological, Political and Indoctrinational Work" and have acquired specific experience in increasing the aggressiveness of propaganda and making it more scientific, and enhancing its linkage with the life of the units and ships, with the specific tasks of the military collectives. An increasing number of fighting men, workers and employees are studying the theory of Marxism-Leninism. It has become the practice to conduct combined political days, which gives the communists in charge an opportunity to study more thoroughly the requests, needs and moods of their men and to take effective and timely political-indoctrinational and organizational steps. The ideological and political material contained in decrees passed by our Party's Central Committee and in the speeches and theoretical works of Comrade L. I. Brezhnev and other leaders of the CPSU and the Soviet State is now being utilized more fully in ideological-political work, which is conducted broadly and continuously in the army and navy.

All of this, however, is only the beginning of the great job of fulfilling instructions provided by the CPSU Central Committee for improving the political-indoctrinational work, for which new horizons will be opened up by the forthcoming 26th CPSU Congress.

It is the task of political organs, party committees and party bureaus to organize the work performed with the propaganda aktiv at a level conforming to today's requirements. Decisions adopted at report-and-election meetings in many party organizations state that it is essential to continue improving the performance of the party education system and to conduct combined political days, so that they are conducted as frank, comradely discussions of urgent matters. Every party organization must live a full and vital ideological life and function as the center of daily ideological and indoctrinational work in their military collective, as the Party Central Committee demands.

Participants in the report-and-election meetings and conferences indicated in their speeches that the unsatisfactory level of intra-party work is directly related to the passivity of some organizations and certain party members and candidate members. This is what reduces the activeness and initiative of the communists and negatively affects the moral atmosphere in the collective and the militancy of the organization. Active intra-party work develops good political and job-performance qualities in party members and candidate members, and a sense of responsibility for the performance of their subunit, unit and ship.

The development of these qualities is a multifaceted problem, a continuous process. It is the duty of every communist to be a political indoctrinator of the masses, a propagandist and a promoter of our party's principles and policy. At the same time, he must also learn from the masses, take their know-how into account and constantly accept the indoctrinational influence of his comrades in the party organization. The system of party assignments for communists and the schooling of party meetings, which develop the ability to resolve matters colectively, intolerance of any sort of deficiencies and the ability to think self-critically and take criticism seriously, are indispensable in this matter.

The development of criticism and self-criticism is actually one of the main ways of effectively combating shortcomings. Many of our party meetings, however, are still not making a profound mark on the life of the organization and are not a school of principles. Even during the reports and elections at some meetings the criticism was anonymous, the causes of shortcomings were not analyzed and ways were not described for eliminating them. To some degree ths was the situation at the report-and-election meeting at which Major I. Kobtsev delivered the report.

The CPSU Rules and Instructions of the CP3U Central Committee to Party Organizations of the Soviet Army and Navy provide broad possibilities for criticism. Despite this, however, there are still instances in which an individual disclosing shortcomings meets with a negative reaction on the part of certain people in charge, motivated by wounded pride, fear of revealing their incompetence in the service, a desire to cover up improper conduct or simply a desire to avoid extra problems.

Any failure by a communist to accept criticism is a major blow at the party organization's activeness. Any suppression of criticism, any violation of the standards of party democracy should cause immediate alarm. In such cases the political organ must put in its important word.

It was pointed out at the report-and-election meetings and conferences that by carrying out instructions issued at the 25th CPSU Congress the political organs have begun overseeing the party organizations more tangibly, improved the training of party activists and stepped up their attention to the performance of evening party schools and universities of Marxism-Leninism. Briefings and seminars for the secretaries of party organizations and party committee members have become a systematic thing in all the districts, groups of forces and fleets. They discuss current problems in the work and summarize progressive experience.

Judging from the critical comments made by the communists at the report and election meetings, however, some political organs are still not providing sufficiently concrete leadership for the primary party organizations, are limiting their activities to brief visits to the units and subunits, and becoming overly involved in the inspection work. Furthermore, they frequently base their assessment of a situation entirely on plans, reports, decisions and resolutions, and not on the actual state of affairs. Mountains of paperwork give some political organ workers the illusion that all is well.

The primary conclusion to be drawn from a summarization of the proposals and critical comments made by the communists on matters of intra-party work is that the political organs need to take a deeper look at the work of every primary party organization and show greater concern for the indoctrination of the young communists and the training of party group leaders, bureau and party committee members in progressive methods of performing political work among the masses. Along with seminars and conferences priority should be given in the leadership of primary organizations to individualized work with the aktiv, and political briefings on the state of affairs, monitoring and verification of the implementation of party decisions must be well organized.

It also needs to be pointed out in connection with this that in order to increase the activeness of the communists in the work of their primary party organization, it is very important to promptly implement the proposals and critical comments made by the communists at report and election meetings and conferences. This is all the more necessary, since the party committees and bureaus essentially have a new membership. Suffice it to say that one-third of all the primary organization secretaries were elected for the first time. These are worthy individuals, who enjoy the trust and respect of their collectives. Many of them are inexperienced, however, and the first step in acquiring experience consists in working to carry out the mandates of the communists. This work is in full swing. Many proposals and critical comments made by participants of the meetings have already been realized. Many of the proposals require prolonged, focused work, however, and this work must be finished.

Combat training is in full swing in the forces and fleets. Personnel of the Armed Forces are advancing toward the 26th CPSU Congress with a thorough understanding of their responsibility for defending socialism's conquests. Soviet fighting men are filled with a desire to greet the congress of their Leninist party with new achievements in the military work and to raise combat readiness in the formations, units and ships to an even higher level. The army and navy communists, political avant-garde of the Armed Forces of the USSR, are leading them toward the pinnacles of combat skill.

Disciplinary Issue Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 25 Jan 81 p 2

[Article by Lt Col A. Polyakov: "A 'Plan' For... The Patrol"]

[Text] Warrant Officer A. Zhuravlev was appointed patrol chief. Officer I. Bannikov, military commandant at the Volgograd Garrison, not only outlined the route for him but even specified how many servicemen he was to arrest. The warrant officer reported this in a letter to the editors.

"I was required to deliver two offenders to the commandant's office and to issue warnings to at least five people for petty infractions," Warrant Officer Zhuravlev wrote.

The fact that the military commandant assigned such a "plan" (it varied, upon the route) that evening was verified by one of the officers, who was also a patrol chief. Bannikov himself did not deny this.

The following day, when the patrol chiefs reported on the performance of their patrol, it was learned that Warrant Officer Zhuravlev had not fulfilled the "arrest plan." Officer Bannikov assessed this as inefficiency and... he arrested the patrol chief himself and sentenced him to 24 hours in the guardroom. Warrant Officer Zhuravlev returned to his unit, however. Upon learning of this the military commandant telephoned the chief of staff, who was acting unit commander. The latter increased the punishment, ordering Warrant Officer Zhuravlev's arrest to be extended to three days.

And this was the incident which prompted the letter to the editors.

The military commandant is well aware, of course, that the so-called "arrest plan" was pure fiction, which distorts the meaning of patrol duty. He still applied the fictitious "plan," however. And then what about the "procedure" used in imposing the penalty. It was not specifically stated why the penalty was imposed. Nor was there a written report on the arrest.

The behavior of the unit chief of staff was also strange. The officer did not consider it necessary to talk with Zhuravlev before announcing his arrest. The punishment was imposed for a "violation of patrol duty." Just what did the violation consist of? The chief of staff could not answer this question. Nor could the military commandant answer it. Incidentally, the patrol was not monitored on the route that evening as specified by regulations.

In short, the punishment was declared in a fit of anger, as they say. Unfortunately, such hasty actions are not isolated incidents. In precisely the same way, in a fit of anger, Bannikov ordered the arrest of another young officer, who was also performing garrison duty. It was later explained that the military commandant had only wanted to "scare" the lieutenant, to punish him as a warning. A strange indoctrination method, to put it mildly.

It would be appropriate in connection with this to mention the demands contained in the Disciplinary Code of the USSR Armed Forces. As a means of strengthening military discipline and the indoctrination of servicemen any summary punishment must be in keeping with the gravity of the infraction and the degree of guilt. Arrest is an extreme measure and is ordinarily only used when other measures taken by the commander (or chief) have been unsuccessful. Another requirement states that when imposing summary punishment the commander must not act with haste in determining the type and the measure of punishment, cause personal humiliation or be rude to a subordinate.

The rules could not be more clear and precise. Undeviating observance of the rules is precisely what makes summary punishment a means of strengthening military discipline and the indoctrination of servicemen. This kind of effect is out of the question in the given case. And disregard for regulations is the reason for this.

As one of the main justifications for the improper actions of those in charge, I was told that Warrant Officer Zhuravlev is an undisciplined individual and has a poor service record. Once again, however, a regulation was not followed. It states that disciplined and demanding servicemen are assigned to patrol duty and that the commanders of the units from whose personnel the garrison patrols are formed are responsible for selecting the personnel and preparing them for the duty. For some reason this was forgotten when Warrant Officer Zhuravlev was assigned to the detail.

Any sort of deviations from regulation order, even the most insignificant, are inadmissible in military collectives. Steps taken to insure the observance of this order, however, must also be in strict accordance with regulations.

Tactical Training for Officers

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 27 Jan 81 p 1

[Editorial: "Officer Training"]

[Text] The success achieved by fighting men of the army and navy in the performance of the tasks assigned the Armed Forces and their fulfillment of socialist commitments accepted in honor of the 26th party congress is determined to a crucial degree by the professional skill and training level of the officers. The nature of the work performed by commanders and staffs in organizing and conducting combat and the methods employed change as means of armed conflict develop and the combat capabilities of formations, units and ships increase. All of this makes it necessary constantly to improve the knowledge and skills of the officers and the methods used for training and indoctrinating the men.

The officer training system contributes to the steady growth of the cadres' professional skill. A great deal is being done in the army and navy to improve the system. A number of formations and units in the Odessa and Volga Military Districts and the Black Sea Fleet, among others, have acquired a considerable amount of useful know-how in this area. Their experience has proved that the officers' skill improves more rapidly where the group exercises, short tactical exercises, drills and other training activities specified in the officer training programs are used most effectively and contribute to the improvement of the officers' practical skills in troop control and the performance of their functional duties, both in the position they occupy and the position one level above that.

Marxist-Leninist training is an extremely important element of officer training. The in-depth study of Lenin's theoretical heritage, the implementation of Lenin's precepts, party decisions and instructions issued by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on defense matters, and the improvement of vigilance and combat readiness have a prominent place in this training. It is the task of military councils, commanders, political organs and staffs to strive persistently for the quality fulfillment of subject-by-subject Marxist-Leninist study plans and the continued improvement of the officers' ideological-theoretical and military-professional level.

Special importance is attached to the improvement of tactical and fire training for the subunit commanders, which comprises the foundation of the field, air, and naval training. Because of this the function of the active training forms and methods is growing. The proper approach is taken in tank regiment "X" in the Belorussian Military District, for example, where last year's training results won them an excellent rating for the tenth time in a row. Most of the officers' training there is conducted in the field, using communication equipment, with practical work on the basic aspects of battle preparations and subunit control and the regular conduct of unscheduled, short individual and group exercises performed with maps or out in the field.

Experience has shown that an officer's tactical boldness and his ability to make well-reasoned decisions independently and without delay in a difficult situation

and to make effective use of organic, attached and support personnel and equipment in a battle depend to a decisive degree upon how thoroughly he knows the combat regulations, manuals and other guiding documents. At the same time, it is important not to permit a gap to develop between the theoretical knowledge and the practical skills. It is the task of commanders to learn how to fight themselves and to teach this to their men. In order to accomplish this it is essential to make active use of examples taken from frontline practice and the extensive know-how produced by the daily combat training, and to create a complicated situation and a climate of great demandingness in the drills and exercises.

The improvement of technical military skills is an important part of the cadres' training. A great deal depends upon the staffs, upon how thoroughly and precisely they plan the work to improve the officers' professional qualifications and how well their independent training is organized and monitored. The experience of outstanding units and ships has proved that every individual who is supposed to have a rating can raise it one level within a period of one or two years. This is a good guideline for all officers.

The continued improvement of combat and political training is inseparably linked to the improvement of the officers' methodological skill. The young officers, who still lack practical methodological skills, require the very closest attention. In the special assemblies, instructional methods and demonstration classes and exercises, methods conferences, exchange attendance at classes and independent work, it is important for them to master the most effective, advanced methods for training and indoctrinating the personnel, especially those dictated by combat experience, practical experience in the conduct of tactical exercises, flights and ocean cruises, and learn how to use simulators and other technical training equipment to create the tension-filled situation of a modern battle and a climate of rivalry in the drills and exercises. Special attention should be given to the officers' training in methods of organizing and conducting tactical training classes, two-sided tactical, special tactical and command and staff exercises, and exercises involving field firing.

The winter training has demonstrated the fact that some commanders and staffs are still not demonstrating enough creativity in the officers' training but are conducting it in a routine and skimpy manner. There are deficiencies in the planning of officer training, the number of activities is increasing and they are not coordinated with respect to time. This is inadmissible. We must step up control over the officers' scheduled training and their independent work, and increase their personal responsibility for their own training. The results of the officer training should be taken into fuller account for making decisions on all matters pertaining to the officers' service.

The party organizations must constantly concern themselves with improving the cadre training. Greater demands should be made of the communists responsible for organizing officer training. At the same time, we need to work harder to develop initiative and party principle in the officers, support their creative investigations, equip them with advanced know-how and hold strictly accountable those who do not demonstrate proper diligence with respect to improving their professional skills.

Continued improvement of officer training will help us to achieve new successes in the struggle to improve the combat readiness of the troops and naval forces.

Problems in Commissary Aired

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Feb 81 p 4

[Article by Col V. Zhuravlev, Red Banner Far East Military District: "Not a Matter of Slush Ice"]

[Text] Respected Comrades

We urge you to come and investigate our complaint. We are outraged at the continuous gross violation of Soviet trade regulations in the garrison store, which is managed by Tamara Grigor'yevna Yatsenko....

The above is an excerpt from a letter signed by V. Rusavskaya, R. Pakhomova, O. Makovkina and others.

It was not an easy matter to reach the small garrison, because of the slush ice. S. Ozhegov's dictionary of the Russian language defines this term as "thin, crumbly ice, which forms prior to the freezing over of bodies of water and during the passage of ice downstream." For the residents of the military post this inescapable natural phenomenon means that from the end of fall almost until January, until the ice becomes solid and stable again, they are cut off from the main part of the country. Naturally, this situation is a major test of the trade worker's ability to provide residents of the post with everything they need.

Unfortunately, this test is clearly too much for some of them. A woman told me: "I have lived at the post through four periods of slush ice, but I have never seen such outrageous trade practices." Another had the following to say: "The slush ice had just formed, but the store was out of flour...." When you add to this the fact that the post rarely receives fresh vegetables, that there are frequent disruptions in the supply of dairy products, even packaged soups, and that these had disappeared from the shelves, then it is clear that the letter received by the editors was not exaggerated. There is an adequate supply of all these products at the base. The store manager did not consider it necessary to determine how much the post residents would need or to lay in a supply.

It is not just the breakdowns in the food supply which disturbs the people, however. The store manager is frequently rude to the customers, and sanitation rules are not always observed in operations under her management. There have also been cases in which customers have been overcharged, prices have been arbitrarily increased, and items have been sold through the service entrance. And the slush ice and other natural phenomena have absolutely nothing to do with this.

Some of those in charge at the post certainly did have something to do with the situation, however. Why is the public control commission not doing anything there. Vera Ivanovna, let us say, or Ol'ga Petrovna buys things out of turn, and there was no one to put them in their place, no one to bring the store manager to account for violating the trade rules. Why does the complaint-and-suggestion book contain entries like the following: "The complaint was reviewed by the unit commander and found to be unjustified"? The signature is that of the political worker. Or the very brief comment: "Complaint unjustified"--signed by Major C. Simikin.

The position taken by the military trade management is equally strange. Acting chief Ye. Anashkina did not try to conceal the fact that the situation at the store is not a normal one, nor the organization of trade, nor the supply of goods. She has a number of "objective justifications" to cover each situation, however: either there are not enough refrigerators or the helicopter was late bringing in supplies. And then, of course, there is the slush ice to blame.

I would like to say in conclusion that a great deal of the blame for what has happened belongs to the senior chiefs, those in charge of monitoring personal services at the remote garrison. Had they taken prompt steps to remedy the situation and had the store shelves not been empty, the customer would have left there in a good mood.

Combat Preparedness Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Feb 81 p 1

[Editorial: "An Important Condition for Combat Readiness"]

[Text] The Communist Party and the Soviet State concern themselves constantly with providing our Armed Forces with everything they need to perform their important task of guarding the peaceful labor of the Soviet people and serving as a bulwark of universal peace.

The equipment and weapons constitute the material and technological foundation for the Armed Forces' fighting power. The combat readiness of the troops and naval forces, as well as the service life and the effective use of the equipment and weapons in drills and tactical exercises, during field firings, on flights and ocean cruises and during the performance of other tasks depend in great measure upon how their servicing is organized and how they are maintained.

The increased combat capabilities and the complexity of modern weapons and equipment, the collective nature of their use and the large volume and diversity of the various technical servicing operations require careful planning, precise organization, irreproachable coordination of action on the part of the specialists and a high level of discipline and efficiency on the part of each one. The commander's technical competence, his knowledge of the specifics of servicing and operating the equipment and weapons and his ability to coordinate the work of his deputies and the service chiefs and to focus their efforts upon improving the professional skill of the personnel are highly important under these circumstances.

The soldiers' level of special training and practical skills in working on the equipment, its exemplary maintenance and servicing are one of the main criteria of combat readiness for the unit or ship. Especially great demands are made of the officers' technical perspective. They must be prepared to master new weapons rapidly, to skillfully train and indoctrinate their men and to develop technical creativity in the latter, directing it toward a search for more effective methods of servicing and using the combat equipment and their adoption on the practical level.

The outstanding units have accumulated a great deal of experience in the training of highly skilled specialists and the exemplary servicing of the equipment and weapons. The antiaircraft missile unit in which Engineer-Lieutenant Colonel Ye. Bogdan serves as officer in charge of weapons is a good example. Its commander, his deputies and the staff devote constant attention to the development of careful handling and love for the equipment in the fighting men and to the organization of socialist competition for the thorough study and excellent maintenance of weapons and equipment and conservation of their service life. The unit has adopted an efficient new technical maintenance system, and specialists with the weapons service thoroughly explain to all of the personnel the peculiarities involved in applying the system under the specific conditions of each subunit and orient the fighting men toward the detection of new reserves. All of this in combination has made it possible to insure good operational reliability for the combat equipment and to conserve almost half of the resources and material means allocated for maintaining this equipment.

There are individual shortcomings, however, in the servicing, maintenance and operation of equipment and weapons in certain subunits and units and on some ships. Not all of them are taking vigorous steps to eliminate these shortcomings and to instill in the specialists a sense of great personal responsibility for the performance of their functional duties. Poorly organized periodic maintenance work and technical servicing, inadequate material and metrological work and the poor professional training of the specialists sometimes result in equipment breakdowns and in a reduction of its service life. This sort of thing is inadmissible. Each such occurrence should be appraised from a standpoint of principle.

The formations, units and ships must exercise effective control over the performance of various types of preventive maintenance and repair work, strive toward full and skillful use of the monitoring and measuring equipment and improve organization in the servicing and operation of the weapons, combat and other equipment. This is a direct duty of the service chiefs and all of the staff and directorate specialists. The deputy commanders for weapons should be assigned a greater role in this matter, and they should be assigned greater responsibility for organizing the maintenance and operation of all types of equipment and for coordinating the performance of technical support tasks.

The CPSU Central Committee's draft program for the 26th party congress states that we must practice strict conservation and economy at all levels of the national economy and increase the stimulating function of technically substantiated standards in this important matter. This party demand also applies to the military collectives. It takes a great deal of materials and labor to

keep the equipment in a good state of readiness and trouble-free operation. Commanders, political workers, engineers and technicians are expected to accomplish the important task of reducing these outlays. Party and Komsomol organizations are expected to see that every communist and Komsomol member sets an example of zeal and desire to keep the subunit, unit or ship at a high level of combat readiness with minimal material outlays.

Many years of experience in the forces has proved that the good qualifications of army and navy specialists and their extensive practical experience make it possible for them to develop improved technical servicing methods and to find new and more effective methods of maintaining and employing the weapons and equipment. This, in turn, makes it possible to reduce the time required to service the equipment and weapons and make them combat-ready, and to conserve the service life of equipment and weapons and materials. This is why the commanders, their officers in charge of weapons and the service specialists must thoroughly study and summarize all innovations contributing to the improved servicing and maintenance of equipment and weapons, and persistently adopt everything new in their practical work.

The effectiveness of efforts put forth by the personnel as they work with the equipment and weapons and the quality of their work depend to a great degree upon the vigor and focus of party-political work. In their efforts to develop a sense of personal responsibility in each fighting man, to publicize technical information and introduce the know-how of the best specialists in the practical work, it is important for the communists and Komsomol members to set an example in the mastery and operation of the combat equipment, in the improvement of servicing procedures and in the competition.

Servicing and maintaining the equipment and weapons in an exemplary manner and finding reserves for extending their service life and methods of employing them more effectively insure the successful fulfillment of combat and political training plans and programs and socialist commitments, and the continued improvement of combat readiness among the troops and naval forces.

Review of Military Press

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 8 Feb 81 p 2

[Article: "Greater Concreteness, Instructional Value"]

[Text] Socialist competition for a fitting reception for the 26th CPSU Congress in the army and navy has developed on a broad scale. It has been given new impetus by the national discussion of the draft Main Directions. As they attempt to fulfill their commitments with honor, the fighting men are persistently perfecting their combat skill and mastering the techniques required to perform skillfully. The communists are in the avant-garde of the competition participants. The results of socialist competition in honor of the Lenin Party's congress are now being summed up in the subunits and units and on the ships. All of this is being described in our army and navy press.

In its articles and reports, number after number, KRASNOYE ZNAMYA, the newspaper of the Red Banner North Caucasus Military District, tells about the heroes of military labor--those excelling in the combat and political training, rated specialists and masters of military affairs. Its front-column reports on the people who are keeping their word are carried under the heading "For the XXVI CPSU Congress--A Fitting Reception!" and under the slogan of this year's competition, "For Good Combat Readiness and Firm Military Order."

The competition is an inseparable part of the training and indoctrinational process and a powerful tool for improving the combat training. And the newspaper orients commanders, political workers, party and Komsomol organizations toward maximum employment of the spirit of rivalry when the fighting men work on their specific combat training tasks and norms.

At the end of the first month of winter training the newspaper published reports on the first competition results. They described the positive things acquired in the units and subunits, criticized the most typical errors and omissions and provided recommendations on the adoption of progressive experience. The newspaper stressed the fact that commanders, party and Komsomol organizations are expected to study more thoroughly the successes and shortcomings of each fighting man, to motivate the personnel to fulfill absolutely their large socialist commitments.

Other items published in KRASNOYE ZNAMYA on the pre-congress competition also exhibit journalistic quest. These include, among others, "Thirty Hectic Minutes," "Will They Be Able To Make It Up..." and "Who Is Your Rival? I Do Not Know." Along with summarizing and publicizing progressive experience, the newspaper also criticizes those whose deeds do not match their words.

SOVETSKAYA ARMIYA, the newspaper of the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, regularly publishes articles on the pre-congress competition and the communists' avant-garde role in it. It has begun publishing a column with the heading "Serve the Homeland According to Lenin's Precepts." An article entitled "We Take Our Example From the Communists" was published in this column in one of the issues. The army communists are at the forward positions, there where success is determined, today, as they always are, writes Senior Lieutenant S. Zolotov. The author gives this example: Fighting men in the company in which Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant A. Yerofeyev, is listed on the roster in perpetuity has accepted large socialist commitments--to retain the title of excellent subunit, to have everyone who is supposed to raise his rating do so; to have every second soldier achieve excellence in the combat and political training; and to achieve total interchangeability in the crews. The communists, led by Senior Lieutenant S. Yeremenko, company commander, are setting the pace in the fulfillment of these commitments.

"Right-Flank Participants in the Competition" is a new, front column carried in all SOVETSKAYA ARMIYA. It carries pictures of those excelling in the combat and political training and of rated specialists—those who keep their word and are devoting a fraction of their work to the improvement of combat readiness in the units and subunits. The content of the reports published beneath the photographs are indicated in their headings: "In the Fore With Respect to Duty," "Military Valor," "Maturation During the Summer Training" and others.

The Guards motorized rifle regiment commanded by Guards Lieutenant Colonel V. Musiyenko was the initiator of socialist competition in the Ground Foces. BOYEVOYE ZNAMYA, newspaper of the Red Banner Central Asian Military District, commendably carries regular reports on the competition initiators, telling how they are progressing with respect to the fulfillment of socialist commitments.

Throughout the month the newspaper has carried reports on how the missilemen, airmen, combat engineers, signalmen and CW troops are fulfilling their commitments accepted in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress, with the slogan "For Good Combat Readiness and Firm Military Order." In the column "Competition: Publicity, Comparison, Experience" it publishes information on the Leninist principles underlying the organization of competition, on competition effectiveness and the adoption of the know-how of the best specialists.

Each of the above newspapers has its own special ways, its own approach to describing the course of socialist competition. They have a common shortcoming, however. The scope and effectiveness of competition depend upon how the Leninist principles for organizing it, including the principle of publicity, are carried out. However, the newspapers write mostly about the results of the competition--"...destroy the target with excellence," "good rating for operating the combat vehicle," "raised his rating," and so forth. They very rarely describe how efficiently and promptly a specific achievement was made known to all the personnel, however, or whether it was repeated by others.

The newspapers, especially BOYEVOYE ZNAMYA, are still rarely illustrating the leading role played by the communists in their reports on the competition. Those ame reports on the fighting men—the airmen, signalmen and CW specialists—which ke up three columns in BOYEVOYE ZNAMYA, do not even mention the word ommunist." It is almost never encountered in most of the reports published under the heading "Right-Flank Participants in the Pre-Congress Competition."

Another major shortcoming of these newspapers is the fact that they rarely write about the work of party organizations, party bureaus and party committees, about how they apply their forms and methods of work to help the commanders organize competition and make it more effective and to strive for a situation in which every communist fulfills his socialist commitments and is in the avant-garde of the competition. In general, party life is described in the newspapers in an ineloquent and unexciting manner.

They are still doing an unsatisfactory job of describing the indoctrinational role of competition and not conducting a vigorous campaign against formalism and bureaucratic rule in the organization of competition and against the practice of making situations appear better than they are. The competition winners are rarely given the opportunity to make a statement. Only from time to time do the newspapers write about how the army cultural and educational institutions are affecting the course of the competition with their methods of work.

It is only a matter of days until the 26th CPSU Congress convenes. It is a matter of honor for the district, group and fleet newspapers to describe and publicize in an intelligible manner the best achievements, the experience of

individual fighting men and military collectives and the avant-garde role played by the communists, and to proceed from a position of principle to reveal shortcomings and formalism in the organization and supervision of the competition. They must describe in an informative manner the essence and the mechanics of worthwhile experience, report on everything which is truly innovative and valuable, and praise each day the heroes of military labor, those who are greeting the Lenin Party's 26th congress in a fitting manner.

Officer Misconduct Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Feb 81 p 2

[Article by Lt Col B. Karpov: "I Can Apologize..."]

[Text] Captain V. Zenin left Lieutenant Colonel M. Kanivets, his commander, totally upset. He had just received word of his father's death and he needed to leave for home immediately. Lieutenant Colonel Kanivets, however, began reproaching him for the fact that the officer had recently been granted a short leave because of family matters. A telegram had arrived in the unit stating the Captain Zenin's father was critically ill. The telegram had not been properly validated, however, and Lieutenant Colonel Kanivets refused to fill out travel and leave papers for the officer. He had to submit a formal request. When the approval arrived, Zenin was granted a short leave. At that point the captain had no complaint about his commander: Order is order, and it should be observed. But why were they causing him problems now? After all, the telegram reporting his father's death had been validated according to all the rules.

Zenin was finally granted a short leave. The red tape caused him numerous problems, however.

This incident to some degree illustrates Lieutenant Colonel Kanivets' workstyle. He talks about the need for consideration for the personnel, for their needs and requests. In fact, however, he concerns himself little with the improvement of morale in the collective and is abrupt, rude and tactless with his men, a fact reported in a letter to the editors of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. I visited the unit and became convinced that the criticism was justified. In the process of checking out the criticism I also unearthed other facts indicating major deficiencies in Comrade Kanivets' performance.

He once summoned Senior Lieutenant N. Voytenko, finance service chief, and asked him to allocate money to acquire a cover for a passenger car. The finance chief explained that there is no provision for allocating money for such purchases.

"Do as you are told," Comrade Kanivets told him.

Naturally, the order was carried out. The very first audit brought out the illegal purchase of the automobile cover, however.

Another time Senior Lieutenant Voytenko "displeased" his commander by expressing doubt about the propriety of soldiers working at the local fruit tree nursery. The finance chief was motivated by the fact that he could find no trace of the money the soldiers earned.

Lieutenant Colonel Kanivets was also unhappy with Senior Lieutenant Voytenko, when the latter inspected a warehouse and failed to find any major deficiencies. Comrade Kanivets then ordered Senior Lieutenant V. Slyuzko to inspect the warehouse again. To make it clear to Slyuzko why he was doing this, Comrade Kanivets told him frankly: "Do what is necessary to see that Soviet Army employee V. Zhuravlev is fired"! Senior Lieutenant Slyuzko finished the job and reported: "Everything is in order at the warehouse. I could only find one thing wrong: The gas range delivered to your apartment has still not been paid for."

Naturally, Lieutenant Colonel Kanivets has not liked Senior Lieutenant Voytenko and Slyuzko since then, and they have more than once been the target of his insulting comments.

The other officers also had numerous complaints.

Lieutenant V. Samuskevich looked me up before I left the unit. I learned that a few days prior to this he had sent a letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. The letter contained a complaint about Lieutenant Colonel Kanivets. One day he ordered Lieutenant Samuskevich to buy some fat meat and sausage to supplement the diet of the soldiers and sergeants. The officer carried out the order. The food was used by Comrade Kanivets for other purposes, however. When the receipt was discovered during an audit, Lieutenant Samuskevich was required to pay the amount spent on the purchase. Lieutenant Colonel Kanivets declared that he knew absolutely nothing about the food items.

I had a thorough talk about everything with Lieutenant Colonel Kanivets. He made every effort to ease the assessment of the shortcomings in his workstyle.

Nor did Lieutenant Colonel Kanivets see anything unusual in the fact that he had gone on leave with official transportation papers and had used a service vehicle to travel to a sanatorium.

When I mentioned his rudeness to subordinates, Comrade Kanivets said:

"Whom have I offended? I can apologize...."

Naturally, he could apologize to those whom he has unjustifiably offended--this is the officer's personal affair. I believe, however, that the senior commander and the political organ will take a standpoint of principle for appraising both Comrade Kanivets' rudeness and lack of tact and the incidents involving his abuse of position.

Follow-Up Reports on Problems

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Feb 81 p 4

[Article by Col A. Shanayev: "And What About Checking?"]

> [Text] Dear Editors! I read in your newspaper that the statement of the reason for my discharge from the Armed Forces had been changed by order of the commander of the Red Banner Ural Military District. I was encouraged and wanted to return to the army. When I was shown my personel file at the military commissariat, however, I was amazed: Nothing had been changed. What about the truth?
>
> Warrant Officer (reserve) N. Gorshkov

The background for the situation is the following. Warrant Officer N. Gorshkov, former chief of the clothing store, discovered a significant supply shortage when he took over the job from his predecessor. This fact was established in a proper report. For reasons unclear, however, the clothing service chief, now Captain A. Shutov, and Major V. Puzanov, deputy regimental commander for rear services, failed to take effective steps for a long time to make up the shortage. And N. Gorshkov wrote a letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. The subordinate's "disobedience" was clearly not to the liking of Major V. Puzanov, and at his personal initiative a case was hatched up for Warrant Officer Gorshkov's early release into the reserve for acts allegedly disgraceful for a serviceman. This time, the "response" machinery went into extraordinarily smooth action: The facts had not even been verified before the discharge order had been signed.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA printed a critical article on the matter in its 9 February 1980 issue: "...Something was fishy." When it published the first response to the steps taken in the case on 1 April 1980, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA stated that unfortunately "the incident had not been appraised from a standpoint of principle" and expressed the hope "that the district political directorate would take another look at the issues raised in the report and take effective steps to prevent such incidents in the future."

The political directorate did take steps. A specially created commission investigated the situation and established the fact that the incidents had indeed taken place. "Based on the results of the investigation," the second response stated, "an order has been issued by the district commander," in which the officials involved have received summary punishment "for the formal and unobjective handling of the warrant officer's discharge" and the statement giving the reasons for Comrade Gorshkov's discharge from the army has been changed.

According to the official reports, this would appear to be the end of the incident: Those to blame had been punished, and justice had triumphed. What would a check on the situation show, however?

Upon receiving the letter from N. Gorshkov, I visited Bezhitskiy Rayon in Bryansk, where his family now lives, or more precisely, "huddles together," in a room of his parents' apartment. Major I. Kamchatkin, a worker with the rayon military commissariat, and I went over the personal file once more. The file indicates that the warrant officer was discharged from active military duty on 22 January 1980 for acts disgraceful to a serviceman. Unfortunately, nothing is said about changing the statement on the reasons for the discharge. It was necessary to go to Sverdlovsk, to the headquarters of the Ural Military District.

I shall not give the dates or the numbers of the "incoming" and "outgoing" papers. I shall say only that the political directorate had reported correctly in its second response: The order had been issued, and those to blame had in fact been punished. The problem, however, lies in the fact that a copy of this order was not attached to the warrant officer's personal file. It "stayed" among the volumes of official correspondence in the regiment in which N. Gorshkov served.

Why did this happen? Was it an accident? Let us not be hasty with our conclusions. Let us turn to the facts.

This is the first fact. Warrant Officer Gorshkov's last efficiency report, which was written up by Major V. Puzanov himself, does not say a single positive word about the warrant officer's service or other qualities. The author of the report was generous in his selection of derogatory epithets written in the most negative manner possible, however. And the special commission from the political directorate, with good reason, therefore arrived at the conclusion that "unverified facts distorting the warrant officer's performance in the service" were used in writing up the efficiency report. The regimental command committed important violations in the very process of writing up the report. The efficiency report was not written by the warrant officer's immediate superior but by Major V. Puzanov, deputy regimental commander for rear services, who exhibited bias in appraising his subordinate's actions. I might say at this point that Comrade Puzanov was immediately transferred to another unit and then expelled from the CPSU for improper, personal moral acts.

The second fact: Lieutenant Colonel S. Goncharov of the district personnel section and I talked with the commander and with Major V. Puzanov, his deputy, at regimental headquarters. We inquired as to why copies of the latest order were missing from the warrant officer's personal file.

"We did not know where he had gone, although we tried to find out," came the brisk answer, which almost carried conviction as to the correctness of what had been done.

What could we say to this? We had only to drive to the military commissariat, where Gorshkov's personal file had been sent following his discharge—a trip of some 20 or 30 minutes—and everything became clear: For almost a year (up to the time it had been requested from the Bezhitskiy Rayon Military Commissariat in the city of Bryansk), the personal file had lain there where it was addressed. How then could they say that they "didn't know"? Obviously, they simply did not

want to know! Was not the same bias mentioned in the conclusions drawn by the commission from the political directorate not involved here in a more veiled, vindictive form? Otherwise, how does one explain the fact that Warrant Officer Gorshkov was even refused the travel papers to which he was legally entitled?

It has long been observed that bias in people immature but vested with power frequently turns into arrogance in situations of conflict. And the arrogance ordinarily creates an "itch" for administrative action. This administrative fuse sometimes sets off in such officials a desire to demonstrate their "power." I am convinced that this explains why the copy of the order from the district commander with respect to Warrant Officer Gorshkov was not delivered to its proper destination.

Collective as Integration Means

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 15 Feb 81 p 2

[Article by Capt A. Koveza, security company commander, Group of Soviet Forces in Germany: "Friendship Makes the Collective Strong"]

[Text] Not long ago I was checking on the performance of guard duty by the sentries. Visibility was so poor that night that it would have been difficult to make out anyone approaching the forbidden zone at the distance indicated in the instructions for the posts. Private 1st Class Sergey Perin and Privates Nikolay Martynchuk, Fayzulla Nabiyev, Tsovendi Mirzoyev and Ashir Orazmuradov, who were on duty at the posts at that time, noticed the approaching inspectors in time, however, and acted as one, in strict accordance with the regulations.

I had the impression that it was the same soldier on duty at all of the posts, so identically smooth were the actions of all the sentries. This impression was reinforced when in accordance with an unexpected, hypothetical situation, the duty officer gave the order: "Turn out the guard"! The personnel at the guard station instantly found their weapons and lined up by number. The actions of Private 1st Class Grigoriy Sichkarenko and Privates Mavlenkul Telemishev, Sergey Yelanidze, Nikolay Shevelev and Stanislav Zapinsky, like those of the sentries, showed the same sort of smoothness and uniformity.

The guards froze in formation. They looked alike in their dashing erectness, neatness and readiness for action.

I then understood the reason for the similarity. Serving together, the surmounting of difficulties and the performance of a common, difficult combat task of guarding the airfield—all of this had welded the young men wearing the soldier's shoulder-straps, with different personalities, of 10 different nationalities and coming from various parts of our country, into a single combat family, a monolithic military collective.

New soldiers arrive in the company twice a year. At first they have a poor knowledge of the manuals and the operating principles of the weapons, regulations

governing military courtesy or the peculiarities of guard duty. Private Ashir Orazmuradov, a native of sunny Turkmeniya, was just such an inexperienced soldier quite recently. In addition, he barely spoke Russian. This did not last long, however. Private Tsovendi Mirzoyev, an Azerbaijani, helped Ashir learn the Russian language, study a political map of the world, learn the manuals, the operating principles and techniques for handling the weapons, helped him to become an excellent soldier. There are many such examples in the company. And the results of this friendly mutual assistance are evident. It was this friendship uniting the efforts of the fighting men, which has helped the company to achieve difficult goals in the socialist competition and to retain the title of excellent subunit four years in a row. After discussing the tasks for the new training year in the squads and platoons, the airmen accepted even larger commitments. They are greeting the 26th CPSU Congress with continued improvement in their combat readiness and with firm regulation order.

These things have been achieved as a result of goal-oriented indoctrinational and organizational work by the commanders, party and Komsomol activists. They strive continuously and vigorously to apply communist moral standards and regulation principles in the life and relationships of the fighting men.

The results of political-indoctrinational work cannot be described with figures. The success of this work depends to a considerable degree upon the prestige of the indoctrinator, upon his ideological-political maturity, moral purity, military and technological perspective, organizational abilities and his tact as a commander. After all, the conduct of the officers and warrant officers in a company, their professional skill, good ideological conditioning and active stance in life serve their subordinates as an indoctrinating example, as a graphic model for the performance of their military duty.

In their painstaking, day-to-day work with the men, the subunit commander and political worker try to reach each of the men, to influence all of them. This makes it possible to develop wholesome public opinion in the company, which has a great deal to do with increasing the activeness of the fighting men and the organization, discipline and solidarity of the subunit, with the way in which the assigned tasks are performed. And this is important. V. I. Lenin himself pointed out the need to increase attention "...to that everyday aspect of intra-factory, intra-village, intra-regiment life, which has the most to do with the building of the new, where the greatest need for attention, publicity, public criticism, the ferreting out of the unsuitable, a call to learn from the good."

The desire to appraise specific events and developments from a standpoint of communist morality is also developed in the process of meetings, public debates and evening discussions of special topics. After all, there is an exchange and frequently, a conflict, of opinions when topics are discussed. It is important that these activities take place in a climate of criticism and self-criticism based on principle. A Komsomol meeting on morality, military culture and the discipline of Komsomol members, a debate on the subject "There Is Always Room for A Real Feat In Life," and evening discussion on the subject "Friendship Makes

the Formation Strong" and a discussion of I. Stadnyuk's book "Voyna" [War] were conducted in the company in precisely this sort of atmosphere.

We ordinarily use the public opinion of the collective for condemning the disciplinary infractions of individual soldiers. Private S. Sayenko was negligent in his performance while on duty at the KPP [traffic control post]. Private M. Ivakh was unkempt at a morning inspection. At a meeting the company fighting men sternly condemned this conduct on the part of their comrades and demanded that they change their attitude toward their duties, toward the service. Naturally, in order for such a meeting to be a real indoctrination school, careful preparations must be made for it. After all, one cannot count on the collective "to straighten out the situation itself." Privates 1st Class V. Pokryshchenko and S. Perin and Privates Yu. Popov and G. Kobel'chuk considered all the facts and prepared themselves carefully, and their talks at the meeting were therefore convincing. We expected that Private A. Savitskiy would take the floor and try to justify Private S. Sayenko's actions with the excuse that the KPP duty man has a difficult job. He had apparently come to understand a great deal, however, and refrained from speaking.

In order to unite the fighting men into a solid collective, consideration and support must be given to each man's desire to establish himself, to be a good influence on his co-workers.

The problem of strengthening the collective is a multifaceted one. It is not possible to cover everything at one time. I would like to see articles in the newspaper about the work performed by other commanders to unite the collective--for example, how they use socialist competition and visual agitation for this purpose, as well as other forms and methods which they consider to be effective in this complex and important work.

Commander Qualities Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Feb 81 p 2

[Article by Lt Col K. Kin: "Spiritual Contact"]

[Text] The Party and its Central Committee place great demands upon the performance, moral-political and ethical qualities and the workstyle of the leaders. It was pointed out at the 25th CPSU Congress that a leader in any area is required to take into account sociopolitical and indoctrinational factors, be sensitive to the personnel, to their needs and requests, and set an example in their work and their daily lives.

These party demands fully apply to the military cadres. Reality is constantly demonstrating the fact that when a commander persistently improves his workstyle and constantly engages in self-education, he is more successful with the tasks involved in training and indoctrinating men and in organizing competition.

Lieutenant Colonel I. Chernilevskiy has a reputation as this kind of skillful, experienced commander. I recall one of my meetings with him. We had an ordinary

conversation, not remarkable in any way. There was something in that talk, however, which brought out even more the nature and the specific features of his workstyle.

I recall half-jokingly scolding the officer: "You haven't called headquarters in a long time, Igor' Prolovich. Don't you have any urgent problems"? His answer was the following: "If I ask for help with every pressing matter, what would there be for me to do"? To make sure that I understood him, he smiled meaningfully and added: "But when I really need help, I won't hesitate to ask for it."

I won't deny that it was nice to hear these words. Those officers and communists who perform their functional duties with a great sense of personal responsibility, in the party manner, deserve a great deal of respect. Unfortunately, however, some officers devote little attention to improving their workstyle and to their self-education, and attempt to justify shortcomings with objective reasons.

I won't name names, but there is such an officer in our collective. He has a superb knowledge of both the equipment and tactics, and he does not want for energy or equanimity. Along with his considerable merits as a commander, however, he also has features which appear minor and harmless on the surface, but which actually cause perceptible harm to both the officer's service performance and his personal authority.

I once summoned this commander—his men had violated guard duty regulations—for a thorough report on the causes of the infraction and on the steps which had been taken. The officer turned the conversation to something entirely different, however. He began to complain—about supply and about the poor training of his assistants. It seemed that everyone else was to blame, while he who had the main responsibility was only the recorder of events.

There are other deficiencies in this leader's workstyle. For example, he does not pay adequate attention to the opinion of his immediate assistants, to their advise and suggestions. And it is difficult for one person to cover all of the areas of work, to make decisions on everything.

We thoroughly criticized this officer. We immediately added, however, that we have confidence in his abilities as a commander, in the fact that he would be able to accept the criticism from a position of principle and derive the necessary conclusions.

In order to demand principle, objectivity and intolerance of shortcomings from subordinates, one must possess these qualities himself. One cannot hide from others the fact that his words and his actions do not coincide. And the individual who sets out on a path of dishonorable acts, concealment of shortcomings and misrepresentation of situations invariably loses spiritual touch with the men, which is detrimental primarily to service interests, to the indoctrination of the personnel.

Naturally, a commander can have shortcomings along with his good qualities. But why do some of us always spot and severely criticize the weaknesses of others, while we consider our own, if we notice them at all, to be "petty," no cause for alarm? Is this attitude as harmless as it might appear at first glance?

A subunit, let us say, is headed by an officer who is good in every respect except for one character flaw--a hot temper. Can we give such a commander a positive rating? The answer might appear to be yes. Such an officer can mistreat a subordinate "in a fit of anger," however, and then try to justify this by saying: "That's just the way I am."

This is "strange" logic: I have good points and I have the right to have shortcomings. This is not right, however. An officer has no right to justify his deficiencies. After all, they affect the mood of the personnel and harm morale in the collective.

My thoughts go back to Lieutenant Colonel Chernilevskiy. A great deal could be said about his remarkable qualities as a commander. First and foremost, of course, is his thorough understanding of the men under him and his ability to smoothly organize the combat training and socialist competition, to establish exemplary regulation order in each section and the best possible morale in the collective as a whole.

What accounts for the spiritual, personal charm of Lieutenant Colonel Chernilevsky, a communist, the moral purity of his actions? I believe that it is primarily his good ideological-political conditioning and his profound understanding of the responsibility with which he is charged. With all his strictness and intolerance of even the slightest lack of organization, Lieutenant Colonel Chernilevskiy is unusually courteous, kind, sincere and attentive to suggestions from the men. This is why his firm will and great demandingness do not discourage initiative in his men. On the contrary, they encourage it and develop in the personnel activeness and the ability to make decisions on their own. He never conceals a resentment against anyone, leaves nothing unsaid and always states the truth, no matter how painful.

To me, these are the distinguishing features of a real military leader. Yes, Lieutenant Colonel Chernilevskiy does not call headquarters for every little thing. In his opinion, difficult matters exist for the purpose of testing one's independence on himself and on his subordinates.

Lieutenant Colonel Chernilevsky knows how to rely upon the party organization. Whenver a difficult and important task has to be performed the commander consults the communists, listens carefully to their opinion and advice, and carries out all of the valuable proposals. The communists make an important contribution to the successes achieved by their subunit, to the establishment of a wholesome moral climate in the collective.

The subunit which Comrade Chernilevskiy took over several years ago was already an outstanding one. It had been commanded by Officer B. Bogaychuk, also a determined, industrious and experienced commander. The subunit was used as an example at all of the meetings and conferences.

It was not so easy to maintain that level of excellence. Lieutenant Colonel Chernilevskiy coped with the task, however. He did more than that--adopting all of the best things from his predecessor, he went even further, united the collective even more solidly and gave greater freedom for initiative and creativity on the part of the personnel. Igor' Frolovich began at the very first service conference by stating that he had special respect for those who performed with initiative and creativity, have their own opinion on matters of principle and defend it with good reasoning. The commander made it clear that such an officer is far more valuable than one who tries to figure out what his superiors want, performs passively and waits for instructions from above in every situation.

This honorable and principled attitude brought rapid results. It produced the proper reaction in the officers and warrant officers, the party and Komsomol organizations. It was as though the personnel had received an additional charge of creative energy and enthusiasm. Their attitude gradually developed to the point at which the individual was happy to carry even the greatest load and performed the most menial job with love.

This is the entire "secret," all the reserves, by means of which the subunit commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Chernilevskiy has become a leader in the competition and is greeting the 26th party congress in a fitting manner.

Unfortunately, some commanders will serve for years and continue to look down on the men. This kind of officer is always pleased with himself, although he is not always right. Why does this happen? Because he considers his purely human qualities to be above those of his subordinates. Because he does not really understand the fact that such conduct is detrimental to his prestige, creates an attitude of passivity and a fear of making independent decisions in his men and in the final analysis, restrains and hampers the entire collective.

Ask Lieutenant Colonel Chernilevskiy to name those on whom he relies, those who help him the most, and he will name names (and not only of officers and warrant officers, but of sergeants and privates as well) until you ask him to stop. He will say in conclusion: "They all make an important contribution to the overall success." Another officer will stop after two or three names. And those officers whom he names could demonstrate far greater initiative and creativity if the commander trusted them more openly and turned to them for advice. Take Major I. Gritsyuk, for example. This officer has an excellent knowledge of the equipment and is a specialist first-class. The men respect him and are drawn to him. Comrade Gritsyuk's commander, however, treats him with caution and sometimes does the job for him.

I had a good reason for discussing the workstyle of the two commanders. I wanted to illustrate the advantages held by the officer who (all other conditions being equal) is able to establish a close rapport with the men.

We know that when Vladimir Il'ich Lenin was working to create the Red Army's first subunits, he devoted careful attention to the indoctrination of commanders. The leader of the revolution provided a great deal of wise advise about how to find and develop workers upon whom one could rely, who would never go against their conscience, never be afraid to admit to any sort of difficulty, never fear any sort of struggle to achieve a goal assigned in earnest.

We need constantly to return to this wise advise from Lenin as we work with the cadres. We need to take steps to see not only that every commander is an efficient and creative individual, but also that he have good moral virtues and political discernment, know how to make the men like him and be able to put down hypocrisy and toadyism.

The human being constitutes the commander's main field of work. Ordinarily, the individual is educated and cultured. This is why the commander must be not only an excellent military specialist, but a psychologist, sociologist and pedagogue as well.

All of us officers need to concern ourselves with the main and most important thing--seeing to it that strict, unflexible demandingness in the commander is always combined with humaneness, with concern for the personnel, for their needs and requests. No two commanders are alike. However, every commander has an obligation to engage persistently in the self-education, to develop the very best qualities in himself, to turn the best side of his soul, figuratively speaking, toward the men. This will invariably produce new successes in the work performed with the men and in the improvement of combat readiness in the subunit and unit.

Military Training for Teachers

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 1 Apr 81 p 2

[Article by Col B. Nikolayevskiy, senior officer with the extra-service training department of the Red Banner Odessa Military District, and Lt Col V. Shevchenko: "Future Military Instructors Study Here"]

[Text] A training battle was developing on the verdant spring field. The crackling of machine gun and sub-machine gun rounds resounded in the air. The extended line rolled rapidly toward the "enemy" strongpoint. It was obvious that the attackers did not need to learn military science. In fact, all of the first-year students at the Nikolayevskiy State Pedagogical Institute imeni V. G. Belinskiy, who would soon become military instructors at various schools, were all reserve servicemen.

"It is still interesting," student N. Timchenko, a junior sergeant in the reserve, said with a smile. "After all, we served in various branches of troops. For example, I commanded a squad of chauffeurs. 'Combat coordination' was absolutely essential...."

A full 80 percent of the future military instructors are yesterday's junior commanders. Senior Sergeants (reserve) N. Leshchenko and P. Yeremchuk were deputy platoon commanders, while Senior Sergeant (reserve) N. Goroshko commanded a tank . Missilemen, antiaircraft gunners, scouts, sailors.... The most diverse military specialties are represented among those who developed a desire to devote their future to indoctrinating the upcoming generation, to training the youth for military service, to defend the homeland. There are many communists among those who have chosen to become instructors of initial military training and physical education. In short, the students here are mature people who have received an education in the school of life in the military formation.

We had the opportunity to talk with many of the instructors. They were unanimous in their opinion of the new students at the institute: Youth with military bearing will make good teachers. The future military instructors in the schools have a sense of responsibility and discipline. Even in the student dormitory, they told us, it is impossible not to notice that the residents were recently in the military. There is strict order throughout. ("We do not forget our first sergeants," said Private 1st Class (reserve) A. Nikitin, former gunner. You get used to military order. It's in your blood.") Those who are studying to become military instructors live the lives of ordinary students, of course. They study all of the subjects without which it would be difficult to imagine a worker in the field of public education. They never forget the fact, however, that along with their diploma they will receive the rank of a reserve officer and the right to wear a military uniform.

This is why the future military instructors' classes in their specialty are conducted with the "military day" system. From morning until evening that day, they wear clothing of protective color, march in formation, salute and observe regulations when addressing the instructors. We saw them on the drill ground and in the classroom, where the first-year students were taking tests on the arrangement of firearms and working on the norms for dismantling and assemblying a machine gun and a sub-machine gun.

The teachers in the military department attempt to give the future military instructors methodological skills, as well as knowledge. The department is staffed by veteran officers. It is headed by Lieutenant Colonel I. Bugayevskiy. He graduated from the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze and commanded a regiment. Lieutenant Colonel A. Morozov, training unit chief, served for a long time at a formation headquarters. His expertise in staff work acquired in the forces help him a great deal in the planning and organization of the training process. Lieutenant Colonel I. Strikha commanded a training battalion before joining the department. Major V. Golovko commanded a training company. While maintaining close contacts with the district units, the officers and instructors persistently study the methods employed at the higher school, summarize experience in initial military training in the schools, maintain contact with public education agencies and exchange pedagogical and military literature.

Many of the problems in the military department have still not been completely resolved, however. It is still not able to take full advantage of the assistance provided the institute by the district staff: There is not enough room to house

the training equipment and military equipment models allocated for the institute by the district headquarters. There is an urgent need for the institute's own field training facility. The drills have to be conducted on a tactical field which does not belong to the institute, and this entails a number of difficulties. The motor vehicle training needed by a military instructor has still not been set up.

The military department enjoys great prestige at the institute. We feel, however, that it still does not enjoy the independence granted to the other departments. There is no party organization in the department, which includes many communists.

We feel that it is time to speed up the summarization of experience accumulated by the military departments of pedagogical institutes. Many issues need to be studied and discussed by the collective. The special training program, for example, does not include classes on various formal ceremonies, the designing of visual agitation, the organization of paramilitary games and assemblies, lessons on valor, and so forth. And this is an important part of the military instructor's work, after all.

Institute graduates with degrees as instructors of initial military training and physical education will be sent primarily to schools, vocational and technical schools and tekhnikums located in rural areas and in workers' settlements. It is up to them to make an important contribution to the accomplishment of the task advanced at the 26th party congress—to develop out of the student youth a generation of people who know the job, who love to work and know how to work, and are always prepared to defend their homeland.

Shortcomings in Komsomol Work

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Apr 81 p 2

[Article by Capt S. Kalinayev: "...And the Komsomol Members Stayed Out of It"]

[Text] It all began with a letter to the editors—alarming, calling for action. The young officer reported that in his opinion he had been treated unfairly. A strict reprimand had been issued to the lieutenant, which was entered in his record, and he was relieved of his duties as secretary of the Komsomol organization. He was also given summary punishment.

I found out at the site that the facts were consistent with reality, so to speak. A reprimand had been issued, and other penalties had been imposed. The only discrepancy I found was some doubt about the word "unfairly" used by the officer in his letter. Because... But let us start from the beginning.

The quiet of evening had settled over the post. The poignant sounds of a song could be heard coming out of the Lenin room. A concert was being transmitted by television. Private Volodin had a heavy heart, however. He was sitting in the barracks, painstakingly sewing a collar lining onto the uniform jacket of Junior Sergeant Samost'yev. One might have thought that the junior sergeant had become disabled and asked the first-year soldier to perform this perfectly understandable, human request. Nothing like this had happened, however. Perfectly healthy, the junior sergeant was working a crossword puzzle in OGONEK. He had indeed asked Volodin for the favor, without even saying "please." Samost'yev had simply handed the jacket over, with the simple order: "Sew it on"! No more and no less than that.

The Komsomol meeting turned out to be a joyous event for Lieutenant Vladimir Polishchuk. When his comrades all raised their hands to vote in favor of the secretary, he had experienced, as he himself said later, a sincere desire to work, to lead the youth toward something great and important. Many of the Komsomol members recalled Polishchuk's statement at that time that he considered it one of his main duties to involve himself deeply in the service and the lives of the fighting men.

Words are one thing, however, and deeds another. It is hard to believe , but one cannot ignore the fact that Polishchuk knew about the incident with the collar lining. Furthermore, he was a witness to it.

"I was walking through the barracks one time," Polishchuk told me, "when I noticed the soldier sitting there. He was wearing a uniform jacket himself and was sewing the collar lining onto another. I asked him what he was doing. He told me that this was his second uniform jacket. So I left it at that. I was walking through the barracks another time, when I saw the same thing. I walked up to the soldier and pulled out the tag. It contained Samost'yev's name....

Let us interrupt Polishchuk's story and try to imagine the situation. The look of bewilderment on the lieutenant's face, the soldier, red from embarrassment, his eyes downcast.... Let us take a close look at this situation, because it is perhaps at this moment that a large problem began to develop. Then and there, before he left the place, Polishchuk should have clarified the situation, talked with the men and taken some sort of steps. Naturally, he should have informed the subunit commander. However... the lieutenant rubbed his forehead as though to erase his growing alarm, returned the uniform jacket to the soldier and moved on....

The minutes of the Komsomol bureau meetings were thorough and precise. The agendas were important and serious: work forms and methods, the avant-garde role of the aktiv.... The personnel had worked hard and resolved many problems—this was apparent. They failed to deal with only one, an extremely important one—especially at that particular time—interrelations among the fighting men. They passed over instances of gross violation of the principles and standards for these interrelations.

And there were such instances, albeit isolated, and the Komsomol activists were aware of them. Someone asked a second-year soldier to make his bed; someone was sent for cigarettes.... The Komsomol organization ignored all of this.

One might reason, of course, that a soldier's arm will not fall off from sewing on a collar lining for someone else, that a soldier will not suffer from a stroll after cigarettes. This is most likely the way Polishchuk was thinking, and he put himself at ease: What was there to be upset about?

It would no doubt be correct to say that such "trifles" build up, one on top of the other, and became fertile soil for the following incident: Private A. Vshanov committed an extremely gross infraction. He violated the laws governing our army comradeship.

People have different ways of reacting to negative developments, of course. It might be belligerent opposition, for example, direct connivance, neutrality or some other reaction. But don't we have the right to ask ourselves how one should rate the performance of a Komsomol organization secretary, who knew about these incidents, which were unpleasant, to put it mildly? Since he knew about them, he should have done more than simply react. He should have done everything possible to understand the people's frame of mind, to help the commander and the party organization prevent a repetition of the incidents.

The secretary's position itself predetermines the rating of his actions: Polishchuk kept silent and did nothing, as though everything were smooth and quiet. Unfortunately, the other members of the Komsomol bureau also failed to do anything.

When I think about the possible causes of such a miscalculation on the part of the activists, I naturally try to understand the logic behind their actions, or more correctly, their lack of action. In all probability, the comrades reasoned that the situation in the subunit as a whole was no cause for alarm, that the incident was an isolated one, an exception. This was absolutely true. To justify their continued passivity in this way would be absolutely incorrect, however. Incorrect, because against this backdrop of "well being," these "unimportant incidents," which failed to attract the attention of the Komsomol members, stood out with special clarity and definition. Left without proper action on the part of the aktiv, they did influence the morale and moods of the people, no matter how slightly. We absolutely cannot pass over such changes. Action is needed, immediate action! And we need to do more than just declare open war against shortcomings. It is no less important to purposively indoctrinate the youth in our best army traditions--mutual assistance, strong friendship and a desire not just to advance oneself but also to help the less experienced colleagues, to bring them up to our own level.

And there have been many such examples of precisely this kind of relations among the fighting men in the life of the subunit. Relations, which provide a model and a standard for our army.

Everyone knew where Private Lipach was spending his free time, for example. At his own initiative he was teaching the young soldiers, sharing with them his know-how in servicing the combat equipment.

Sergeant Litnevskiy (a second-year soldier) approached the commander and requested to be assigned a detail instead of Junior Sergeant Zastavnyy, who had only recently entered the service.

"It is his birthday," Litnevskiy explained, "and there is no one to replace him."

Polishchuk and the entire aktiv should have publicized examples like this, and there are dozens to be found, to establish a spirit of collectivism and comradeship in the subunit. Examples like these should be used for teaching the men.

It would perhaps be useful at this point to switch our discussion from the moral plane, so to speak, to the purely service, legal level. We know, after all, that the life of every fighting man in the collective is strictly governed by regulations, which define with absolute accuracy and precision the standards of conduct for military personnel. The entire spirit of the regulations absolutely rules out even the slightest humiliation of an individual, any attempt to infringe upon his rights. Relations among the fighting men are based upon mutual respect, kindness and a readiness to come to the aid of a comrade at any time. This is on the one hand. On the other, the Disciplinary Code of the Armed Forces of the USSR states that special attention should be given to the prompt clarification of causes and the prevention of infractions by subordinates, to the development of intolerance for infractions of military discipline.

The Komsomol activists should have supported and done everything possible to establish precisely such strict regulation relations in the collective. They should have established them by carefully studying the men, by restraining certain soldiers from making improper moves, at the right time, by eliminating the very soil which might nurture even slight infractions of discipline.

Let us return to Lieutenant Polishchuk, who was primarily responsible for orienting the aktiv toward precisely such an approach to the indoctrination of the fighting men, for using various forms of Komsomol influence to make certain that every individual felt a sense of personal responsibility for the state of military discipline and for the creation of a wholesome moral climate in the collective. He was responsible for seeing to it that there were no indifferent, inactive people among those carrying a Komsomol card. Unfortunately, this was not done. And when one of the negligent soldiers deviated from the requirements contained in the regulations and violated discipline, the Komsomol members stayed out of it. As we can see, the position taken by the secretary himself was no better. Was it an accident that he "overlooked" those alarming signs, those incidents discussed above? There can be only one answer to this question: No, it was no accident. And it was not simply a matter of his lack of experience or competence as a Komsomol leader. The reasons for the officer's failures and errors lie in his personal qualities, his very attitude toward the service.

Everyone understands that an individual called upon to indoctrinate others must set an example of morality and service performance. Otherwise, the very essence of indoctrinational work is distorted. This is an axiom. Polishchuk himself did not always set a good example in his conduct and his attitude toward the service. This and a great deal more was discussed at a Komsomol meeting, at which the personal file of Komsomol member Polishchuk was studied. This time as well, he did not understand anything, or did not want to understand. When everyone voted to relieve Polishchuk of his duties as secretary and voted to issue a strict reprimand to him, which was to go into his record, he felt that here at this point, an injustice was being done. Later, at home, his resentment took the form of a letter to the editors....

What I have described happened a long time ago. It served as an important lesson for Polishchuk. He thought about many things and reexperienced them intensely. He is now a subunit commander. He is closer to and more concerned with the men, because he understands that success in the overall job depends precisely upon them, upon each individual.

Despite this, I consider it necessary to return to all that happened in the subunit. I returned to it, in order to illustrate what can result from seemingly insignificant changes in the mood of the men, which are not detected promptly. And how much it means for an individual to be light and bright of heart at the sounds of a good, poignant song.

Party Work, Economy, Problems

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 4 Apr 81 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen N. Chebotarev: "The Communists' Opinion"]

[Text] The work procedure established at a party meeting had to be abandoned: Immediately after the report was presented by Captain V. Nikiforov, secretary of the subunit party organization, the chairman was forced to announce a break. No one there wanted to speak.

During the break, the secretary, disturbed by such an unexpected turn of affairs, approached first one communist and then another.

"Romanenko," he said, "why didn't you say anything? Don't you have any problems in your subunit"?

"I have problems, but what is the point of talking about them? It won't make any difference. Nothing is going to change."

"What do you mean, no point in talking about them?" the secretary said as he began to simmer. "Stop thinking like that, Romanenko. Otherwise, I am afraid it might become necessary for you to render a report to the bureau."

The first to request the floor after the break was Senior Lieutenant A. Romanenko. He was followed by Major A. Solodov, Warrant Officer A. Trofimov...seven people in all. Captain Nikiforov brightened up perceptibly. His efforts had not been in vain: Although there had been a brief hangup following the report, the meeting as a whole had taken place "at the proper level."

An instructor with the political section, who was present at the meeting, formed a different opinion, however. Important matters in the life of the collective were discussed at the party meeting. And there were certain things which required joint consideration. For the third year in a row the subunit had been "marking time," so to speak, achieving mediocre results. The last inspection had revealed major deficiencies in the organization of the training and indoctrinational process and the competition. One could not say that the party organization was truly disturbed about the situation, however. Some of the communists lacked a sense of responsibility and the ability to critically appraise their own work and the achievements of the entire collective, and their public-political activeness was poor. Despite this, these matters were not discussed at the meeting. The talks were delivered mainly for "points," one might say: Since the secretary had personally asked the men to speak, they needed to do so...

Senior Lieutenant Romanenko had already brought out one of the causes of the passivity in the communists: "There are problems, but what is the point in talking about them"?! In fact, many of the issues raised at previous meetings had simply been written down in the minutes, and no more. Romanenko, for example, had one time suggested that specific steps be outlined to insure that the communists set a good personal example in the strengthening of discipline. At that time he mentioned Senior Lieutenant A. Silak, who was not especially demanding of himself. As a result, the senior lieutenant's men frequently violated military discipline. The bureau members had a talk with Senior Lieutenant Silak and reproached him for his behavior. What changes were made, however? Practically none. Now, a year later, Communist Silak was still failing to set an example of good organization and efficiency. His subunit was in last place in the unit.

Another example: When the subunit specialists perform periodic maintenance work on the equipment they frequently come up against a lack of organizational coordination: Now the personnel in another subunit failed to provide them with materials when they need them, now there is a delay with the delivery of equipment. And the other subunit has countercomplaints. It was suggested that a "round table" meeting be convened to discuss this situation and eliminate the friction in the relationships between the two collectives. The communists did not pass a resolution on this suggestion, however. Is it any wonder that the communists gradually lost their enthusiasm for speaking at meetings about deficiencies and unresolved problems? After all, the matter most frequently never went beyond the point of talk.

When one thinks about these incidents, considers them from the high level which we have reached today, from the standpoint of the demands set forth at the 26th CPSU Congress, one feels particularly that each of us needs to use stricter

measures for assessing the work of the party collective. The congress set important tasks for the party organizations, and in order to accomplish them it is essential to take a critical look at the forms and methods used in our work, to achieve a situation in which every primary party organization truly becomes a center of daily ideological and indoctrinational work.

This is a perfectly concrete concept, and how it is implemented is demonstrated by how militant the party organization is, what sort of outlook on life each communist has and the degree to which he shows himself to be a fighter for the party. These qualities are developed by the entire structure of life in the collective and depend to a considerable degree upon the state of intra-party work, upon the extent to which issues brought up for discussion at the meetings are resolved in a serious and principled manner. It is the meetings which bring out the collective intellect of the organization and develop singleness of opinion among the communists, and in the meetings where the collective will takes the form of party law as expressed in the decisions adopted.

"The work of party organizations cannot be truly effective," states the Accountability Report to the 26th CPSU Congress, "if the party members attend meetings only to sit out the required number of hours and listen to speakers selected in advance."

The main cause of this situation lies in poor party leadership of the primary organizations, which, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has stressed, must be vigorous and competent

The party committee members in this unit were not aware of the real state of affairs in the subunits and did not know about the situation which had developed in the party organization headed by Captain Nikiforov. Their knowledge of the situation came mainly from the minutes of meetings and bureau sections. And with respect to paperwork, the bureau secretary had everything in complete order. Furthermore, he reacted immediately to every instruction from the party committee--and I should say that many of them were issued. Again, however, he reacted with more paperwork.

"Unfortunately, it was noted at the 26th party congress some people have still not grasped the simple fact that the art of leadership does not lie in the proliferation and waste of instructions on every single matter. After making a decision, we need to see that it is carried out absolutely and within the time specified. Stepped-up control should contribute to this matter."

The paperwork style of leadership has given rise to a paperwork style of reporting, and the latter has, in turn, produced passivity and indifference in the people. It would be difficult to expect militancy and initiative on the part of the communists, if their suggestions essentially receive no attention. Self-critical, demanding scrutiny of what has been accomplished is particularly important now, during the period of stepped-up activities on the part of party organizations to implement decisions coming out of the 26th CPSU Congress. Even

in those collectives in which things are going well, it is always possible to improve them. It is important just to listen attentively to the opinions of the communists, to study them and to implement all of the serious and valuable suggestions.

The matter of conservation came up at a party meeting in one of the units. It seemed that all existing reserves had already been used, and a certain amount of success had been achieved. Despite this, the party committee, of which Major N. Kuz'min is a member, decided to take a closer look at the problem.

At his initiative a commission was created, consisting of specialists from the various fields. They were assigned the task of looking into matters of a thoroughly special nature: Had automatic regulators been established throughout for adjusting fuel consumption in accordance with the surrounding temperature, had all of the boiler units been completely adjusted in accordance with the operating charts, and so forth? The communits proceeded from the assumption that the struggle for conservation and thrift is a political as well as a technological task. The organizational work was set up on this basis. Lectures and talks were conducted in the subunits, personnel meetings were held, and classes were conducted for instructing the men on methods. During the competition the idea was conceived to set up personal scoreboards for the specialists, which would show the results of the struggle for conservation for a shift, a day, a week. Steps were outlined for publicizing progressive experience and the fulfillment of commitments as the competition progressed.

Everything was not accomplished at once. A study made by the party committee showed that certain communists in charge were not demonstrating proper concern for increasing conservation. These leaders were asked frankly why they were not fulfilling the party decision.

The issue raised by the communists at the meeting was extended into the performance of the entire collective and produced a campaign to conserve fuel and electric energy, which made it possible to reduce consumption by 20 to 25 percent. On 18 April an unpaid communist day of work in honor of the 111th anniversary of V. I. Lenin's birth, the unit fighting men decided to use the resources saved in April to perform the jobs.

Knowing how to listen to people, to utilize public opinion in the work and a desire to implement valuable suggestions and to strive for the realization of critical comments and the fulfillment of the decisions made--without these things it is inconceivable that the party organ, party committee or bureau could be successful in the development of public and political activeness, initiative and creativity in the fighting men.

Training Shortcomings Noted

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Apr 81 p 1

[Editorial: "Successfully Conclude the Winter Training"]

[Text] What needs to be done to see that the remaining days of winter combat training are used to maximum effect? What steps must be taken in order to fulfill training plans and programs and socialist commitments, completely and well? These questions are traditionally on the mind in every unit, on every ship, in the spring, when the end of the winter training is approaching. This year, however, they are being asked with special urgency. Fighting men of the army and navy, like all the Soviet people, are living under the profound effect of decisions coming out of the 26th CPSU Congress. All of their efforts and plans are aimed at making a worthy contribution to the fulfillment of plans adopted at the party forum. Speaking to the homeland's glorious defenders from the speaker's platform at the congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev expressed his confidence that they will continue to reliably protect the peaceful, creative labor of the Soviet people. Soviet fighting men see their duty as one of responding with practical deeds to the high rating given the Armed Forces of the USSR at the congress and of working tirelessly to strengthen their combat capability--a solid blend of good technical equipment, military skill and indestructible morale. It is the primary task of the homeland's armed defenders to reach the first summation point in the life of the army and navy since the congress, with good results, to successfully conclude the winter combat training.

There is great intensity, smooth organization of the military work and a determined struggle to fulfill the competition commitments in many units and on many ships today. In recent practice drills, for example, good tactical and fire training was demonstrated by the personnel of motorized rifle regiment "X" of the Southern Group of Forces, especially by the battalion commanded by Guards Major P. Zakhar'yev. After taking a critical look at what they had achieved, the personnel found new reserves for making the training process more intensive and made an effort to see that every drill is conducted with even greater precision, using advanced methods. The unit has worked out well the pertinent items in the training plan and is successfully fulfilling the socialist commitments.

The situation is not like this everywhere, unfortunately. Some subunits, units and ships have fallen behind in the realization of their plans and programs, and there is a danger that they will not achieve the goals set in the competition. Such deficiencies are a result of poor organizational work by individual commanders and of their poor sense of responsibility for the assigned job.

It is not easy to catch up after one has fallen behind, of course. It would be a great error, however, simply to accept a lag which has been detected, to fail to do everything possible to rectify the situation, to make maximum use of the time remaining and pull the weak elements up to the level of the others. This is presently one of the prime concerns of commanders, political organs and staffs.

It is important to study carefully each such situation, to demand that the commanders of the lagging subunits make a determined effort to improve the organization of the training process. Naturally, demandingness and strict control must be combined with tangible practical assistance, with a desire to teach the people how to correctly supervise the combat and political training, how to achieve maximum results with minimal outlays of effort and means.

A great deal will depend upon the officers sent from higher headquarters and political organs to carry out the inspections. It is their service and party duty to appraise what has been achieved, objectively and from a standpoint of principle, guided by state interests and the demands of modern combat. All of their work in the units and on the ships is expected to serve as an example of efficiency and the ability to recognize innovation. It should provide the personnel with new stimulus to seek more effective ways and means of intensifying the training process, perfecting training and indoctrination methods and making the competition more effective.

The conclusion of the winter training marks an important stage in the All-Army Socialist Competition for the achievement of new successes in the combat and political training this training year. Today, the competition slogan: "For Good Combat Readiness and Firm Military Order!" has an especially mobilizing ring to it. The competition results for the winter training period must be summed up efficiently and thoroughly everywhere. And the process should be based upon the fact that the main objective of the competition is to achieve good end results in the accomplishment of combat training tasks and the tasks involved in improving the training of the troops and naval forces and improving the quality and effectiveness of the personnel's training and service, and to successfully fulfill the tasks set by the minister of defense for the 1981 training year.

When we sum up the results of the competition we should name the winning squads, crews, teams, subunits, units and ships. We also need to mention those who have failed to fulfill their commitments. We must thoroughly disclose and eliminate the causes of the shortcomings. It is important to evaluate the work of every fighting man according to its merits, to tell every individual exactly what contribution he has made to the overall cause and whether he has taken advantage of all possible reserves to improve his combat skill.

The prompt and efficient summarization and application of progressive experience is a prime task. For this purpose it is important to get maximum results from the period of preparation for the summer combat training, particularly the training methods assemblies scheduled for this period. We should already be thoroughly planning steps to improve the training materials base.

Rallying the personnel to successfully conclude the winter training is one of the most important areas of party-political work. A good personal example on the part of the communists and Komsomol members is a tested means of achieving this goal. Guided by the requirements set forth at the 26th CPSU Congress, political organs and party organizations are expected to do everything possible to raise the responsibility of all communists for the end result of their work, particularly for a successful conclusion of the winter training.

It is the patriotic duty of every fighting man, of all Armed Forces personnel to complete the winter training period with good results.

Discussion of Legal Responsibility

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Apr 81 p 2

[Article by Col Justice A. Frolov, judge advocate for the Leningrad Garrison: "...They Decided Not to Report It"]

[Text] Trouble occurred unexpectedly. That dark October evening the soldiers and sergeants were watching television, when the lights suddenly went out in the barracks.

"Hold on a minute," Private Toyvo Potsep reassured his comrades and began rapidly to dress. Taking his tools and a flashlight, he ran outside to correct the problem.

He first entered the compartment with the electric power panel, turned off the main switch and hung up the sign: "Do not turn on! Repair work under way!" Prior to being drafted into the army Toyvo had worked as an electrical engineer on a large sovkhoz, so that he was quite familiar with the job which he was undertaking. Now he located the end of a broken wire. When the soldier was almost finished reattaching it, however, someone approached the switchboard and... turned on the main switch....

It was an extraordinary and distressingly absurd incident. Even the veteran workers with our judge advocate's office simply threw up their hands, so to speak. Such disorganization and carelessness--and in an outstanding military unit known beyond the garrison for its regulation order and discipline!

In view of this there was even more reason to make a thorough study of all the circumstances surrounding the incident and to discover the causes and the conditions as a result of which a soldier was almost killed. And once a shaky circle of even the more absurd circumstances has closed just once, who can guarantee that the same thing will not happen again somewhere else?

What is important in this case is the fact that the idea of preventing additional errors by analyzing a given, specific accident is contained in a large number of Soviet laws and military regulations. Among other things they specify the action to be taken by those in charge in connection with accidents or crimes. For example, the Internal Service Regulations require that in such cases the unit commander immediately report them to the senior commander (or chief), inform the judge advocate and instigate criminal proceedings (order an administrative investigation). When there are especially serious consequences the unit commander is required to participate personally in the investigation of the occurrence.

Who needs all of this and why could not be more clear, one would think. In reality, however, even the most obvious things sometimes do not appear so to everyone. The most unexpected reasons "prevent" some commanders from acting in strict accordance with the law, with regulations.

It was the following day before workers with our judge advocate's office learned about what had happened in unit "X." We placed a call to them and asked what was going on. "We decided not to report it," the confident voice said over the phone. "You know yourself that no one would have done this deliberately. It was an accident...."

How did someone's deliberate action come into the picture?! And how could he talk about it in general, if it was still not known who had turned on the switch. Investigative agencies exist, after all, in order to establish the truth....

A military investigator left for the unit that very hour. Despite the fact that time had been lost, he managed to clear up many things. He learned that it had been a long time since the personnel in the unit had been reminded of the procedure established for correcting malfunctions in the electric power system, and practically everyone had unlimited access to the switchboards. This is why it did not occur to the victim himself that he was leaving open the electric power control compartment not along the fence of a farm or in a cowbarn as he had done on his native sovkhoz, but in a populous area. In this situation it was also easy to understand the actions of the soldier who turned on the switch. The investigation identified him, of course. He had also been trying to find out why there was no light in the barracks and naively assumed that he had found the cause. All of this was pointed out to the unit commander and his deputies. Proper steps were also taken in other garrison units, military educational institutions and establishments. There is confidence that the correct conclusions have been drawn universally from the sad event of last fall.

I would like to get back to the "position" taken by the commander immediately after the incident, however. He is an experienced and demanding officer, and it is difficult to agree that he could not have properly assessed the situation and the importance of scrupulously investigating it to prevent repetitions. "An accident.... Too late to do anything about it...." How out of keeping with the image of an officer are these words spoken by way of justifying his decision not to inform the judge advocate of the incident. I believe there were more reasons than one for this decision.

First of all, I see the inability of a military leader to properly handle an unpleasant incident as one reason. It is his service and public duty not to lament a coincidence of circumstances but to attempt to overcome them. The first thing the officer should have thought about after taking emergency action to save the individual was the fact that television sets were on in all the unit Lenin rooms, that many, many servicemen there and far away from the unit were picking up an electric iron or an electric guitar at that very moment. How could they be helped to avoid accidents? Could they be taught, using his own bitter experience?

It is interesting that safety measures were discussed in all of the classes involving weapons, combat and other equipment in the unit, but they forgot to talk about the need for such measures at home. And was this the only such unit?

I would add the fact that the vast majority of our officers are well aware of the importance of progressive experience, that they seek it out and successfully adopt it. But negative experience also has to be considered in life. We must not wait until something happens in our unit, until someone somewhere has already consumed the bitter brew of experience. The price of waiting is too great. Despite this, however, not all of accidents by far are studied by all officials concerned. Why does this happen? It occurs to a large degree because unpleasant events are not given proper publicity. And how can we have publicity, when some commanders, even within their own garrison, consider it "improper" to speak about their omissions. In any case, they say, steps will be taken to prevent a repitition of this or that accident in the unit, but the blemish on the commander's reputation may remain for a long time.

This is an incorrect, erroneous attitude! And the superior commanders, political workers and we military legal workers are apparently going to have to work hard to overcome this sort of delusion. All the more, since one frequently encounters situations in which certain people in charge attempt to cure problems with "home remedies," without "outside" interference--in my view, without assistance.

As an example, Colonel I. Volodin, chief of the training department at one of the military schools, once received a report that some expensive equipment had been lost. Instead of immediately organizing a search for the culprits, the officer tried to cover up the occurrence and issued orders... to write off the equipment. I recall another incident--this occurred at another garrison--in which a malicious violator of public order was sent by the commander to guardroom "for deviating from the daily routine."

It is farthest from my mind to talk about such actions on the part of those in charge who interfere with the establishment of the truth. The legal workers finally discovered the violator of public order, and we found the stolen equipment. For an inexcusably long time, however, conditions conducive to new infractions of the law existed in the unit, at the educational institution, and people had already begun to think that the law is indifferent to such activities. Suffice it to say that by the time the military investigator arrived to talk with Colonel Volodin, the latter was short, in addition to the equipment, cameras, movie cameras, amplifiers and videotape recorders, and some people at the school frankly doubted that all of these thefts would be investigated.

In short, a commander's failure to carry out regulation requirements and his duties as an investigative agent is detrimental to the moral climate in the collective, interferes with the proper organization of indoctrinational work with subordinates and damages the authority of the leader himself.

Unfortunately, a commander's improper reaction to a certain incident is sometimes a result of erroneous decisions by superiors, who sometimes penalize both the guilty and the innocent for what has happened--"as a warning." But the effectiveness of actions is certainly not determined by the severity of the punishment but by the creation of conditions preventing a repeat of the errors.

I recall once discovering that some coal was missing at a depot (where I was stationed before): The depot was not guarded, and anyone who wanted it could take the coal. After the judge advocate's office took action I asked the garrison commander what steps had been taken. He told me that everyone had been punished and that the weighers had been fired. I asked about a fence. I was told that they could not obtain the materials to build a fence....

Blanket punishment, on the other hand, usually dampens activeness on the job and the commander's demandingness and adherence to principle. It may even prompt the immature commander to deliberately conceal infractions of the law. Incidentally, it is one of the most important principles of Soviet law that when determining punishment, the degree of an individual's c bility must correspond exactly to the seriousness of his crime. I believe t l commanders and chiefs should be reminded of this more frequently.

It goes without saying that any incident is unpleasant for the individual in charge, for the commander. It is also a test of his maturity and his adherence to principle, however. His actions should be determined only in accordance with the law and with regulations. When this is true, I am confident that he will not be tormented by futile doubts as to whether or not he should report what has happened. As a result, there will be fewer calls of alarm to the judge advocate.

Review of Rybalko Biography

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Apr 81 p 2

[Review by Col Gen A. Zvartsev of the book "Marshal Rybalko" by Lt Gen Tank Trps S. Mel'nikov, Politizdat Ukrainy, 1980, 256 pages]

[Text] Marshal of Armored Troops T. Rybalko, who commanded the 3d Guards Tank Army during the war, did not manage to write his memoirs before his death. The readers have therefore demonstrated even greater interest in the book "Marshal Rybalko" by Hero of the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General of Tank Troops (retired) S. Mel'nikov.

The book covers the entire life of the army commander. The process of development of the communist and military leader is revealed to the reader. T. Rybalko was active in the civil war, later serving as military adviser in China. While at this post he did a great deal to help the Chinese people in their war of national liberation against the Japanese aggressors.

Pavel Semenovich Rybalko's talent was brought out especially clearly at the post of commander of the 3d Guards Tank Army, which made a worthy contribution to the achievement of victory over the German fascist invaders. Formed in the summer of 1942 it traveled a long, difficult and glorious route. The army took part in many frontal offensive and defensive operations, fighting on the most important axes. It crushed the Hitlerite invaders near Kozel'sk, in the Voronezh-Khar'kov sector, in the Kursk Battle, in the Left-Bank and Right-Bank Ukraine, in southern Poland, in Germany and in fraternal Czechoslovakia.

P. Rybalko carefully studied the war and derived conclusions from every battle. He devoted much time and effort to the training of commanders for the army and constantly taught them the art of maneuvering. The book tells how the army led by him carried out a brilliant march along the Dnepr, from the Bukrin to the Lutsk bridgehead. No less impressive was the maneuvering of the army's units near L'vov. "Don't look back, don't be afraid to have exposed flanks," the army commander taught the corps and brigade commanders. "Overtake the withdrawing Hitlerites to the west, smash their rear service forces and disorient their headquarters. Forward and only forward." Marshal of the Soviet Union I. Konev, commander of the 1st Ukrainian Front, told Rybalko more than once: "I know your ability for lightning maneuvers, Pavel Semenovich, and I am counting on you." And one maneuver followed another. In Silesia at the height of the fighting the army turned back from the north to the south along the eastern bank of the Oder and forced the enemy to abandon the Silesian industrial region. It then performed a 250-kilometer march to a spot near Breslau (Wroclaw). From there it carried out a rapid assault and struck at the enemy's flank to the west of Breslau.

Rybalko was attentive to the men, but he was also demanding of them. He boldly supported decisive and bold commanders. It was not just coincidence that such remarkable commanders as twice Heroes of the Soviet Union A. Golovachev, Z. Slyusarenko, D. Dragunskiy, I. Yakubovskiy, V. Arkhipov, S. Khokhryakov and N. Goryushkin developed in the 3d Guards Tank Army.

The author describes how Rybalko paid constant and close attention to troop control, while keeping an eye on logistical support for the forces. At crucial times he ordered the state of support for army operations to be checked and took determined steps to make it possible for rear service echelons to advance without interruption to the combat formations of the troops.

The author tells us how the army commander scrupulously studied the officer cadres and assessed them rigorously prior to appointing them to a post.

P. Rybalko placed great value upon political work in the forces. He himself devoted a great deal of effort to political work, willingly addressed the subunits and talked with the soldiers and commanders. He always supported the political workers, who considered it their duty to be among the troops at difficult times. This is well illustrated in the book, using the example of the battles fought for Kiev.

The book describes with great skill and artistry the role played by P. Rybalko in the final stage of the Berlin Operation, in the regrouping of the 3d Guards Tank Army near the city of Riza and in the swift attack upon Prague between 6 and 9 May of 1945.

After the war Marshal of Armored Troops P. Rybalko became commander of armored and mechanized troops of the Soviet Army. This part of his career is also fittingly described in the book.

The book about twice Hero of the Soviet Union, Marshal of Armored Troops P. Rybalko is informative and interesting. The author has succeeded in providing an accurate image of one of the Soviet military leaders, one of our homeland's devoted sons. It describes the tank army's performance in frontal offensive operations, especially in its march-maneuvers in the L'vov-Sandomir, Vistula-Oder and Prague operations. The book extensively describes the heroism demonstrated by our soldiers, sergeants and officers.

Physical Training of Troops

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Apr 81 p 1

[Article by Col V. Gavrilin: "Singleness of Purpose"]

[Text] In the exercise, the subunit of signalmen commanded by Captain I. Glushkov had to make a long march, at night and in bad weather. Low-hanging clouds covered the land, rain alternated with wet snow, and the roads had turned into mire. Despite all this, the subunit arrived at the designated area on time, deployed from the march and provided stable, uninterrupted communication. When he summed up the results the superior commander commented particularly on the signalmen's physical and special training.

When Captain I. Glushkov was asked to tell what had gone into the successful performance of his men, he mentioned, among other things, singleness of purpose, physical conditioning, mass sports activities and regular workouts by the fighting men in the applied sports, particularly radio sport. And it was certainly just coincidence that primarily the rated sportsmen excelled in the exercise. They included Sergeants A. Zaytsev and I. Andrusiv and Warrant Officer V. Yeremchenko. Radio sport has a place of special prominence in this excellent subunit. Almost all of the soldiers engage in this sport. The officers set the example, and the party and Komsomol organizations devote constant attention to large-scale development of the sport. It should be pointed out that the good results in radio sport were achieved as a result of good, general physical conditioning.

Radio sport is regarded as an important means of improving the signalmen's combat training not just in the subunit commanded by Captain I. Glushkov, but throughout the unit. The commander, the political workers and the party organization saw in this sport, with its unvarying features--rivalry, publicity, comparability of results, determination of the strongest and the lagging participants, and its

emotional aspect--as a powerful means of accustoming the fighting men to additional drills, which would improve the signalmen's skill and help them to improve their mastery of their combat specialties. Upwards of 30 percent of the unit personnel now regularly engage in radio sport. The soldiers include highly skilled specialists. Warrant Officer N. Velikanov, a master of sports, is a four-time champion of the Armed Forces in the "fox hunting" competition and won first place in one of the exercises in the All-Union competitions. Warrant Officer S. Gnevashov, also a master of sports, is the district champion and was first-place winner in the Ground Forces.

In addition to radio sport, other sports with military application, which help to develop the qualities and skills essential to signalmen, have developed broadly in the unit. These include skiing, cross-country running and gymnastics, as well as short forced marches, sports games and military relay races, which include elements of combat training. All of this in combination makes the mass sports work more goal-oriented and brings it into greater conformity with the combat training requirements. Incidentally, the rated sportsmen in the unit train primarily in the applied military and technical types of sports.

Socialist commitments in sports accepted by the signalmen for the winter training period have been fulfilled. A full 86 percent of the personnel are rated sportsmen (almost one-fourth of them with a first-class rating) and 83 percent are holders of VSK [military-sports complex] badges. To be sure, there were many difficulties to overcome. The main problem was the lack of a gymnasium. This primarily affected the soldiers' work in gymnastics. It was feared that many of the soldiers would not be able to meet the VSK standards or to fulfill their socialist commitments. A solution, albeit not entirely satisfactory, was found, however. At the suggestion of Captain V. Medvedev, a member of the sports committee and a candidate master of sports, gymnastic equipment was set up in the barracks. Now anyone who wanted to could work out on a horizontal bar.

In view of the lag in gymnastics, the gymnastic facility in the unit was put into shape in good time, and at the first breath of spring the practice was transferred there. The time allocated for mass sports work was also used for workouts. All of this helped to close the gap in gymnastics.

The unit sports committee had a strong aktiv, without which it is doubtful that real mass participation could have been achieved. And the officers set the pace. Senior Lieutenant I. Kapliyenko, a subunit commander and candidate master of sports, is on the football team, for example. Captain G. Legkobyt, who has a first-class rating, helps the weight lifting and direction-finding sections. There is an unusual aspect to these activities in the unit. Mass sports work is carried out not only with the personnel, but also with members of the servicemen's families, especially the teenagers. The military signalmen have set up a radio sports section at the local school, which is supervised on a volunteer basis by Warrant Officer N. Velikanov and his wife, N. Velikanova, who is a candidate master of sports. Around 20 students are involved in the section.

A great deal has been accomplished in the unit during the winter training period, but there is even more to do. For example, the morning calisthenics must be improved and made more effective, and the methods used in the section and team activities must be improved and all the personnel must be involved in them. The practice of combining concomitant training deserves serious study. There are considerable unutilized reserves in this area for the signalmen. Some of these do not depend entirely upon the commander or the unit sports committee, however. There is not enough methodological literature, for example, on the physical conditioning of signalmen and the selection of applied sports most needed by them. I believe that scientists at the Military Institute of Physical Culture could make an important contribution to the resolution of these matters. Specific experience in mass sports work acquired in other communication units could be used with considerable benefit. The dissemination of this experience would help to develop mass sports more rapidly and improve the signalmen's physical conditioning and combat training.

Draftee Benefits Described

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Apr 81 p 4

[Article: "Benefits for Draftees"]

> [Text] Readers N. Vinogradov, V. Kravchenko and others have asked for information on the procedure for drafting the youth into the Soviet Armed Forces and on draftee benefits.

Under the Constitution of the USSR universal military duty is the law, and military service in the Armed Forces of the USSR is the honored duty of Soviet citizens. Active military duty must be performed by all of our country's citizens, regardless of racial or national origin, religion, education, social status or status with regard to property.

According to the Law of the USSR "On Universal Military Duty," citizens are drafted for active military duty annually, twice a year (in May-June and November-December, and also in April and October for forces located in remote and certain other areas) at the order of the USSR minister of defense. In the year in which citizens are drafted into the active military service they cannot be discharged from their job at the instigation of the administration, with the exception of individuals who systematically violate labor discipline.

After the draft order is issued by the USSR minister of defense, each conscript reports to his draft center. Precise reporting dates are specified in orders issued by rayon (or city) military commissars and are announced in personal notices sent out by the military commissariats.

Heads of enterprises, establishments, organizations, kolkhozes and educational institutions are required to release draftees from the job (or training) for the period of time necessary for the call-up, to recall draftees from temporary work assignments and see to it that they report on time at the draft center. Blue- and white-collar workers, kolkhoz workers and students are granted leave for

the call-up period, during which time they continue to receive their average earnings or stipend (if they are receiving one).

Upon being hospitalized they are issued a medical certificate authorizing them to receive social insurance through the normal channels.

Upon leaving the job individuals drafted into the active military service receive payment for unutilized leave time and severance pay: Blue- and white-collar workers receive the amount of their average earnings for two weeks; kolkhoz workers on kolkhozes using the system of payment by the workday are paid an amount equaling half their average monthly earnings, calculated according to the number of days worked and the plan valuation of a workday, and on kolkhozes using the daily wage system--an amount equaling half their computed, average monthly earnings; VUZ students and individuals studying at secondary specialized educational institutions and all types of schools, as well as young specialists absent from work as a result of their induction into the army, are paid an amount equaling half their monthly stipend (if they are receiving one) out of the educational institution's funds.

Citizens who have reached the age of 18 years are drafted into the military service. Military educational institutions accept 17-year-olds. Students at military schools are considered to be on active military duty and enjoy all of the benefits established by law for servicemen called up for regular military duty. Individuals permitted to take the entrance exams are granted leave time to report to the military educational institution to take the exams. They retain their position and average earning at their place of work for the time required to take the exams. The trip to and from the military school is paid by the state. Those accepted at a military educational institution, like those drafted for active military duty, receive severance pay.

Military personnel have all the rights and duties of citizens of the USSR. According to the conditions under which they are performing their military service, their rights and duties are established by the Law "On Universal Military Duty" and by military regulations.

Servicemen on active military duty retain their housing, and their names may not be removed from the lists of those in line for housing. Extra housing area resulting from the induction of a family member for active military duty is paid for at a single rate throughout his regular service and for six months from the day of his discharge into the reserve. The families of servicemen retain departmental housing obtained through a labor agreement of the draftee. Such families cannot be evicted by court decision, without being provided with other housing. Time served in the Armed Forces of the USSR is added to the total length of service, and to the total length of uninterrupted service if the time elapsing between the individual's discharge from the military service and his return to the job has not exceeded three months, not counting the travel time required to reach his permanent residence.

The wives of military personnel on regular duty must be provided with jobs no later than one month from the day they submit a request for work. Within that same period their children must be assigned to nurseries or kindergartens, regardless of their departmental affiliation.

The ispolkoms of soviets of people's deputies are required to look after the families of servicemen and to take steps to see that current laws on benefits for such families are strictly observed.

Books on Legal Issues Reviewed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 9 Apr 81 p 2

[Review of books on legal issues by Col Justice (reserve) V. Maslov, doctor of legal sciences, and Col Justice A. Khalin: "The Constituents of Firm Discipline"]

[Text] Intensive combat and political training is under way in the units and on the ships. Inspired by decisions coming out of the 26th CPSU Congress, commanders, party and Komsomol organizations and all of the personnel are striving persistently to improve the combat readiness of the forces. Firm military discipline and smooth regulation order are one of the indicators of the subunits' unity and good combat readiness.

It is therefore perfectly understandable why the readers are interested in literature on discipline and military order. Recently, various publishers have released several such books. Special mention should be made of books and pamphlets dealing with key issues of discipline and military law and order, specifically--those reviewing the constitutional principles underlying military discipline, the development of social activeness in the military collectives, the maintaining of regulation interrelations in the collectives and organization of the work performed to insure that regulation order is not violated during the performance of combat duty.

The book "Zashchita sotsialisticheskogo Otechestva" [Defense of the Socialist Homeland] by Lieutenant General of Justice G. Bushuyev, candidate of legal sciences and chairman of the Collegium for Military Cases of the USSR Supreme Soviet, which was published by the "Moskovskiy rabochiy" publishing house, discusses in detail the constitutional principles underlying Soviet military discipline, explains its conscience nature and convincingly demonstrates the inseparable link between the combat readiness and the combat capability of the troops and the state of discipline among the personnel. The author analyzes pertinent sections of our country's Fundamental Law, the Constitution of the USSR, and correctly underscores the importance of the ideological and organizational work performed by commanders, political organs, party and Komsomol organizations of the Armed Forces toward the all-round strengthening of military discipline and the maintenance of regulation order in the units and on the ships. Indoctrination of the fighting men in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism and the development of a sense of personal responsibility in them for the defense of our homeland and for the reliable guarding of the Soviet people's peaceful labor are crucial to firm military discipline in the forces.

At the same time, the author reminds us that law enforcement agencies of the Soviet State are also watching over discipline and regulation order in the forces. They do so because, as V. I. Lenin pointed out--and this is stressed in the book--the law "is nothing without a system capable of forcing people to observe the law."

A small but informative book by V. Dolgov, "O sluzhbe i druzhbe" [On Service and Friendship], published by Voyenizdat, is worth reading. The author tells how military friendship and comradeship develop and gain strength in the military service, in the daily military work, adding to the capabilities of the fighting men and helping them to acquire political and military knowledge, improve their combat skill and be disciplined and efficient. This book is about the primary military collectives and about ways of increasing their social activeness for maintaining firm military discipline in the forces and insuring a high level of combat readiness in the units and subunits. It contains many striking examples of military heroism and valor born of military friendship and mutual support. The author demonstrates the fact that military friendship is based upon a feeling of military duty and a profound awareness by each fighting man of his responsibility to conscientiously perform his honored constitutional duty. The author correctly points out the fact that military friendship is stronger, the more strictly regulation interrelations are observed among the servicemen.

A pamphlet "Na boyevom dezhurstve, v morskom pokhode" [On Combat Duty and On An Ocean Cruise] by G. Gusev and I. Petrov, published by Voyenizdat, was written for army and navy agitators. Its value lies in the fact that it orients party and Komsomol activists toward stepped-up, oral political agitation during combat duty and on a cruise. It contains a summary of positive experience in organizaing and conducting oral agitation under the specific circumstances existing for troops guarding the security of the Soviet State, when each soldier is required to have maximum equanimity, unweakened awareness, unflagging vigilance, irreproachable discipline and efficiency.

In today's situation it is important to take an integrated approach to the indoctrination of the homeland's defenders. It is precisely this approach which makes it possible to thoroughly prepare the fighting man to perform the important duties assigned him by the Soviet people. The collection "Kompleksnyy podkhod k vospitanyu doprizyvnoy molodezhi" [An Integrated Approach to the Indoctrination of Pre-Draft-Age Youth] published by the DOSAAF publishing house deals with these matters. It discusses the main focuses of communist indoctrination: ideological-political, military-patriotic, international, moral, labor, esthetic and physical. "All of these forms of indoctrination," the collection stresses, "are inseparably interlinked." It is precisely their mutual linkage which makes it possible to increase the fighting man's awareness and which in the final analysis contributes to the development of good moral qualities and fighting efficiency and to the improvement of every serviceman's efficiency and discipline. The collection succeeds in summarizing experience in indoctrinational work and gives examples of great effectiveness from this work.

Legal indoctrination is an integral part, an important constituent of communist indoctrination. "...The more literate are the new army replacements in the legal sense," it was remarked at the All-Union Scientific and Practical Conference in Baku, "the more effective will be the process of developing the necessary military qualities in the young men and the more rapid will be the process." It is unfortunate that the compilers of the collection did not consider it possible to acquaint the reader with the forms and methods used for developing a high level of socialist legal awareness in the youth. This shortcoming can also be attributed to certain other books and pamphlets reviewed by us. Their influence with respect to strengthening military discipline would be greater, if the authors had described in greater detail the legal principles involved.

Naturally, the publications reviewed do not resolve all of the problems involved in further strengthening military discipline and regulation order. Right now, in view of the requirements set forth at the 26th CPSU Congress, it is important to step up development of the moral aspects of aware military discipline and self-discipline and to increase each soldier's sense of responsibility for the observance of regulation military order.

Increased demands are now being placed upon the output of our press. Unfortunately, some publications dealing with military indoctrination are not notable for their innovative formulation of the subject, their language is monotonous and the examples presented therein are not always convincing. They also lack journalistic style and serious generalizations. All of this imposes great responsibility upon the authors and editors. The reader expects new and substantive books on urgent matters of military discipline and the continued strengthening of discipline and order.

Officer Misconduct Discussed

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 81 p 2

[Article by Eng-Lt Col A. Belousov: "Forgery"]

[Text] "Can an individual be condemned for wanting to learn"?

"Of course not."

"And if his desire to study was so strong that he enrolled in the study-by-correspondence department of an institute and did not enjoy any of the benefits, can he be condemned for this"?

"Certainly not"!

"Well, they want to punish my husband for doing just that...."

This is how my conversation with Galina Iosifovna Zharinova began. Her husband, Guards Captain A. Zharinov, enrolled in a correspondence division of a technological institute in 1976. At this point he had completed four courses, and the time was not far off when he would have to defend his diploma. It was not until the end of last year, however--the first time since he had begun studying at the institute--he requested that command give him extra leave to take the exams. He was greatly surprised when he learned that a considerable amount was to be withheld from his pay. This was ostensibly for extra leave time used in years past. But he had used only his personal time, his days off, to take the finals and other exams. So why should they withhold his money?

Galina Iosifovna told me with indignation about all of this. She was also the one who wrote the letter to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. (As it turned out, however, I was on my way from Moscow to Siberia, to that very garrison where the Zharinovy live, when the letter was en route to the editors.) "I ask only one thing," Galina Iosifovna said with pain in her voice, "that you help us get justice."

How was I to help?

Guards Major V. Korobka, finance service chief for the formation, briefed me on the case: According to institute records Officer Zharinov had regularly taken the finals and other exams. He had taken them on service time. And since an individual cannot be at the institute and on the job at the same time, then those days essentially constituted extra leave. During his four years of study Guards Captain Zharinov, although officially he received no extra leave, was absent from the unit to take exams, and he illegally received a considerable amount of pay.

The accuracy of finance workers is well known. They calculated the amount which should be withheld from the pay of Guards Captain Zharinov down to the kopeck. Why were they only getting around to this now, however? Whey were they computing the overpayment for the four years all at once, when they should have done this as the officer took the days for schoolwork? Because of this, the amount to be withheld was considerable.

"We did not know that Zharinov was enrolled at the institute," said Guards Major Korobka. Noticing my bewilderment, he explained: "We only learned about everything quite recently, when he brought us a notice from the institute requesting him to attend a session there."

The confusion grew. Was it possible for an officer to study at a correspondence division of an institute for four years without this being known in the unit? He had to enroll in the institute sometime, after all. And an institute does not accept applicants without papers. It requires references, personal records.... Didn't someone have to sign these papers?

"It seems that the papers were issued by Guards Major Badulin, acting unit commander at that time," the finance service chief said hesitatingly. "If he did, however, he signed them illegally. It would be illegal, for one thing, because

permission for an officer to enter an educational institution is given by his superior at the request of the unit commander."

The matter had taken an entirely unexpected turn. I was not able to meet with Guards Major A. Badulin, who was away on leave. There was only one thing left to do--visit the institute.

Guards Major Korobka was right: Zharinov had taken the finals and other exams on workdays. I looked at the folder containing his papers. There was a reference dated 3 July 1976. It had the signature of Guards Major Badulin and a seal. There was another reference, this one without a date, but also signed by Badulin and stamped with a seal. The hand-written service record also lacked a date.

It was certainly not necessary to be a criminal law expert to see that the signatures on the papers were not the same. The difference was striking. Officer A. Koval'skiy, who accompanied me to the institute, could only shake his head when he saw them. Workers at the institute were dumbfounded: "How could we have failed to notice this before"?!

It was apparent that no one but Guards Captain Zharinov himself would be able to clear up the situation entirely. He brought his wife along when he met with the correspondent. He repeated what I already knew: The money, he said, was being withheld illegally. He also asked for help.

"But you took the exams on regular workdays, did you not? The finance workers had a right to count these as extra leave."

"This is not right. My trips to the institute did not take much time. I have my own car. A quick trip of half an hour to the institute to take the tests and... back again."

Aleksandr Petrovich remained firm in his insistence that it was a simple and rapid matter to take the exams at the institute, which, incidentally, is more than any 10 kilometers from the unit.

"And who signed the papers granting you permission to enroll in the institute"?

"Guards Major Badulin," he answered without hesitation.

"You remember that precisely? Perhaps someone else also signed them? I ask this, because the signatures on the papers are different."

Guards Captain Zharinov thought for a moment and then said:

"That was a long time ago. I don't remember exactly."

We didn't say anything for a time. The silence was heavy. Zharinov then admitted that he had signed the papers himself.

"What prompted you to do such a thing? Why couldn't you have received permission by the established procedure"?

"I was afraid I wouldn't get the permission."

"Why"?

"Because... I've had a little trouble in the service."

I later learned that "a little trouble" was perhaps too mild a term. There had been a lack of personal discipline. Serious negligence in the work. It was clear that with this kind of reputation he would not receive permission to enroll at the institute, and Zharinov decided simply to manage on his own.

A desire to learn--this, according to Zharinov, is what prompted him to take this extreme action. There is no way one can agree with him, however. It is not called a desire to learn but something entirely different, when an individual forgets about honor, ignores his conscience and resorts to forgery. We need to assume that this incident will be appraised from a standpoint of principle in the unit.

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BELORUSSIAN MD CHIEF OF STAFF ON USE OF TRAINING TIME

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 81 (signed to press 19 Jan 81) pp 52-58

[Article by Lt Gen I. Gashkov, chief of staff of the Red Banner Belorussian Military District: "The Value of Training Time"]

[Text] Winter combat training is in full swing. District personnel are working hard, with inspiration, to fulfill their combat and political training tasks and their large socialist commitments to prepare a fitting reception for the 26th congress of the Leninist Party. The CPSU Central Committee's draft program for the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, "Main Directions for the USSR's Economic and Social Development for the Years 1981-1985 and Extending Through the Period to 1990," has evoked a new surge of political and creative activity in the fighting men. The defenders of the socialist homeland, along with all the people, are studying this profoundly scientific, thoroughly developed and substantiated document with enormous interest and expressing their hearty approval of it. Like all Soviet people, they have taken an active part in the discussion of this document and are confident that the successful implementation of the Party's grand projects will contribute to the nation's continued economic and social development.

District personnel are well aware of the fact that the complexity of the international situation and the realistically increasing danger of war created by imperialism and the Beijing hegemonists, who are drawing closer and closer to imperialism, require that they always be on guard and persistently improve their combat skill and their readiness to repel any aggressor immediately and decisively. This awareness is reflected in the fighting men's efforts to perform in an exemplary manner their constitutional duty to reliably defend the socialist homeland, to perform better, to achieve more in their struggle for good quality and effectiveness in the combat training and to get the most out of every training day and hour. This attitude and moral climate exist in particular among fighting men of the Red Banner Tank Regiment imeni Lenin Komsomol, the Guards four-time order-bearing motorized rifle regiment, the three-time order-bearing tank regiment and many other district units and subunits, which are confidently leading the pre-congress socialist competition.

Many years of experience and the first months of winter training have demonstrated the fact that good results are ordinarily achieved in the combat training in those military collectives which value and make thrifty use of the training time. Just as labor productivity at an enterprise is measured by the output per unit of time, the effectiveness of the training process in a unit or subunit is determined by what knowledge and skills the personnel have acquired during the past day, week or month. The march of time is irreversible, of course. Wasted hours cannot be regained. Poorly organized drills and exercises and poorly performed firings are all an inadmissible waste of time, which must then be made up through even greater effort in the work, frequently with a deterioration in the performance of the tasks.

In short, the problem of making efficient use of training time is not as simple as it might appear at first glance. Teaching the troops what will be required in a war means thoroughly preparing the personnel to conduct modern combat against a powerful enemy under the most difficult conditions. The basic changes occurring in the technical equipment of the troops, in the nature of combat operations and the methods used to conduct them, and the possibility that an aggressor may use nuclear weapons have immeasurably increased the demands made of the combat, tactical and fire training, the moral-political and psychological qualities and the physical conditioning of the fighting men. And all of these qualities must be developed within a short period of time, in the process of combat and political training. This is why the value of every training hour has increased considerably. And it is certainly understandable that we frequently hear some commanders and staff officers complain about a shortage of time. In this situation, perfectly justified complaints are made about the overly generous use of time in certain units and formations for various kinds of conferences and meetings.

This is only one aspect of the matter, however. Let us take a look at another, more significant side of the problem. Is the pure training time, if I may call it that, always used efficiently? Are all of the commanders, staffs and political organs capable of valuing time, of using it efficiently and with the greatest effectiveness for preparing the personnel to engage in modern combat?

Unfortunately, we can still not say a simple, affirmative "yes" to these questions. Yes, the majority of our generals and officers are capable of valuing and making thrifty use of the training time. There are cases, however, when the use coefficient of the time allocated for combat and political training leaves something to be desired, due to poor planning, lack of coordination in material and technical support, poor control, inadequate training on the part of those in charge, and sometimes negligence and lack of ability or desire to employ new and progressive training methods, and for other reasons.

We can see that the causes of lost time are diverse. It is not always possible to detect them at once. All of them, however, albeit in varying degrees, damage the intensity of combat training, its quality and effectiveness. This occurred in the military collective in which officer A. Gneushev serves, for example. The results of the combat training there were more modest, to put it mildly, than in other collectives with equal conditions. A study of the causes

of the deficiencies in the personnel's training showed, among other things, that far from all of the officers in charge have an adequately thorough and precise understanding of the problem of making training time more effective. Frankly speaking, the simplified approach is still thriving fairly well in some places: If the drills are conducted and the personnel do not miss training, then everything is good.

In fact, this is good. Furthermore, it is simply an essential condition, without which we cannot get along. It must be strictly seen to that all of the fighting men receive combat training. It is very important that not a single soldier be taken out of the drills. It is equally important, however, to bear in mind the fact that effective use of training time is determined by other factors as well. The main ones are the scientific level and degree of optimization in the planning of combat and political training, the level of methodological skill on the part of commanders, the availability and intelligent use of modern material training facilities, strictness and demandingness, and intolerance of shortcomings, indulgences and simplifications. These factors also include an objective appraisal of the situation and strict verification of performance on the part of commanders, political workers, staff officers and Party organizations, firm discipline in the unit and subunit, focused and effective Party-political work with the men and well organized socialist competition among the personnel. All of these are links in a single chain, and a weakening of even one of them will invariably damage the strength of the chain.

Under the beneficial influence of decisions coming out of the 25th party congress and subsequent plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, the troops in our district, like the Soviet Armed Forces universally, have begun conducting a more persistent struggle for good quality and effectiveness in the training and indoctrination process, including a campaign to make efficient use of the time allocated for combat training. Unity of political and organizational work and the training and indoctrination of the personnel is growing stronger as a result of joint efforts on the part of commanders, political organs, staffs and party organizations, and a comprehensive approach to the performance of all tasks leading to good end results is becoming well established.

Advances have also been made in the planning of combat and political training. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has repeatedly stressed in his books, reports and speeches the fact that the plan is the main tool for well organized and productive work. "It can and should be discussed at the development stage," he writes in "Vozrozhdeniye" [The Rebirth]. "Once a plan has been ratified and has taken on the force of a law of our state, only one duty remains--to fulfill it, and to fulfill it not just on time, but with the least possible expenditures and the best possible results." These instructions and the demands set forth in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, "On Improving Planning and Increasing the Force of the Economic Mechanism for Raising Production Effectiveness and Improving the Quality of the Work," also apply to our military life. By way of implementing them the district military council and leading personnel of the units and formations are taking steps to improve the planning of combat and political training and to raise the organizational role of plans in the matter of establishing intensive, smooth-flowing and productive training.

In accordance with requirements set forth by the USSR minister of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy, an optimal training plan, broken down by training periods, has been compiled in the district for combat and political training for the current year. The bulk of the training time is designated for tactical, special tactical, technical and fire training in the field, in a situation approaching actual combat to the maximum degree possible. The stress is on the integrated method of working out the tasks specified in training programs and plans. Greater thought is being given to the monthly planning and the development of plans for specific exercises and drills at the regimental, battalion and company levels. It is particularly gratifying that political organs and party organizations are becoming more deeply involved in this important matter and that the party-political work plans are being linked more closely with the tasks performed by the personnel. All these things are making it possible to get more out of each training day with respect to improving the soldiers' combat skills.

This is the way things are in the three-time order-bearing tank regiment. Its commanders and staffs take a serious and responsible attitude toward the compilation of training plans and skillfully integrate the tactical training with fire, technical and special training. I could mention Captain A. Petrush, commander of an outstanding tank battalion, as an example. The battalion commander takes part in the planning and works to calculate the time precisely, carefully coordinate the battalion and company plans and eliminate overlaps in the drill schedules, unproductive use of the training facilities and equipment, and any lack of coordination in material support. The regimental chief of staff, together with officers A. Grigor'yev, V. Polyanskiy and V. Nazirov, use the training assignments and their thorough knowledge of the real situation in the subunits to find new and more effective methods of intensifying the training process, squeezing more out of each training hour and making it more substantive. The motorized rifle and artillery subunits, as well as the subunits of special forces, are ordinarily extensively involved in the integrated drills and tactical exercises. They go through their training activities in a common, tactical situation in the interest of accomplishing a common task. This helps to achieve closer interaction among the personnel of various troop branches and brings the training conditions into conformity with an actual combat situation.

The battalion and regimental tankmen do not waste time in the integrated drills and tactical exercises. On the march they work on interchangeability among the crews, conduct reconnaissance and so forth. In the concentration area the soldiers acquire and develop practical skills in providing combat, special and technical support and protecting themselves against weapons of mass destruction, and receive other types of combat training. During an exercise, in an offensive, for example, the personnel are the target of "enemy" artillery fire and missile and bombing strikes by the "enemy's" aircraft, and negotiate areas of radioactive "contamination" and fires, areas of devastation and water barriers. In short, the soldiers get to know the difficulties involved in modern combat, learn to perform according to its demands and laws and receive moral-psychological and physical conditioning.

There is no reason to idealize the situation in this collective, of course. It also has its difficulties. It is important to stress the fact, however, that a Party, creative approach to the organization of the training process has been established there, whereby responsibility and persistent work are combined with the rejection of formalism and routine. Naturally, it is not an easy task to develop this kind of approach. Harmonious and coordinated effort is required, and the continuous combining of organizational with political work.

This is the way it is done in the outstanding collective referred to. The battalion and regimental Party organizations use their natural work forms and methods to give the commanders tangible assistance with respect to improving the combat training and the planning, and with respect to making the drills dynamic and effective. As the communists explain the Party's requirements to the officers, warrant officers, sergeants and soldiers, they develop in them an attitude of responsibility toward the plans and drill schedules as toward a state assignment, and with their personal example, their words and deeds they inspire the fighting men to work hard at the military training and show them that one should value every minute of training time.

The regimental staff's Party organization, which is headed by Major A. Kas'yanikov, works hard to develop in the staff officers a feeling for the new and a desire to thoroughly study the training process and pass on to all personnel everything which will make it more effective. At the initiate of the unit communists, a persistent effort is made not just to conserve training time but also to use it prudently for various types of meetings and formations and during movements. Thrifty use of the time allocated for combat and political training has become firmly established in the collective precisely because of the constant and goal-oriented work of the commander, the political workers and the Party organization. And this is very important from the standpoint of conditions conducive to the accomplishment of all tasks facing the tankmen in this year of the 26th CPSU Congress.

How efficiently the training time is used depends to a considerable degree upon the professional training, the organizational abilities and the methodological and pedagogical skill of those in charge of the combat training. The very best plans and drill schedules can remain only good intentions written down on paper if those responsible for implementing them do not have all of the qualities necessary for their practical realization. Experience has proved that the integrated training method makes it possible, as it were, to compact the training time, to achieve more by way of preparing the personnel for combat in a shorter period of time. However, some manage to achieve this, others do not. Majors L. Lelekov and P. Stepanov and Captain A. Zaytsev, thoroughly trained and skillful methods experts and commanders of outstanding subunits, and many other officers competently integrate various training subjects with tactics and cover a number of subjects well in a week, which would require two or three weeks if handled separately.

The attention of the military council and the district staff is constantly focused upon the methodological training of the officers and the improvement of their training as commanders. They see to it in the Party manner that the officers improve their political, military, special and pedagogical skills. Prior to the beginning of the current training year the district staff, with active participation by officers from the political directorate, conducted assemblies for various categories of commanders. Common views on methods of improving the organization of the combat training were worked out at these assemblies, and a detailed study was made of progressive know-how in taking an integrated approach to the performance of combat training tasks, the achievement of combat cohesiveness among teams, crews and subunits, and the achievement of effectiveness in the training process as a whole. These assemblies were held in the units and formations. Demonstration classes and classes on instructional methods are extensively conducted in the forces. They are ordinarily presented by officers with good methodological skill. The aforementioned Major L. Lelekov, for example, gave the commanders a practical demonstration of how to make the integrated drills and tactical exercises highly intensive and effective. Lieutenant Colonel A. Voznyuk demonstrated progressive methods for teaching firing skills. Captain A. Zaytsev, an excellent drill leader and sportsman, shared his expertise in organizing drill classes and physical training.

Most of the district officers in charge of drills and exercises properly understand their tasks and perform them with methodological competence, creativity and initiative, in accordance with the demands of today, adopting everything new and progressive in the training process. It should be frankly stated, however, that there are still numerous oversights, unutilized reserves and possibilities with respect to improving the professional and methodological training of the officers. Some commanders still do not understand that this is an ongoing task, in the performance of which there is no place for sudden, temporary spurts of effort or for vacations.

The development and comprehensive use of training facilities is an important area of work, one which has a direct affect upon the effectiveness of the training process and the conservation of training time. All of the district units and formations have the necessary training facilities and are improving them. A good example of this is the Guards Motorized Rifle Rogachev Division imeni Verkhovnyy Sovet BSSR. This is our outstanding formation. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the level of provision of the units and subunits with various types of training and drill equipment, automated systems and technical devices for the practical training make it possible to fully integrate various training subjects with tactics, to create a situation of any complexity in the drills and exercises, a situation approaching actual combat conditions. Incidentally, a large portion of these means and systems were prepared by such skilled rationalizers as Major Yu. Verstenin, Warrant Officer G. Shkarupo and many others.

Electronic trainers for the operators of PTURS [antitank guided missiles], for example, are highly effective for preparing the men to perform real launchings. They make it possible to load the classes to the maximum and use a minimum of training time. And the trainers for driver-mechanics of tanks, infantry combat vehicles, armored personnel carriers and motor vehicles, which are equipped for

simulating movement, help the personnel acquire a more thorough knowledge of the equipment and the rules for operating combat vehicles under the most diverse conditions. In the combat control classes, which have mock-ups of terrain with a tactical setting, commanders at all levels develop skills in the performance of their main functional duty--they learn to direct combat. The extensive use of automated systems on the training fields, at tank training grounds and firing ranges makes it possible to approximate actual combat conditions in the training situation. In addition to this, we should bear in mind the fact that all of these improvements make it possible to conserve the motor life of the expensive combat equipment and fuel. It is apparent that enormous reserves lie in the exercising of technical creativity on the local level. In the final analysis, we also derive enormous moral benefit from the Party approach to the development of the rationalization movement.

The fact should be stressed that greater attention is being given to the development and the optimal use of training and practice facilities as an important factor for making the training and indoctrinational process more effective and using the time more efficiently. Matters in this important area are still not as good as we would like them to be, however. Certain commanders and staffs are still not showing proper concern for improving training and practice facilities or getting the maximum use from them. Scientifically based methods and the latest training equipment, including technical equipment, are still not being fully utilized in the aforementioned unit, where officer A. Gneushev serves, and in certain other military collectives.

Oversights and shortcomings in any area of the struggle for good quality in the training process and for the effective use of training time are ordinarily due to unsatisfactory demandingness inadequate organizational and indoctrinational work and lax control on the part of commanders, staffs, political organs and Party organizations over the fulfillment of requirements set forth in the guiding documents. The continued improvement of the workstyle for all categories of commanders and political cadres in accordance with demands set forth at the 25th party congress and the June and October 1980 Plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, and instructions issued by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev is regarded by the district military council, political directorate and staff as one of their main tasks in the new training year, as one of the main areas of preparation for the 26th CPSU Congress.

When the results of the past year were summed up and the tasks for the new year were discussed at report and election Party meetings of the Party organizations of directorates and sections, at a Party conference of the staff and the directorates and at a district Party conference, specific steps were outlined to improve the workstyle of officers and generals and to enhance the Party's influence on their service performance. The stress was laid on work directly among the forces. The political directorate, the staff political section and the Party organizations are doing a great deal to improve the level of ideological and theoretical training, efficiency and creative initiative, and to develop a high level of Party-mindedness and demandingness in the district staff officers and generals.

All of these things are producing definite results. For example, the work of Major General of Artillery S. Lebedev and Colonels Ye. Artemenko and V. Alimov, as well as other officers, demonstrates a comprehensive approach to the performance of training and indoctrinational tasks, a thorough study and an objective appraisal of the state of affairs in the units and subunits, and a combination of strict control and effective assistance for the commanders, staffs and political workers with the establishments of a smooth training process and firm military order, with the adoption of progressive know-how and the elimination of shortcomings. As they work among the troops they always try to recognize and disseminate everything valuable and progressive, and resolutely eliminate indulgences and simplifications in the combat training.

Socialist competition has a great deal to do with the quality and effectiveness of the combat training and with our success in improving combat readiness. This training year, the year of the 26th CPSU Congress, socialist competition has undergone further development. The appeal by the initiator of competition in the Ground Forces--the Guards Red-Banner Motorized Rifle Regiment of the Guards Rezhitskaya Motorized Rifle Division imeni Hero of the Soviet Union, Major General I. V. Panfilov--to expand competition in honor of the next Party congress with the slogan "For Good Combat Readiness and Firm Military Order!" has met with active support in the district units and formations.

District personnel are working persistently during these days of intense winter combat training to accomplish the difficult and important tasks set by the USSR minister of defense and are making every effort to fulfill their socialist commitments absolutely. The effectiveness of competition, as we know, depends greatly upon how it is organized, upon the ability of commanders, political organs, staffs, Party and Komsomol organizations to use this powerful tool for increasing the creative activity and initiative of the fighting men, to constantly develop the competition among servicemen, subunits and units, to specifically define the tasks for both the training periods and the day-to-day training, and to thoroughly improve the methodological art of the officers, warrant officers and sergeants and their ility to create a climate of rivalry in each drill.

Organization of the training process on a scientific basis, the achievement of good quality and the closest possible duplication of an actual combat situation in the drills, training sessions and exercises, a relentless campaign against indulgence and simplifications and efficient use of the time allocated for combat and political training are crucial conditions for the successful performance of commitments accepted by the competition participants.

It goes without saying that the problem of achieving efficient use of the training time to further improve the military skill of the personnel and the combat readiness of the forces demands considerable effort on the part of the district military council, political directorate and staff, the commanders, political organs, staffs and Party organizations of the units and formations. After all, we have not yet entirely corrected all the shortcomings in the planning of combat and political training, in the fulfillment of training plans

and programs and the use of training equipment and facilities. Nor have we fully eliminated all situations in which time is wasted because of inefficiency and lack of coordination in the work of those in charge. There are deficiencies in the organizational and indoctrinational work, and formalism still exists in the socialist competition. We have a great deal to do in order to further strengthen military discipline and regulation order and to improve control over and verification of performance.

The officers and generals, the communists and all the district personnel are aware of these shortcomings and are persistently seeking unutilized reserves and taking steps to eliminate everything which is interfering with progress. The defenders of the socialist homeland are filled with resolve to achieve the maximum from each training day for the improvement of their combat skill and to do everything possible to commemorate the year of the 26th congress of our Leninist Party with a high level of combat readiness and with firm military order.

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OUTLINE FOR INDOCTRINATION ON USSR NATIONALITIES

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 81 (signed to press 19 Jan 81) pp 70-78

[Outline for indoctrination classes: "The Great Strength of the Friendship of the USSR's Peoples"*]

[Text] Classes on this subject are designed to help the students gain a more thorough understanding of the Marxist-Leninist position on the nationality question and the work performed by V. I. Lenin and the Communist Party to unite the multinational Soviet people into a close knit fraternal family, and to understand the importance of friendship and cooperation among the Soviet people as one of the most important conditions for the successful building of communism in our nation, an important factor in the Soviet state's reliable defense capability. One important objective of the classes is to make the military collectives even more closely united, to strengthen friendship and military comradeship, to develop in the soldiers and sailors a desire to raise even higher the combat readiness of the subunit, unit or ship, and to orient all of the fighting men toward the exact fulfillment of their obligations and their sacred constitutional duty to defend the socialist homeland.

A total of six hours is allocated for this subject. Two hours should be used for lectures (or talks), two hours for independent work and two hours for a seminar (or discussion).

The following subjects should be covered in the lectures (or talks): 1. The triumph of the Leninist national policy in the USSR; 2. The Soviet republic's success in economic, scientific, technological and cultural development and the improvement of the workers' standard of living; 3. The friendship and fraternity of the Soviet peoples--the source of strength for the Armed Forces.

By the time this subject is taught in the political classes the propagandists will apparently have at their disposal the basic information on the 26th CPSU Congress, which will have been published by then. This information should be used without fail in preparing for the lectures (or talks), during the independent work by the students and during the seminar (or discussion).

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* Material for political classes on the subject "The Fraternal Friendship of the USSR's Peoples--A Source of Strength for the Soviet Union and Its Armed Forces; the Constitution of the USSR on the All-Round Development and Rapprochement of Nations and Ethnic Groups."

1. The Triumph of the Leninist National Policy in the USSR

The nationality question is one of the most complex and important issues of public life. There are more than 2,000 nationalities and ethnic groups on our planet. They speak various languages and are at various levels of economic, political and spiritual development. National relationships under capitalism are relationships of economic and social inequality, oppression, discord and distrust among peoples. In the capitalist society, which is based upon private ownership and class antagonisms, to the exploitation of man by man is added the enslavement and robbery of certain peoples by others. In the era of imperialism, because of the seizure of enormous territories and the enslavement of many peoples by colonizers, the nationality question has become even more acute and turned into a national-colonial issue.

Imperialism has doomed the multimillion masses of poorly developed nations to hunger, poverty and suffering. For many years it has robbed them of their national wealth and deliberately retarded economic development in those countries. Even in the 1950's the colonial and semi-colonial territories and poorly developed nations, with around two-thirds of the world's population, accounted for only five percent of the industrial output. The average annual earnings of a worker in the colonial and dependent nations was 11-fold less than in the developed capitalist states. The results of this ruthless exploitation are still being felt today, after imperialism's colonial system in its classic forms can be considered eliminated in general, when the population of the vast majority of colonial and dependent nations have achieved national independence. Even today 375 million people in the nonsocialist world live on the brink of starvation. A total of 80,000 people die of hunger there each day. This is approximately one person every second.

K. Marx and F. Engels and V. I. Lenin proved that it is only possible to eliminate national oppression and the inequality of peoples with the destruction of capitalism and victory for socialism. "As the exploitation of one individual by another is eradicated," wrote K. Marx and F. Engels, "the exploitation of one nation by another will be eliminated.

"Hostile relations among nations will disappear together with antagonism among classes within nations" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 4, p 445).

As the Marxist-Leninist classics worked out the program of struggle to restructure society according to socialist principles, they devoted particular attention to the nationality question. During the period of revolutionary upsurge and during World War I, for example, V. I. Lenin wrote more than 60 works explaining various aspects of the Party's theory and its program and policy with respect to the nationality question.

The main principle underlying Leninist theory and the Leninist program on the nationality question is the rapprochement of nations, leading to friendship and fraternity among all peoples and in the future--to their merging. Friendship can only occur among equals, however. But how can such equality actually be achieved? V. I. Lenin and the Party set forth specific ways to accomplish this: a) recognition of the right of nations to self-determination, even to the point

of state separation; b) a voluntary union and the extension of full economic, political and cultural equality to all races and nations. "We want a voluntary union of nations," V. I. Lenin underscored, "a union which will not permit any sort of coercion by one nation against another, a union based on complete trust, on clear awareness of the fraternal unity, on completely voluntary agreement" ("Poln. sobr. soch." [Complete Works], vol 40, p 43).

The party's slogan on the right of nations to self-determination reflects the concept of their equality, the concept of international unity of the workers for the joint struggle for a victory of socialism, for the building of a new society and its defense. V. I. Lenin taught us that the right of nations to self-determination should not be confused with the matter of the expediency of state separation of nations under any circumstances. The resolution of this issue must take into account the interests of the proletariat's class struggle for socialism. This is why next to the recognition of nations' right to self-determination, the second most important aspect of the Party's program pertaining to the nationality question is the requirement for international solidarity of the proletariat and the workers of all nations in the struggle for social and national liberation.

The Marxist-Leninist classics scientifically demonstrated the fact that the proletariat is the force capable of effecting the social and national liberation of mankind, of destroying national isolation and establishing fraternity among peoples. By overthrowing a state of reactionary classes--the bourgeoisie and landowners, who s w hostility and dissension among peoples--the proletariat, allied with all the working masses in a socialist revolution, eliminates all forms of social and national oppression and breaks down the barriers to the rapprochement of peoples.

The Great October Socialist Revolution put an end once and for all to man's exploitation of man in Russia, destroyed national inequality and created the conditions necessary for fraternal cooperation among nations on a voluntary and equal basis. The Great October Socialist Revolution gave our nation's peoples the broadest of rights and liberties and opened up every possibility for the all-round development of their material and spiritual potentials, for their unification in the single, multinational Soviet state.

Upon gaining control the Lenin party set about the practical implementation of plans for creating socialism, including the program dealing with the nationality question. The "Declaration of the Rights of Russia's Peoples" was adopted during the first days of existence of Soviet power. It consolidated legislatively the principles underlying the Soviet state's nationality policy. The declaration proclaimed the equality and sovereignty of Russia's peoples, their right to unrestricted self-determination, the abolishment of every and all national and national-religious privileges and restrictions, the unrestricted development of the national minorities and the necessity of a voluntary and honorable union of peoples. These principles were further elaborated and confirmed in the appeal "To the Moslem Workers of Russia and the East," in the "Declaration of the Rights of the Working and Exploited People," in Soviet Russia's recognition of the independence of Poland and Finland, and in other documents.

The Soviet experience has demonstrated the powerful force of the Leninist principles of national-state organization: total equality of nations and ethnic groups in all areas of societal life, the right to self-determination, the sovereignty of all the united republics and democratic centralism as a way of combining international and national interests. An event of historic importance--the formation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 30 December 1922--furthered the implementation of these principles. The RSFSR, the Ukrainian SSR, the Belorussian SSR and the Trancaucasian Socialist Federated Soviet Republic joined together as Soviet republics in the USSR on the basis of proletarian internationalism.

In recent years the fraternal alliance of our nation's peoples has grown and become stronger. The Uzbek and Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republics were formed and voluntarily joined the USSR in 1924. The Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic was formed in 1929. In 1936 the Transcaucasian Federation, which had successfully performed its historic function of strengthening fraternal relations among its peoples and of developing the economy of the Transcaucasus, was abolished, and the republics forming it--Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan--became Union republics in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The Kazakh and Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republics became a part of the Union in 1936. The Moldavian SSR, formed as a result of the return of Bessarabia to the Soviet State and the reunification of the Moldavian people, became a part of the USSR in 1940. The Lithuanian SSR, the Latvian SSR and the Estonian SSR were accepted into the USSR that same year. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics now includes 15 Union and 20 autonomous republics, 8 autonomous oblasts and 10 autonomous okrugs.

V. I. Lenin regarded the creation of a national state system of our nation's peoples and the building of "their own" state as one of the most important achievements of the October Revolution. "We gave all of the non-Russian nationalities," he said, "their own republics or autonomous oblasts" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," vol 44, p 146).

The need to create a single, multinational Soviet state was dictated by the entire course of history. Without a close alliance of Soviet republics it would be impossible to defend their existence against world imperialism. This sort of state union opened possibilities for the development of a national economy, regulated according to a common plan, provided for the efficient use of natural resources and the public division of labor among its separate regions for the good of all the peoples and increased their strength for the building of a new society.

Equality before the law for all nations was proclaimed immediately after the victory was achieved in the October Revolution, but time was needed to secure their practical equality. It was necessary to properly distribute industry throughout the nation and with this as the basis, to achieve equalization of the economic development of all its national regions. This task had not even been accomplished when the 1936 Constitution of the USSR was adopted, and the efforts of the party and state were aimed at creating conditions most conducive to its implementation.

Bound together by international unity, the peoples of the USSR overcame the backwardness inherited from the past within an unprecedentedly short period of time and raised themselves up to the pinnacles of social progress. Enormous transformations have occurred in the economic and social areas, in ideology and culture in each of the fraternal republics during the years of the Soviet Union's existence.

Prior to the victory in the Great October Socialist Revolution, Russia's outlying national districts were economically and culturally backward. Hopeless poverty and lack of rights were the lot of the vast majority of people in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, many areas of Belorussia, Moldavia and the Transcaucasus.

Centuries-old backwardness reigned in Uzbekistan before Soviet power was established, for example. Today, however, with the fraternal assistance of the Soviet peoples, primarily the Russian people, more than 100 branches of industry consisting of more than 1400 large enterprises have been created in the republic. The republic's industrial output has grown almost 240-fold in the years of Soviet power. Today, Uzbekistan's industry produces more goods every three days than it produced during the entire year of 1924. National working class cadres and an enormous army of engineers and technicians have been created there. Basic changes have also occurred in agriculture--today, Uzbekistan has no equals in the world with respect to cotton yield. The transforming force of the Leninist national policy has also manifested itself clearly in cultural development: While only 3.6 percent of the population in Uzbekistan could read and write prior to the October Revolution, today the transition to universal secondary education has basically been completed there, as it has throughout our nation.

The same sort of remarkable changes have occurred in the other fraternal republics. Since the October Revolution they have become prospering areas with a powerful industry, progressive agriculture, science and culture.

Actual equality of the nations and ethnic groups of the USSR has now been achieved in all areas of life as a result of the creation of a mature socialist society in the Soviet Union. In its summation of the results of the development of national relations in our state of all the people, the 1977 Constitution of the USSR established the fact that in our nation "a new, historic community of people--the Soviet people--has developed as a result of the equalization of all classes and social strata, the existence of legal and actual equality for all nations and ethnic groups, and their fraternal cooperation." Today, this community represents the highest attainment in social progress.

In our nation the interests of each republic are harmoniously combined with those of the Union as a whole. The all-round development of the Union republics under mature socialism is accompanied by the continued strengthening of their friendship and cooperation, their increasing equalization and the strengthening of the multinational Soviet state as a whole. The strengthening of the Soviet state, in turn, contributes to the flowering of each of its republics.

The moral-political unity of the peoples provides the solid foundation for the Soviet Union's strength. It is a result of the oneness of their goals, the steady growth of the Communist Party's guiding role in the nation's life and the strengthening of the alliance of the working class, the kolkhoz peasantry and the people's intelligentsia as the social foundation of our state.

Developed socialism's Constitution has not simply retained the previous sovereign rights of the Union republics, but has actually added new ones. The right to legislative initiative in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR has been secured for the Union republic through its highest agencies of state power. Furthermore, the Constitution extends to each Union republic the right to take part in decision-making on matters pertaining to the management of the USSR, in the USSR Supreme Soviet, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Council of Ministers and other agencies of state power. At the same time, the Union republic helps with the application of USSR authority in its territory, with the implementation of decisions adopted by the nation's highest agencies of state power and control. It is also in charge of comprehensive economic and social development in its territory, coordinates and controls the operation of Union-level enterprises, institutions and organizations there.

Our nation's Fundamental Law is the first in the history of our state's constitutional legislation to devote special sections to the legal status of the autonomous republic, autonomous oblast and autonomous okrug. V. I. Lenin foresaw this diversity of forms of Soviet autonomy when he wrote about the possibility of creating autonomous okrugs "even the smallest," along with large national-territorial formations ("Poln. sobr. soch.," vol 24, p 148).

In his speech at the 4 October 1977 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev had the following to say by way of demonstrating the erroneousness and unacceptability of suggestions made during the national discussion of the draft of the new Constitution with respect to eliminating the Union and autonomous republics or drastically restricting the sovereignty of the Union republics and depriving them specifically of the right to secede from the USSR: "The friendship of the Soviet peoples is indestructible. They are coming steadily closer together and their spiritual life is being mutually enriched in the process of building communism. We would be setting out on a dangerous path, however, if we began to artifically force this objective process of the coming together of nations. V. I. Lenin persistently warned against this, and we shall not deviate from his precepts." The report pointed out that the social-political unity of the Soviet people does not mean the disappearance of national distinctions at all. These distinctions still exist and will continue to exist for a long time. As long as there are nations, their languages, customs and cultures, we cannot ignore the national characteristics and consequently we cannot reject national statehood.

As the presentation of the first subject is brought to an end it should be pointed out that the forms of national statehood which have developed in the USSR have stood the test of time. They still retain their importance at the contemporary stage in the building of communism. Furthermore, there have never

before been such favorable conditions for bringing out the possibilities of Soviet national statehood. Never before have nations lived such a full and vital life as in the society of developed socialism. This is contributing to their intensive rapprochement and to the strengthening of the social-political unity of the entire people within the Union state.

The importance of the USSR is growing under developed socialism as a state form of joint struggle by free peoples for the building of communism in our nation, a form which has fully proved itself historically.

2. The Soviet Republic's Success in Economic, Scientific and Cultural Development and in the Improvement of the Workers' Standard of Living

Presentation of the second subject should begin with the statement that the history of the USSR is a history of the development of indestructible unity and friendship among all the peoples joined together within the Soviet Socialist State. It is a history of unprecedented growth and all-round development of a state born of socialist revolution, a state which has become one of the mightiest powers in the world today. It is a history of the emergence and of the real economic, political and cultural prospering of all the republics, of all the nations and ethnic groups populating our nation and joined together under its banner.

The successful fulfillment of the 10th Five-Year Plan was enormously important with respect to the further rapprochement of the Soviet nations and ethnic groups. Every nation and every Union republic made a large contribution to the accomplishment of our national tasks, regarding this as their prime patriotic and international duty. This is why the economic capability of each republic increased considerably during the years of the 10th Five-Year Plan, and another large advance was made in the accomplishment of social tasks and in the improvement of the workers' material and cultural standard of living. Allocations from the national income for improving the people's standard of living during the five-year period exceeded the figure for the Ninth Five-Year Plan by 329 billion rubles. Real per capita income increased by 17 percent. The material and spiritual needs of the Soviet people were more fully satisfied, and their working and living conditions improved.

Today, all of our republics have a developed industry, a mechanized agriculture and cadres of skilled workers and specialists in all branches of production and all areas of culture. The CPSU Central Committee's draft program for the 26th party congress, "Main Directions of Economic and Social Development for the USSR for the Years 1981-1985 and Extending Through the Period to 1990," consistent with the requirements of our Leninist national policy, calls for another large improvement in the economies, the science and technology of all the fraternal republics and provides for rapid rates of growth for the republic, for the efficient use of natural resources and on this basis, for improvement of the material and cultural standard of living of all the workers of our great homeland.

It should be pointed out that the USSR economy comprises a single national economic complex, which embraces all levels of public production, distribution and exchange within the nation. The CPSU Central Committee's draft program for the 26th party congress, "Main Directions of Economic and Social Development for the USSR for the Years 1981-1985 and Extending Through the Period to 1990," calls for accelerated rates of production most consistent with the production conditions of each of our Union republics: machine-building, gas, chemical, petrochemical, light and food industries in the RSFSR; power and chemical machine-building, electrochemical industry, machine tool and tool building and the production of machinery for animal husbandry and feed production in the Ukrainian SSR; radio engineering and electronic industry and tool building in the Belorussian SSR; electrical engineering, ferrous and nonferrous metallurgy, machine-building, coal, chemical, petrochemical, light and food industries in the Kazakh SSR and so forth. All of this will contribute to the further economic strengthening of the nation as a whole, while at the same time permitting each republic to uplift its own economy and make a significant contribution to the accomplishment of common Union tasks.

Thanks to the constant concern demonstrated by the party for the accelerated economic development of the entire nation and of each republic, the building of the material and technological foundation for communism is developing in our nation on a comprehensive and proportionate basis. All existing economic, raw material and labor resources are being drawn into economic circulation in a planned manner. The joint labor of many peoples is embodied in every operating enterprise and every enterprise under construction and frequently even in an individual machine produced there. More than 4,000 subcontracting enterprises from all the Union republics deliver their products to the Latvian SSR, for example, more than 2,000 deliver to the Azerbaijan SSR and 4,500 deliver to the Kirghiz SSR.

And so, the progress of the Soviet national economy along lines leading to the creation of the material and technological foundation for communism is a rich source for achieving the further flowering of economic life for each nation and ethnic group. It is at the same time a source for increasing the common Union wealth, for further improving international economic ties and strengthening the society's unity. In the contemporary situation, as the Communist Party strives to further strengthen the fraternal alliance of the peoples of the USSR, it is pursuing a course leading to increasingly more complete equalization of the republics' levels of economic development, carefully combining Union interests with the needs and special characteristics of each nation and ethnic group.

The instruction should then stress the fact that the Great October Socialist Revolution released the people's spiritual and creative forces from bondage. A real cultural revolution has been carried out in our nation, and a culture socialist in substance and national in form is successfully developing. Within an unprecedentedly short period of time the former national hinterlands have become republics with uniform literacy. Public education, especially the higher school, is developing rapidly there.

While under tsarism many of Russia's peoples did not have their own specialists with a higher education (the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Tajiks, Turkmens and others), at the present time all of the nationalities have specialists with higher education employed in the national economy. For every 1,000 people employed in the national economy, 779 in the Uzbek SSR have a higher or secondary (complete or partial) education, 770 in the Kazakh SSR, 763 in the Kirghiz SSR, 737 in the Tajik SSR and 795 in the Turkmen SSR.

As a result of all this, the process of the flowering and convergence of nations is also occurring in the area of spiritual culture--in science, art and literature. Furthermore, the development of the communist society's culture is occurring precisely through the development of the national cultures, on the one hand, and their mutual enrichment, interpenetration and convergence, on the other.

The Russian language, which has become the universally accepted means of international communication, is playing an enormous role in the convergence of nations. Thanks to the Russian language the achievements of the Russian and other peoples in science, technology and culture are being made accessible to all the nation's peoples. It is important to underscore the fact that the spread of the Russian language is occurring on a voluntary basis and is paralleled by the development of the national languages. Equality of languages is guaranteed by law in the socialist society, and every individual has complete freedom to speak, to rear and teach his children in any language.

The CPSU, a party of convinced and consistent internationalists is the nucleus and the main strength of the international solidarity of nations and ethnic groups of the USSR. In the struggle for socialism's victory and as a result of the implementation of the Communist Party's Leninist national policy the Communist Party has forged an indestructible fraternal friendship among the peoples of the USSR. This friendship is one of the crucial factors behind the Soviet State's constantly growing strength, the moral-political unity of all the nations and ethnic groups of our developed socialist society and their steady development and convergence in the material and spiritual areas. Regarding the friendship of the USSR peoples as one of the remarkable achievements, one dearest to the heart of every Soviet individual, the CPSU constantly attempts to strengthen and develop that friendship and to see that our people cherish it as their most prized possession.

The good effects of the Party's Leninist national policy have in one way or another been reflected in the lot of all the Soviet people, especially those who lived in the former national hinterlands of tsarist Russia. The family of Dzhamankul Dzhenchurayev, a Kirghiz, is a fairly typical example of what socialism can give an individual in the lifetime of a single generation. Dzhamankul was born in the village of Alchaly, which is in the Chuyskaya valley. Prior to the revolution there was not a single literate person in the village. Not a single one! Dzhamankul's father was rich only in the fact that he had five children, children which he could not feed properly. His father tended a large herd of livestock, but it all belonged to the bai. He wanted to give his children a great deal, but he could not. And he died illiterate.

At the age of 10, Dzhamankul picked up his first book. The book was given to him by Soviet authorities. He had barely learned to read when he was forced to fight the basmachi. For 10 years he fought them in the foothills of the Ala-Too and Pamir. He was wounded three times. When the basmachi had been defeated he was assigned to the frontier troops. The beginning of the Great Patriotic War found Dzhenchurayev on the western border of the USSR. Throughout the war Dzhamankul carried two books in his pack: the first volume of V. I. Lenin's "Sochineniya" [Works] (3d edition) and "Osnovy obshchevoyskovogo boya" [Principles of Combined-Arms Combat]. They taught him how to live, to fight and to conquer.

Now, alongside the other books on D. Dzhenchurayev's bookshelf at home are books written by him: "Po sledam basmachey" [On the Tracks of the Basmaks] and "Frontovyye zapiski pogranichnika" [Frontline Notes of a Frontier Guard].

The veteran's children are grown. His daughter Rozaliya was the first Kirghiz woman to become a candidate of geological and mineralogical sciences. His son Damir served his term in the navy, joined the working class and became a probing rationalizer. His second son, Del'ves, is a candidate of sciences and a geologist. The family is an international one. Dzhamankul is a Kirghiz, his wife is a Tatar, his son-in-law Georgiy and daughter-in-law Lyuba are Russians and his daughter-in-law Sasha is a Ukrainian. One could say that all of the great rights and liberties of the developed socialist society are reflected in the history of this family, like the sun in a drop of clear water.

The developed socialist society has rich socioeconomic and spiritual possibilities for the increasingly closer merging of the peoples, for the achievement of a qualitatively new level in their fraternal cooperation and mutual assistance. We are no longer referring simply to the friendship of peoples, of which the Soviet people are justifiably proud, but of an increased, stronger, indestructible international unity of all our country's nations and ethnic groups.

The presentation of the second subject should include a detailed account of the achievements of the republic in which the unit is located, as well as those of the fraternal republics from which the students in the group were drafted. This information is to be found in speeches delivered by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev on the anniversaries of certain Soviet republics and in his congratulatory messages to republics and individual production collectives on their labor successes in 1980.

3. The Friendship and Fraternity of the Soviet Fighting Men--The Source of Strength for the Armed Forces

At the beginning of the third subject it is a good time to stress the fact that the growing scales of peaceful creation in the nation have demonstrated over and over to all of mankind the Soviet people's profound interest in lasting peace and the unchanging peace-loving foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

As long as imperialism with its aggressive nature exists on earth, however, the Communist Party will continue unceasingly to concern itself with maintaining a

reliable defense for our Soviet homeland, further strengthening its defense capability and improving the army and navy in every way.

Defense of the socialist homeland is an international matter. V. I. Lenin taught us that peoples setting out on a path of socialist development "absolutely must have a close military and economic alliance, because otherwise the capitalists... will crush us and strangle us individually" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," vol 40, p 46).

A strong military-political alliance of Soviet republics has developed in the joint struggle of our country's peoples to build socialism on the basis of their common interest and goals. This was one of the crucial factors behind the victory of the first workers and peasants state over the combined forces of internal and external counterrevolution during the years of civil war and foreign intervention.

The successful resolution of the nationality question, which resulted in the creation of a strong, multinational socialist state, created an inexhaustible source for maintaining a strong defense capability for the nation and for giving the Soviet Armed Forces great fighting strength. We honorably passed the most difficult test of the USSR's strength--the Great Patriotic War--because all of the Soviet people, regardless of their national origin, defended the freedom and independence of their socialist homeland heroically and in a single formation.

International reaction believed that fascist Germany's attack on the USSR would result in dissension among our country's peoples. Bourgeois propagandists proclaimed to the entire world that the Soviet State was an "ethnic conglomeration" lacking internal unity, that it would therefore disintegrate, just as the Austro-Hungarian Empire had disintegrated in its time.

The prophets of disaster were badly mistaken, however. Even our most inveterate foes became convinced that the Soviet Union is not just simply a geographic concept but a monolithic state united by the common nature of the basic interests of all USSR peoples. With the Party's leadership the multinational Soviet nation was turned into a single military camp. The enemy was unable to weaken the fraternal friendship of the USSR's peoples. The Soviet people rose up as one to the Party's call to combat the fascist invaders, considering the defense of the socialist homeland to be the vital cause of all Soviet nations and ethnic groups.

For example, the workers of Uzbekistan wrote the following in an appeal to the Uzbek soldiers: "Your people are the child of the Soviet Union. Russian, Ukrainian, Belorussian, Azerbaijani, Georgian, Armenian, Tajik, Turkmen, Kazakh and Kirghiz have worked together with you for 25 years to build our great home, our country, our culture... And now the German basmach has broken into the home of your older brother, the Russian, into the home of your brothers, the Belorussian and the Ukrainian. He brings the brown plague, gallows and the whip, hunger and death. The home of the Russian is your home, however, the home of the Ukrainian and the Belorussian are also your home! They are your home because the Soviet Union is a fraternal family in which, even though everyone lives in his own home, the yard and management are shared in common and are inseparable."

All of the Soviet peoples courageously defended the socialist homeland. This is eloquently attested by the fact alone that more than 7 million of our soldiers, sailors, noncommissioned officers, officers, generals and admirals, who fought the German fascist invaders selflessly, were awarded orders and medals of the homeland. More than 11,600 people were awarded the title "Hero of the Soviet Union." Among them were representatives of all our nation's republics.

The indomitable, uniting force of our multinational state is Soviet patriotism, which is based not upon racial or nationalistic prejudices but upon the profound devotion and loyalty of peoples of various nationalities to their socialist homeland and to the cause of communism. Our patriotism harmoniously combines the national traditions of the peoples and the common, vital interests of all the Soviet people. It is inseparably interwoven with the proletarian solidarity of the workers of all nations. Comrade L. I. Brezhnev wrote the following in his book "Malaya zemlya": "...in the patriotic fighting man the awareness of his duty to the homeland suppresses his fear, his pain, his thoughts of death." Around 300 fighting men of various nationalities covered the embrasures of enemy pillboxes with their bodies. More than half of the heroes were communists or Komsomol members, including Russian A. Matrosov, Ukrainian A. Shevchenko, Kirghiz Ch. Tuleberdiyev, Uzbek G. Erdzhagitov, Moldavian I. Soltys, Kazakh S. Baymagambetov, Estonian I. Laar and many others. The feat performed by Nikolay Gastello and his crew was repeated more than 400 times. The feat was performed by Russian pilots D. Tarasov, L. Mikhaylov and S. Aleshin, Ukrainian I. Vedovenko, Belorussian I. Panteleyev, Armenian A. Ogandzhanyan, Kazakh N. Abdirov and members of our homeland's other nationalities.

In his memoirs from "Malaya zemlya," Leonid Il'ich Brezhnev describes an exciting example of combat fraternity among fighting men of various nationalities, made strong by blood shed together in the fighting for the homeland: "...on 15 February, the eleventh day following the first landing, Shalve Tatarashvili, a member of the assault landing force, had his 23d birthday. His inseparable friend Petr Vereshchagin presented him with 23 shells from his cartridge drum. This was the dearest present possible, because there was a shortage of shells and another enemy attack was expected."

The Soviet Armed Forces honorably fulfilled their international duty during the Great Patriotic War and performed the decisive role in driving the invaders from a large number of European and Asian nations. Our fighting men spared neither their strength nor their very lives as they fought for the liberation of other peoples. A total of 600,000 Soviet soldiers and officers died in the fighting to liberate Poland, for example, and more than 140,000 perished in battles fought to liberate Czechoslovakia. We lost hundreds of thousands of fighting men in the liberation of Romania, Hungary and other countries.

It would be impossible to overstate the importance of the friendship and unity of the Soviet peoples with respect to strengthening the defense capability of the multinational Soviet State and increasing the fighting strength of its Armed Forces in the postwar years.

The principle of socialist internationalism is presently manifested in Soviet military organizational development in the fact that all nations and ethnic groups of the USSR have a common military organization--the multinational Armed Forces--which reliably defend the interests of the Soviet Union as a whole and those of each republic. Equality of rights and obligations of our country's peoples is strictly observed in the performance of tasks in the military service.

Relations among servicemen in the Armed Forces of the USSR are based on a communist world outlook and reflect the indestructible moral-political unity of the Soviet society and the friendship and fraternity of all our country's nations and ethnic groups. They are at the same time a result of the multifaceted and goal-oriented ideological work performed by the Communist Party to indoctrinate the Soviet people, including fighting men of the army and navy, in the principles of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism. "Our army," Comrade L. I. Brezhnev has said, "is special also in the sense that it is a school of internationalism, a school for the development of feelings of fraternity, solidarity and mutual respect among nations and ethnic groups of the Soviet Union" ("Leninskim kursom" [On a Leninist Course], vol 4, p 61).

A sense of pride in belonging to his multinational military collective is growing and becoming stronger in each soldier, along with military skill, as is his awareness of the fact that their strength lies in solidarity, in indestructible union and comradeship.

The Armed Forces have accumulated a great deal of experience and developed an extensive system of forms, methods and means of indoctrinating the personnel in a spirit of friendship of peoples of the USSR, in a spirit of Soviet patriotism and socialist internationalism. Such forms of mass political work as evenings of discussion on special subjects and group talks around a map of the homeland on the achievements of the workers of the national republics and oblasts enjoy great popularity among fighting men of the subunits, units and ships. The hearts of the fighting men are filled with pride for their homeland and for the friendship of peoples of the USSR when they hear the stories of heroes of labor and leaders of Party and soviet organs on the contribution made by the multinational labor collectives to the implementation of the Party's grand plans.

It is important to underscore the fact that our Armed Forces are an integral part of the multinational Soviet people. The army and navy of the Soviet Nation are a single, friendly military family, the living embodiment of socialist internationalism. Members of all our country's nations and ethnic groups perform their military service in a single formation, shoulder to shoulder, fulfilling their civil duty. Worthy heirs to the combat glory of older generations of the homeland's defenders, they devote all their strength and knowledge, all the fervor of their hearts to the performance of their assigned task of reliably defending the socialist homeland and remaining in a state of constant combat readiness ensuring an immediate rebuff to any aggressor.

Developing on the basis of the great economic, scientific and technological achievements of the Soviet Nation, our army and navy are made powerful and

unconquerable by the monolithic solidarity of the Soviet society and by the friendship and fraternity of the USSR's peoples. The international nature and essence of our Armed Forces at the contemporary stage in their development are clearly manifested in the combat alliance with armies of the fraternal socialist nations joined by the Warsaw Pact and in their joint fulfillment of the sacred duty of defending the conquests of socialism.

As this subject is concluded it should be pointed out once more that our Armed Forces are the living embodiment of socialist internationalism, a monolithic, multinational military family united round the CPSU. The sons of various nations and ethnic groups populating our vast homeland serve in every military collective. Rallied closely round their own Leninist Party, they sacredly fulfill their patriotic and international duty and constantly strengthen the defense might and the combat readiness of the Armed Forces of the USSR.

During the independent preparation for the seminar (or discussion) it is recommended that the students study V. I. Lenin's works, "On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," vol 25, pp 276-277, 288, 317), "On the National Pride of the Great Russians" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," vol 26, pp 106-110) and "Speech Delivered at a Meeting of the Warsaw Revolutionary Regiment on 2 August 1918" ("Poln. sobr. soch.," vol 37, pp 24-26); "The Program of the CPSU" (pp 110-116); "The Constitution (Fundamental Law) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" (Preamble, Articles 1, 19, 31-34, 36, 62-64); excerpts from Comrade L. I. Brezhnev's report "On the 50th Anniversary of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics" ("Leninskim kursom," vol 4, pp 41-101); Chapter 4 of the training aid "Nasha tsel'--Kommunizm" [Our Goal Is Communism] (Voyenizdat, 1976).

It is recommended that the following subjects be discussed in the seminar (or discussion): 1. V. I. Lenin's development of the principles underlying the Communist Party's national policy and its importance for the victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution; 2. What are the main successes achieved by the republics in th development of their economy and culture during the years of Soviet power?; 3. What role did the indestructible friendship of our homeland's peoples play in the defeat of the interventionists and white guards during the years of civil war and in the achievement of victory of worldwide historical importance in the Great Patriotic War?; 4. The Soviet Army and Navy--a school of internationalism, and the importance of the friendship and fraternity of fighting men of various nationalities for improving the combat readiness of the subunits, units and ships.

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ARMY GEN N. LYASHCHENKO ON MORAL EDUCATION

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 1980 pp 2-5

[Text]

General of the Army Nikolai LYASHCHENKO has been serving in the Soviet Armed Forces for over half a century. He has a long record from cadet to inspector-adviser in the Group of General Inspectors of the USSR Ministry of Defence. Between these landmarks he took part in fierce encounters with the Basmaches * in Central Asia, fought on the republican side against General Franco's supporters in Spain, commanded a regiment, an independent naval brigade and an infantry division during the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). In recent years he was in command of the Volga, Turkestan and Central Asian military districts. Lieutenant-Colonel V. Titov, a "Soviet Military Review" correspondent, asked General of the Army N. Lyashchenko to tell our readers about the role played by the Soviet Army in servicemen's moral education.

* Armed counter-revolutionary nationalistic movement of feudal lords, bourgeoisie, clergy and kulaks in Central Asia against Soviet power during its establishment.

Comrade General of the Army, what is, in your opinion, the basis of Soviet servicemen's moral education?

The process of young people's education, moulding the citizen, patriot and internationalist, which begins in the family and at school, goes on in the army. Communist morality forms the basis of young people's, including servicemen's moral education. Like any other morality, it represents a combination of norms of people's behaviour in society, characterising their ideas of justice and injustice, good and evil, honour and dishonour. However, unlike bourgeois morality, which defends the interests of the imperialist bourgeoisie with its lust for profits, communist morality serves the purpose of building a classless society, and expresses the interests and ideals of the mass of the people. Communist morality is the complex of principles of life and ethical norms corresponding to the communist socio-economic system. Its objective criterion is the struggle for the victory of communism, the world's justest and most humane society.

The basic principles of communist morality are set forth in the Programme of the CPSU — the moral code for the builder of communism. These principles include devotion to the cause of communism, multiplying public wealth by personal labour, awareness of one's social duty, collectivism, humanism and internationalism.

From the point of view of communist morality, that is moral which promotes the progress of society towards communism.

It is noteworthy that communist morality is the objective result of mankind's social, spiritual and moral development. Communist morality becomes firmly established as the dominating type of morality only after the victory of a socialist revolution. As Lenin said, a new morality is not established all of a sudden, at the bidding of a slogan, a resolution or a decree, but only as the result of a long and arduous mass struggle.

People of my generation learned from their own experience how true that is. In building socialism workers, peasants and intelligentsia gradually discarded the "birth-marks" of the past — private property habits and morals, and developed new socialist features and moral make-up, namely collectivism, Soviet patriotism and proletarian internationalism, a new attitude to labour, national pride and so on.

In the Soviet country today, in conditions of developed socialism, communist morality is completely dominant, for it harmoniously combines the interests of society and the individual. In socialist society man is to man a friend, comrade and brother, whereas in bourgeois society with its principles of extreme individualism a man pursues his own goals in detriment to other people's interests.

I was fortunate to be a delegate to the 25th CPSU Congress, which paid much attention to questions of educating Soviet people in conditions of developed socialism and to questions of morality and ethics. The following words, which will go down in history, were pronounced at that Congress: "Nothing adds so much to the stature of the individual as a constructive attitude to life and a conscious approach to one's duty to society, when matching words and deeds becomes a rule of daily behaviour. It is the task of moral education to help people develop such an attitude."

At the present time questions of the moral education of the working people in general and of servicemen of the Soviet Armed Forces in particular, are the most important tasks of ideological work, because building communism requires not only a sound material basis, but also comprehensive and harmonious development of people.

Could you please give us some details of how the principles of communist morality find their expression in the army and navy?

The Soviet Armed Forces are the flesh and blood of the Soviet people. It is quite natural that the requirements of communist morality and ethics apply entirely to Soviet servicemen. The process of communist education in military collectives presupposes all-round perfection of ethical relations and establishment of a healthy moral atmosphere on the basis of socialist social relations.

Our soldiers, sailors and officers being workers, peasants or representatives of people's intelligentsia by origin, there are not and cannot be any antagonisms between them, because in Soviet society there are no privileged classes or groups, no exploitation or appropriation of the fruits of other people's labour. In the USSR a historically new social and international community of people—the Soviet people—has taken shape. This is clearly reflected in military collectives. For instance, representatives of 41 nationalities serve in the Taman Guards Motorised Infantry Division. Each unit and subunit is a friendly multinational combat family. All servicemen, irrespective of nationality, enjoy equal political rights and freedoms and have equal opportunities for promotion.

Whichever subunit, unit or formation of the Soviet Armed Forces you take, you will see how deeply and firmly the norms of communist morality are implanted in the servicemen's life. More than once I have visited the Guards Panfilov Division. Political Instructor Vasily Klochkov, hero of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45), has been for ever entered in the rolls of one of its companies. His name is widely known in our country. When in November 1941 the hitlerites launched an offensive in an effort to break through to the Soviet capital, a group of 28 fighting men headed by Klochkov repulsed an attack of 50 enemy tanks, disabling the majority of them. The fighting men were guided by the moral law: to bar the enemy's way to Moscow at any cost. Many of them, including Political Instructor Klochkov, died the death of heroes, but did not let the nazis through.

Today servicemen of 14 nationalities from ten Union Republics serve in the Klochkov company. They are a single family overcoming difficulties and coping successfully with their missions. Strong military friendship is of great help to them in their service.

What forms and methods of serviceman's moral education are used in the Soviet Armed Forces?

They are extremely diverse, including lectures and talks, disputes and theoretical get-togethers, reviews and discussion of films and TV programmes. But the most efficient method of serviceman's moral education is, to my mind, developing the necessary qualities in the process of instruction and education. At my age one can see particularly well how the perfectly organised military labour and intense service rhythm steel the individual and strengthen him both physically and spiritually. Combat training, including operation and maintenance of combat equipment and watch keeping help to develop such qualities as persistence in attaining the goals set, efficiency, staunchness, poise and readiness for resolute action in a fluid situation.

The tenor of life in the army and navy makes the greatest impact on servicemen in units and subunits when the requirements of military regulations and the Oath of Allegiance are fulfilled unswervingly, because their very essence expresses the will of the Soviet people — reliably to defend the Homeland and revolutionary gains. The regulations and the Oath of Allegiance lay down concretely what a serviceman must do to discharge his duty with honour. Their requirements are based not on fear of punishment or on coercion, but in the first place on each serviceman's awareness of his duty and personal responsibility for the defence of the Homeland and of the entire socialist community.

Nearly all norms and rules of servicemen's behaviour prescribed by the Oath of Allegiance and the regulations are both moral and legal. For instance, respect for elders being a requirement of Soviet morality, it also acquires legal force in a unit or on a ship. The Interior Service Regulations read in part: "A serviceman must show respect for commanders (chiefs) and elders."

In the army and navy increased demand is made concerning the observance of such moral norms as comradeship and mutual aid. Soviet servicemen have a motto: "Die, but save your comrade." In modern conditions the significance of military comradeship has grown immeasurably. New weapons and methods of warfare with the use of the most destructive means and the high dynamics of combat operations make considerably higher demands on servicemen's moral and psychological qualities, friendship and military comradeship, mutual support and assistance in battle.

A man's ideological convictions are of particular importance. They form the core of the morality, staunchness and firmness which have always been characteristic of Soviet servicemen. The history of the army and navy is full of examples of how human spirit, nobleness and selflessness manifested themselves in times of trials.

Talking with young soldiers and sailors I become more and more convinced each time that, like their grandfathers and fathers, they are ready to defend the Socialist Homeland, fulfilling to the end their constitutional duty. Commanders, political workers, Party and YCL activists constantly perfect the forms and methods of moral education. This is manifested in the servicemen's patriotic undertakings and daily military labour.

For instance, the Guards Panfilov Division has accumulated considerable experience in servicemen's moral education. Questions of soldiers' and officers' ideological and moral education are regularly discussed at conferences and seminars. The political department constantly instructs propagandists, Party and YCL activists in these matters. L. I. Brezhnev's books "Vital Problems of Ideological Work of the CPSU," "Small Land," "Rebirth" and "The Virgin Lands" are of invaluable help to educators. The formation has held theoretical conferences based on these books.

Problems of moral education are given much attention in the plans of agitation teams. The agitators deliver lectures and make reports in subunits. Leading political workers in the formation are among the lecturers. Activists of cultural and educational organisations also take part in the servicemen's moral education. They organise meetings with interesting people, discussion of books featuring the heroes' moral purity, courage, gallantry and honour.

Comrade General of the Army, what can you say about the role of the officer's personal example in serviceman's moral education?

All of us have at some time taken the life experience of outstanding people as an example to imitate. In the army the educators' example plays an immense role in servicemen's moral education. Exactingness towards themselves and principledness have always been distinguishing features of

highly moral people. It has been noted that the greatest success in combat training and service in general is achieved by officers with an attractive, pure and clear moral make-up. The Soviet officer is exacting towards himself and his subordinates, tactful and heedful of their needs, honest, always backs his word by deeds and spares no pains to implement commanders' and chiefs' orders and instructions. That is why his every demand, reprimand, recommendation or wish are regarded as obligatory, just and correct.

Now a few words about the standards of officers' behaviour during service hours. These standards presuppose efficiency, precision, punctuality, conscientiousness and zeal. The officer has the right to issue orders and instructions to his subordinates. Despite their categorical nature the officer's behaviour when performing his duty requires that he should recognise the dignity of each individual, display self-control, listen to the men without interrupting them and check his temper which might lead to hasty actions and premature conclusions and decisions. Familiarity and indulgence towards shortcomings have a negative impact on the men.

Servicemen regard their commanders as irreproachable people worthy of their high appointment, they follow their example, learning from them to be faithful to their duty, the laws of military service, moral principles, i.e. everything that ennobles and elevates the Soviet servicemen's spiritual make-up.

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COMBAT TRADITIONS: PURPOSE AND DESCRIPTION

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[Article by Lt-Col V. Khoroshilov]

[Text]

Definite rules and customs of army and navy life have taken root during the years of the Soviet Armed Forces' existence. Many of them are reflected in the Oath of Allegiance and the Regulations, and being handed down from one generation to another have become inviolable traditions. They have to do with the fighting man's love for their unit, fidelity to the Combat Colour, comradeship-in-arms, mutual assistance in action, conscious discipline, constant striving to perfect their military and political knowledge, care of weapons and military equipment, and friendship and cooperation with the armies of the socialist countries.

One of the Soviet Armed Forces' principal traditions is loyalty of the servicemen to their Socialist Motherland, their people and the cause of the Communist Party. It is part and parcel of another important combat tradition — fidelity to the soldier's duty.

This tradition, like the others, appeared at the birth of the Soviet Army. Already the Civil War convincingly confirmed the correctness of Lenin's words that Russia was capable of producing not only individual heroes but could bring forth hundreds and thousands of them. Some 15 thousand soldiers and commanders were decorated with the highest award of that time — the Order of the Red Banner.

The Soviet fighting men's mass heroism manifested itself with particular force in the battles of the Great Patriotic War (1941-45). Over 7 million people received state awards for feats accomplished in the battles against the nazi occupants and Japanese militarists; over 11,600 were awarded the high title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The tradition of heroism lives on in the Soviet Army in peacetime too. Numerous examples of selfless behaviour and heroic deeds during manoeuvres and exercises confirm this. Not only individual soldiers and officers and separate subunits but numerous units, formations and ships have distinguished themselves there.

The force of example, impelling the fighting men to vie with the heroes of the past and present and to imitate them, is an element of these traditions. Among these traditions the Soviet people single out especially those rules and customs that have been established since the triumph of the new social system — socialism. The principle of the socialist community "man is to man a friend, comrade and brother" has become the norm of the Soviet way of life. The older generation, handing down its experience of life to the young people, follows Lenin's behests and remembers his words on the necessity to achieve: "that the habits, usages and convictions acquired by the working class in the course of many decades of struggle for political liberty — the sum total of these habits, usages and ideas — should serve as an instrument for the education of all working people."

Combat friendship and comradeship-in-arms played a big role during the past war. Today too this tradition is preserved with care. Soviet servicemen consider it unworthy of themselves to abandon comrades who are in trouble or danger. The more difficult the situation, the more strongly is manifested their brotherhood-in-arms.

Inviolable is the tradition of friendship of the Soviet people and their fighting men with the peoples and armies of the socialist countries. What unites them, the defenders of the building of socialism and communism, are proletarian internationalism and their common goals and tasks.

The fraternal friendship strengthens and develops at joint army exercises of the Warsaw Treaty member-states, at their numerous meetings and joint operations to improve the fighting trim of the forces.

Combat traditions help the younger generation to acquire a correct idea of the heroic deeds performed by the older generation and become imbued with respect for the difficult but honourable duties of the defenders of the country and the socialist gains of the people. The propaganda of traditions helps to achieve the continuity of generations, to unite the personnel into a single combat family and strengthen the fighting efficiency of units and subunits.

Education on combat traditions in the Soviet Armed Forces proceeds in the process of combat training and political education, mass propaganda, cultural-educational work and in everyday life. The commanders, political workers, Party and Komsomol organisations of subunits and units concentrate their attention on helping each serviceman to develop a deep understanding of the content and meaning of the revolutionary, labour and combat traditions of the people and the army and on their activities in the spirit of these demands. From the very first days of the recruits' service in regiments and on ships they are acquainted with the traditions of the army and the navy. The young men are addressed by the veterans of the units, who tell about the history of the Soviet Army and Navy, the unit's combat road, the heroic deeds of their brothers-in-arms and the experience of the excellent serviceman in combat training and political education. The young soldiers feel a legitimate pride when, for example, they learned that the Guards unit in which they were to serve had defended Stalingrad, liberated Belgorod, Kharkov, Kirovograd and other cities and had forced many rivers in battle. The men of this unit took prisoner some 6,000 nazi soldiers and officers, captured 209 enemy guns, 23 tanks, about 1,000 motor vehicles and 250 mortars. During the war years 10 servicemen of this unit were awarded the title of Hero of the Soviet Union and over 5 thousand were decorated with Orders and medals.

Talks with the young recruits are often held in front of the unit's Combat Colour and the Ship's Flag, which are symbols of military valour, honour and glory. The Colour, as is stated in the Interior Service Regulations, reminds every serviceman of his sacred duty to defend the Motherland with fortitude and skill, without sparing his blood and very life. In the battles against the enemies of the Homeland the Soviet Army and Navy covered their colours with unfading glory. And when the Colour was threatened with danger everyone was ready to give all his strength, to sacrifice his life to prevent its being captured by the enemy. Many soldiers, sergeants and officers were decorated with high state awards.

For a Soviet fighting man to be worthy of the Combat Colour means to multiply its glory by excellent results in the service and to enhance combat readiness.

The soldiers and sergeants get acquainted with the rules and standards of behaviour which have become traditional, at political lessons. For instance, when studying the history of the country, the Communist Party and the Soviet Armed Forces, they come to understand the essence of the revolutionary, combat and labour traditions of the Soviet people.

Museums and Rooms of Combat Glory in formations and units and veterans' councils play an active role in military patriotic work. Positive experience has been accumulated in the units where the Hero of the Soviet Union Yuri Smirnov served. There is a well-appointed Room of Combat Glory in the unit. Its displays illustrate the staunchness of Smirnov, his devotion to the Motherland. Smirnov died a martyr's death: the nazis, having taken him prisoner when he was wounded, nailed him to a wall and subjected him to torture. But Yuri Smirnov did not betray any military secrets.

Displayed in the Room are a sketch of the unit's combat road, pictures, photographs, documents, the heroes' personal belongings, descriptions of their feats, models of the weapons used in battles and memorable gifts presented to the personnel by the working people.

One of the combat traditions is to honour the memory of servicemen who died a hero's death in battles for the Motherland and have been entered for ever in the rolls of a unit or ship. Every day their names are mentioned at the evening roll-call. Monuments to the hero-servicemen are erected on the territories of many cantonments, and their accurately made beds are kept in prominent places in the barracks. For instance, by the bed of the above-mentioned Yu. Smirnov, entered for ever in the rolls of the unit, stands his bust made by handicraftsmen of the unit. Here on display is also a brass plate on which is engraved the text of the Decree of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet conferring on him the title of Hero of the Soviet Union.

The central and army press, radio and TV are effective means of propagating traditions. The District and Navy political administrations put out pamphlets, combat bulletins and placards devoted to the war veterans. Printed materials are also devoted to the heroes of peaceful everyday army life and to excellent servicemen in combat training and political education.

Of great help in educating the personnel are military rituals, such as parading the Combat Colour, taking the Oath of Allegiance, drill reviews, presentation of combat weapons, daily relief of the guards, photographing of excellent servicemen in combat training and political education next to the unfolded Combat Colour of the unit, and so on.

During the days when notable dates in the history of the country and the Armed Forces and the anniversaries of formations and units are marked the unit veterans, representatives of the local government bodies, front-rank workers and parents of the heroes who fell in battle are invited.

During preparations for and holding of tactical exercises the fighting men are told about the feats of the front-line soldiers.

The feats of the older generations of the country's defenders were and are, for Soviet officers and men vivid examples of valour and heroism, models of service of the Socialist Homeland.

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WARTIME OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS DESCRIBED

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[Article by Col N. Kobrin, Cand. Sc. (History)]

[Text]

Massing of men and equipment in the main directions is one of the most important principles of the art of war. During the Great Patriotic War (1941-45) the Soviet Command, in its efforts to achieve success in the offensive strove not to disperse its manpower and equipment along the entire front but to concentrate them on the decisive direction. This provided the possibility to outnumber the enemy in manpower and equipment on separate sectors, without at the time having actual superiority over him.

Thus during the East-Prussia operation (January-April 1945) the 54th Guards Infantry Division of the 28th Army was assigned the mission to break through the enemy defences in a zone 3.5 km wide (see Sketch No. 1).

The divisional commander decided to deliver the main blow with his right flank on a one km sector, where the most vulnerable spot in the enemy defence — the limiting point between his units — was located. Besides, the terrain allowed the use of tanks and self-propelled artillery mounts to the best of their capacity, quick manoeuvres and surprise of the attack. On the left flank the terrain was boggy.

According to reconnaissance data the divisional commander established that in the zone of the impending attack the enemy had organised defence in depth consisting of three strongly fortified zones. The forward edge was covered with double-row wire entanglements and mine fields of the mixed type. The inhabited localities had a perimeter defence.

Experience of previous battles showed that to break through a deep enemy defence it was necessary to have a three-fourfold superiority over the enemy in infantry, and a five-sixfold superiority in artillery, tanks and self-propelled guns.

At the beginning of the operation, the 54th Guards Infantry Division taking into account organic, attached and supporting weapons, had 174 mortars, 166 guns and 34 tanks, which allowed only a two-threefold superiority over the enemy in artillery and tanks.

Taking this into consideration the divisional commander decided to concentrate two thirds of his division in the direction of the main blow in order to have high densities: 244 guns and mortars, 20 tanks and self-propelled guns per km of frontage. Such massing of fire weapons made it possible to strike simultaneously at the most important targets in the direction of the main blow and on the flanks to a depth of 10-12 km.

The major condition for carrying out the offensive at high speed was the troop formation. Massing in this case involved not only creating powerful first echelons, but also assigning large forces to the second echelons and reserves. The battle order of an infantry division both during the breakthrough of the enemy defences and in the course of the offensive assumed various forms. It had to correspond to the concept of the impending action, and to the actual situation.

During the first years of the war, when the depth of the enemy defences was, as a rule, small, the battle orders of the Soviet forces from section to company assumed line formation and from battalion to division, a one echelon formation with

obligatory, not very large reserves. For example, in the counteroffensive at Stalingrad in November 1942, the commander of the 47th Guards Infantry Division of the 5th Tank Army of the South-Western Front formed up all three regiments in one echelon. Only a motorised infantry battalion was held in reserve. Motorised infantry battalions and regiments also formed their battle orders in one echelon, with up to an infantry company in reserve.

An artillery antitank reserve consisting of two-three batteries of antitank artillery, two platoons of antitank rifles and artillery group of the infantry support was organised in a division.

Such a formation of the battle order allowed maximum concentration of men and equipment in the first echelon. Of the division's 27 companies, 21 took part in the attack with an overall density up to two and a half infantry battalions per kilometre of the frontage. This increased the strength of the first blow and made possible a successful breakthrough of not very deep enemy defences.

However, subsequent operations showed that with one echelon combat formation the division commander had not sufficient men and equipment to build up strength in breaking through deep defences. So in late 1942, when the enemy defences were deep, the advancing infantry divisions and regiments assumed two and even three echelon battle order. As a rule, one third of all available forces was assigned to the second echelon. Fire weapons of the second echelons of infantry divisions and regiments prior to their commitment to action reinforced with their fire the subunits and units of the first echelon.

The Commander of the 54th Guards Infantry Division, for example, assumed two-echelon combat formation with the 163rd and the 162nd Guards Infantry regiments in the first echelon and the 160th Guards Infantry Regiment in the second echelon (see Sketch No. 1). The second echelon was to advance behind the division's right flank. Strong regimental artillery groups were organised in the 163rd and 162nd Guards Infantry regiments. The divisional artillery group consisted of a howitzer regiment and a regiment of rocket mortars.

As the warring sides began to make massive use of tanks, fighting them became an immediate task. Antitank weapons were included in battle formations of the first and second echelons and artillery-antitank reserves of divisions and regiments were organised during the fighting in tank threatened directions. A mobile obstacle detachment consisting of engineer subunits with mining equipment was also detailed to fight tanks.

Such a structure of the battle order of units and formations made it possible to build up the strength of blow in good time, to shift efforts quickly during battle from one direction to another, to repulse enemy counterattacks successfully and when necessary to replace first echelon subunits.

When advancing in the direction of the secon-

Sketch No. 1



dary attack and against weakly organised enemy defences the forces more often than not assumed one-echelon formation with a small reserve.

However, the breakthrough of the enemy defences in the entire depth depended not only on concentrating men and equipment in the main direction but also on accumulating combat efforts during the offensive. The time of commitment to action of the second echelon acquired in this case paramount significance. Experience teaches that build-up of efforts and exploitation of success of the first echelon must be carried out before the advance slows down. Delay in committing the second echelon allows the enemy to prepare for organised resistance. However, the second echelon should not be committed prematurely, because in this case the fresh subunits may sustain heavy losses and suffer a considerable loss of striking power.

During the war second echelons and reserves of a division were committed to action, as a rule, simultaneously in full strength, from the same line and in the same direction. This made it possible to achieve superiority over the enemy in men and equipment and to increase the speed of advance of the Soviet forces. Usually reserves were committed where the advance developed most successfully both in the main direction and the direction of the secondary attack. If there were intervals and gaps in the enemy defences, second echelons were frequently committed in secondary directions. This precluded overdensity of the advancing forces, broadened the zone of advance and created favourable conditions for manoeuvre. Combination of massing men and equipment in definite directions with broad manoeuvre with them both before and during battle allowed the Soviet Command to achieve success.

Frontal attacks allowed an enemy in defence to concentrate fire on the most important sectors and repulse counterattacks by the Soviet forces. On sectors where units and subunits made wide use of gaps, open flanks and other weak spots in the enemy defences for bold and resolute and sometimes daring flanking movements and envelopments, victory was achieved more quickly and with smaller losses.

The experience of the war showed that during the offensive and sometimes when breaking through the enemy defences it was often necessary to shift the main effort from one direction to another. This was done by manoeuvring with the second echelons, reserves and also some of the men and equipment of the first echelon.



Sketch No. 2

The operations of the 121st Infantry Division in August 1943 when capturing a bridgehead on the Seim River in the area of the city of Rylsk are characteristic in this respect (see Sketch No. 2). By decision of the divisional commander the main blow was delivered at the left flank by the forces of the 574th and 383rd Infantry regiments. The bulk of the artillery was concentrated there. In order to mislead the enemy the 705th Infantry Regiment advanced on the right flank.

On August 1, after the artillery preparation, the division passed over to the offensive. Operating two days in the direction of the main blow the division was unable to capture a bridgehead. The enemy brought up reserves and by counterattacks hurled back the Soviet forces to their initial position.

Operations in the direction of the secondary attack succeeded, and the 705th Infantry Regiment managed to capture a bridgehead on the Seim. The commander of the division decided to leave two infantry companies in the zone of the offensive of the 574th and 383rd Infantry regiments. The rest of the forces he decided to switch over during the night to the captured bridgehead and by striking at the flank of the enemy grouping to capture the city of Rylsk. Having carried out a manoeuvre the Soviet forces passed over to the offensive on the move, defeated the enemy and on August 5, liberated Rylsk.

During the postwar years the principle of massing men and equipment acquired new qualitative aspects. In contemporary conditions its significance has further grown.

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TRANSCAUCASUS MD COMMANDER ON DEVELOPING INITIATIVE

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 81 (signed to press 19 Jan 81) pp 26-32

[Article by Col Gen O. Kulishev, commander of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "Develop the Youth's Initiative"]

[Text] As important dates and events approach we, the Soviet people, customarily look back over the path we have covered and take an even closer look at the future. Today, as we approach the 26th congress of our own Communist Party, each of us is of course mentally asking himself what he personally has done for the prospering of the homeland, what he has contributed to the growth of its economic and defense strength. Preparations for the next congress, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, has stated, provide a powerful means of increasing the political and labor activity of both the communists and non-members of the party.

Both the communists and non-members.... Yes, every Soviet person, whether he smelts steel or harvests grain, descends into the mines or drives an awesome combat vehicle into a practice attack, is filled with determination to provide a fitting reception for the forum of his own Party, to make his contribution to the noble cause of building communism.

This reminds me of some good words: "Communism is the youth of the world, and the young are to build it." These are truly rallying words! The young generation ready to respond to any Party appeal, the passionate young mind, fervent souls, skillful young hands--are these not one of our creating nation's most import treasures?!

To the call of duty, to the dictates of the Komsomol conscience, the youth go wherever it is most difficult, demonstrating their best qualities. These desires are also inherent in the young soldiers of the Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District, of course.

For them, as for all the personnel of our Armed Forces, there is no task more important than that of constantly increasing vigilance and combat readiness and

of the exemplary fulfillment of their constitutional duty. They have everything they need to further perfect their military skills. The forces are outfitted with modern equipment, and their material training foundation is being constantly improved. The older generations of fighting men--commanders, political workers, engineers and technicians--pass their military know-how onto the young ones. They are the ones who teach the personnel to perform skillfully in their various types of combat, in any season, at any time of day and any sort of terrain, and to expertly employ or the sake of victory all of the means at their disposal. This is convincingly demonstrated by the combat training of district forces, in the course of which the fighting men, including the young soldiers, perform with determination, energetically, smoothly and with good coordination.

The Komsomol organization of the Guards air regiment in which Guards Senior Lieutenant M. Zaloznev is secretary of the Komsomol committee successfully performs the tasks assigned it. And this does not just happen: The Party committee constantly keeps its eye on the Komsomol's leadership and the indoctrination of the youth. The party committee skillfully and systematically focuses the efforts and the attention of Komsomol members upon the accomplishment of specific tasks for which the personnel are responsible and competently organizes the ideological and indoctrinational work performed with the youth. They devote special attention to the quality and effectiveness of each undertaking. The important thing is that it observes the rule of not doing the work for the Komsomol members and not exercising petty tutelage, but thoroughly developing their inclination for action.

What we need to teach the youth and how they need to study to become worthy builders of communism, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev stated at the 18th Komsomol Congress, is presently the most important aspect of Komsomol work and of Party supervision over this work. To help the Komsomol members and the young fighting men to thoroughly master Marxist-Leninist doctrine, to develop communist conviction and an active stance in life in these individuals, to produce courageous, skilled and disciplined soldiers--this is the prime duty of the communists. They must consistently implement the Party's instructions with regard to the comprehensive approach to indoctrination and make certain that the ideological and political, labor and moral indoctrination of the youth is unified.

Political organs and Party organizations must become more deeply involved in the ideological life of each Komsomol collective and show more objective concern for improving the political and indoctrinational work performed with the youth and for the creative and effective use of all ways of influencing each young soldier ideologically, taking into account his general education and cultural level. It is important not only to constantly orient the Komsomol organizations toward the thorough teaching of the Leninist ideological and theoretical heritage and the Party's foreign and domestic policy to the Komsomol members and the youth, but also to give them specific and all-round assistance in this matter, to draw the Komsomol members and all of the young soldiers into the active public-political life of the subunits and units, to help them develop useful initiative in the training and the strengthening of discipline.

One must have a great deal of knowledge and skill in order to carry weight with the youth today. This fact is taken into account by members of the Party committee referred to. Officers I. Volchkov, M. Popov and N. Makogonenko develop an interest in self-education in the youth leaders and help them to expand their perspective and to acquire the ability to reach the hearts of the men. At the same time they do everything possible to support and enhance the authority of the Komsomol leaders and activists.

The youth of this regiment lead an interesting and full life and initiate many undertakings. Competition with the slogan "For Each Flight--A Komsomol Guarantee" is well organized and skillfully conducted in the unit, equipment days and quizzes on the equipment are regularly conducted and are instructive, a bulletin "Pereklichka pokoleniy" [Roll Call of the Generations] is published, and other activities are conducted. And what is pleasing is the fact that every good initiative is discussed in the party and Komsomol committees before being passed onto the collective.

The commanders and political organs do everything possible to teach the troops that which is essential in a war. The assistance provided them by the Komsomol organizations is a great help in the daily work.

Field training is the crowning element in the training of the troops, of course. The richer and more extensive the set of tactical methods possessed by the troops, the greater is the likelihood that they will emerge victorious from the battlefield. The Komsomol initiative aimed at enhancing the practical skills of the young fighting men in an offensive and in a defense, in the operation of the modern weapons and combat equipment, and at helping the commander train them to perform boldly and confidently, to demonstrate steadfastness, determination and persistence in the achievement of the assigned objective is especially praiseworthy for this reason.

This kind of initiative has been demonstrated by Komsomol members in many parts of our district. The tank battalion commanded by Major I. Cherepov has been highly successful in the socialist competition for many years. Time passes, and people are replaced, but the subunit's confident advance toward the pinnacles of military skill remains the same. Why is this? One of the main factors in Major Cherepov's success is the militancy of the battalion Party organization, which skillfully relies upon the youth, while pointing out to them the paths to take in the quest for improvement. And the youth are coming up with their own forms of initiative. These include evenings devoted to tactics, which were approved by the commander, technical quizzes, competitions to become the best in a combat specialty and youth-oriented, exciting ceremonies honoring the competition winners.

The Komsomol organization conducts evening assemblies devoted to the outstanding participants. At these assemblies the comrades give glowing accounts of their colleagues' successes, local poets read poetry written about the winners, and the favorite songs of those excelling in the competition are sung.

It is important to stress the fact that these activities are not a matter of secondary importance for the activists. In their own way they are also performing the important task of creating a wholesome moral climate in the collective and improving the morale of the men, and arousing in the young hearts a fervent, commendable desire to equal the outstanding men, to advance. Naturally, such evening festivities alone would not accomplish a great deal. They are worthwhile only in combination with other activities.

In the battalion referred to questions pertaining to the exemplary performance of the young fighting men in the training, service and discipline and to the improvement of vigilance and combat readiness are regularly discussed at Party and Komsomol meetings and bureau sessions. The thought that it is a matter of personal honor to improve one's skill each day becomes stronger by the day in the mind of each Komsomol member.

It is gratifying to note that the absolute majority of young fighting men in the district see their task in precisely this light. They responded wholeheartedly to the appeal contained in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On Socialist Competition for a Fitting Reception for the 26th CPSU Congress" to struggle persistently to improve the work and make it more effective.

Today, every third Komsomol member in the district is outstanding in the training and has received three or four badges for military valor, around 60 percent of the Komsomol members have passed certification exams and around 40 percent have mastered related specialties and achieved complete interchangeability in the teams and crews.

We are pleased with the success achieved by fighting men of the Guards tank regiment commanded by Lieutenant Colonel I. Sukhostavets, a communist, who was recently promoted to a higher position. The work of the commanders, the political workers and other communists lies behind the success of the tankmen. Also that of the Komsomol aktiv and the young Leninists, of course. Everything done by the youth there is focused upon the main task, that of constantly helping the commander and the Party organization to improve vigilance and combat readiness and to maintain firm military discipline. These matters are regularly discussed at meetings of the Komsomol committee, aktiv seminars and meetings. They are always discussed in the tank unit in a concerned manner, taking into account the opinions and suggestions of every Komsomol member. And when it comes time to put the plans into action, the Komsomol activists once again set the tone. I might add that in this regiment they are all outstanding in the combat and political training, highly qualified specialists and rated sportsmen. They are involved and interested in everything pertaining to the training and conduct of the Komsomol members. They want to know who is lagging, who needs help and how they can improve the situation.

Success did not come to the youth of this regiment all at once, however. There was a time when a great deal of fuss would be made about a good and useful undertaking, and that would be the end of it. A fancy resolution would be written up, and then, when it came time for the practical work, the people would run out

of energy. And a good beginning would lose its steam. It is to the credit of the regimental Komsomol committee and Senior Lieutenant M. Yakovlev, its secretary, that this situation did not last long.

Some of the Komsomol organizations are still not demonstrating initiative, seeking improvements or striving to be innovative, however. The Party organizations do not always provide them with tangible assistance.

Take the regiment in which Captain S. Shcherban' is secretary of the Party committee, for example. The communists there do not involve themselves deeply enough in the life of the Komsomol organization and do not provide the secretary of the Komsomol committee with tangible assistance. And the youth there lead an uninteresting life. The unit has mediocre ratings for training and discipline. This is due in great part to a low level of aggressiveness on the part of the Komsomol members. Some of the Party members try to explain the situation by saying: "We don't have time for the youth. We have enough concerns of our own...."

The situation is no better in another unit. The Komsomol organization's work reflects formalism and is mostly all on paper. The Komsomol members adopted a decision to launch a competition in the unit with the slogan "Destroy the Target with the First Shot, the First Launching, the First Round." Time passed, however, and they did not lift a finger to back up their words with specific action. Who is to blame for this? Primarily, of course, the Komsomol committee, which is headed by Senior Lieutenant V. Khazov. The Party organization and all of the communists unquestionaly share the blame, however. After approving the Komsomol members' initiative, they did not help the latter to organize the competition or interest the personnel. As a result, the young peoples' decision was never carried out.

Lack of initiative also comes in many forms, unfortunately. Don't we have situations in which people accept important commitments at the beginning of the training period, present useful ideas and feel that they have fulfilled their duty with that? Reality then brings up other, specific tasks, and the Komsomol organization moves on to them. As a result, each new task pushes the previous one into the background. We are warned against precisely this manner of performing the job and against this type of errors by the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On the Continued Improvement of Ideological, Political and Indoctrinational Work," which demands persistence in the resolution of problems which arise.

It has been almost two years since this decree was passed. During this time little has been done in the district forces to implement the requirements set forth therein. This is especially true with respect to enhancing the indoctrinational role of the Soviet Armed Forces, serving in which provides a remarkable school of labor and military training, moral purity and courage, patriotism and comradeship.

We are justifiably proud of the fact that the entire structure of our army reality and the day-to-day work of the commanders, political workers, Party

and Komsomol organizations make it possible to develop steadfast armed defenders of the homeland. And yet, we need to give more thought to this matter. This includes those who work with the youth.

Consider the following fact. A large part of the youth are drafted into the army straight from the schoolroom. In the beginning it is not easy for them to cope with the hardships of military work. Simply stated, they are not prepared for this.

Let us digress for a moment and consider how the youth's first impression of the service is formed. They most frequently get their first impression from books and films and from the stories of their comrades and older brothers, when they return from the army. I would not say that our service is described as easy in films or in works of literature. The youth perceive reality in such a way, however, that the most lasting impression in their minds is made by the romantic side of the service, while the difficulties created by the particular way of life somehow remain in the background. And then, the young soldier, literally on his very first day, learns that the service consists not only of difficult military work but also of washing floors, cleaning the barracks and the grounds of the army post and a great deal more, which is far from romantic. And some of them, frankly speaking, are not accustomed to doing these things at home. Their concepts do not coincide with the reality. And although this discrepancy does not last, it is still felt severely. This is where special tact and a special approach are required of the commanders, political workers, Party and Komsomol activists. It is no secret, however, that some of the young officers, warrant officers and sergeants sometimes limit this work to simply talking with the men: They talk with one soldier today, with another tomorrow. This talking becomes a goal in itself and produces a minimum of results with respect to affecting the young soldiers. Just what is wrong? As it turns out, working with the men on an individual basis is more than a matter of talking. It also requires devoting constant attention to the less experienced colleague, giving him direct assistance with the mastery of the complex combat equipment and many other things which give the individual support during his difficult days.

There is another aspect of the problem. It is not only the new soldiers who require attention from the collective. The team should never for a minute neglect to work with soldiers in their second year of service. Having become familiar with the army way of life and having mastered the complex combat equipment, the majority of them have deservedly gained prestige and respect among their colleagues. This is not always the case, however. Sometimes, contrary to regulations, second-year servicemen begin exhibiting arrogance toward the newcomers and attempt to shift some of their duties onto the latter. And it never occurs to the superiors of those individuals or to the aktiv to ask them sternly: Do you really have so much seniority over the recent draftees? Does this give you any sort of special privileges? Does this fit in with our moral standards or military ethics? It is absolutely clear that the tasks involved in strengthening military discipline and uniting the collectives are always successfully accomplished where there is a climate of intolerance for any irregularities in the relationships among the soldiers, where there is a wholesome moral atmosphere. What is involved in creating a wholesome climate, however,

and what role do the Komsomol activists have in this matter? First and foremost, it involves striving to see that all of the Komsomol members are strict with themselves and with others, that they strive to prevent individuals from covering up for each other and not reconcile themselves to those who live by the rule "It is no concern of mine," to those who say one thing and do another, those who are not comfortable with discipline and order.

It is not necessary to demonstrate the fact that today's soldier must be especially levelheaded and sharp and possess good mental concentration. The age we live in is such that we cannot afford to become lax. The equipment and weapons are demanding increasingly greater discipline and effort on the part of the individual. One has to be not simply bold, but bold and skillful, in order to be daring on the battlefield today. In other words, patriotism and a sense of duty backed up by a good knowledge of the equipment and excellent combat training are what is needed. The young person can only substantiate his love for the homeland with action performed on a high professional level. Indoctrinational work performed with the youth should center around this thought.

We still frequently see people working at half-capacity, however, making errors and even attempting to "justify" their performance with the standing excuse: "I am young. I will straighten up." But no, youth was not given to an individual for justifying a lack of concern. It was given for real accomplishments, for the performance of real work, work which goes especially well in the swing of socialist competition.

Take the competition for combat training tasks and norms, as an example. When skillfully and creatively organized, it takes the participants from goals already reached onto new ones. Furthermore, it teaches the soldier to value training time, to appreciate every second. It is commendable that the district Komsomol organizations are aware of these qualities and take them into account in their work. There are still reserves in this area, however.

What are the predominate commitments in our district? To achieve excellence, to become a highly rated specialist or a rated sportsman, to make the crew or team an excellent one, and so forth. These important and necessary commitments have a long range objective, so to speak. One can only say for certain that they have been fulfilled at the end of the training period or year. We know that in some instances it is precisely this fact which deprives the competition of its vital and daily link with the training process and essentially turns the competition into two elements: the acceptance of commitments and the totaling up of the final results. And rivalry is only effective when the tension never weakens, when at every stage the participants can see an immediate goal, a goal which must be linked to the fulfillment of specific combat training tasks and norms. Only then is it possible at any time objectively to assess the fulfillment of the commitments, to see things in perspective, to take steps to eliminate deficiencies. However, it is also very important to bear in mind the fact that competition and rivalry among equals especially brings out the youth's initiative. This creates extensive possibilities for questing. It is perhaps in this area, more than anywhere else, however, where routine is the main enemy. If part of the young

soldiers in a certain subunit are competing for "checkmarks," if the aktiv takes no interest in the matter, if the demanding attitude is missing, then the damage is doubled. In the first place, the competition itself is ruined. In the second place, moral harm is inevitable. The young people become accustomed to the idea that the most important thing is not to actually accomplish something but to simulate vigorous activity. It seems to me that there is no point in even discussing Komsomol initiative in this situation.

I have already discussed the particular importance of properly organizing the drills, especially tactical drills. This is of crucial importance to the combat training. There is also a moral aspect to the matter, however.

I shall illustrate this with the following example.

In one of the exercises the subunit commanded by Senior Lieutenant N. Ivanov, a Komsomol activist, was assigned the mission of capturing an "enemy" strongpoint, which was preventing the main forces from advancing. The officer appraised the situation and decided to divert the attention of the defending forces. After determining that one of the opponent's flanks was less securely covered, Ivanov dispatched a detachment of company machine guns to the area. The plan was successful: The "enemy" had not expected this kind of onslaught and did not hold out. During this battle the young motorized riflemen performed boldly and resolutely, ignoring the conditionality of the situation. The men were infected by the initiative of their commander, an activist.

Now, I have a different example. I will not mention the young officer's name, because I believe he will correct his ways. He was the object of serious criticism at a recent service conference, however: His drills are conducted at a poor methodological level, and the performance of the personnel is simplified. Instead of admitting his error, however, the young officer tried to produce justifications. He made it sound as though the men in the subunit are apathetic and uninterested in improving the situation, that "the bunch of them lacks initiative," in general.

But where would they get it, the initiative? After all, the commander is the leader and the origin of it all. After all, a spark is needed to produce fire.

The army youth's initiative, inclination to seek and enthusiasm.... These matters have concerned and will continue to concern commanders, political workers, Party and Komsomol activists.

Unquestionably, it is primarily the people who think of life in terms of action, who are oriented toward initiative and quest. "Nothing so elevates the individual as does an attitude of action toward life, an aware regard for public duty, when unity of words and deeds becomes the daily standard of conduct. It is the task of moral indoctrination to develop such an attitude." These words uttered by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and chairman of the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet, at the 25th party congress, constitute a militant program for Komsomol organizations in the moral indoctrination of the army youth and the development of an attitude of action toward life in them.

A soldier's good morality is based upon his ideological maturity and his communist conviction. This fact accounts for one of the Komsomol's most important tasks, that of continuously improving the work of providing the youth with a communist indoctrination, of seeking and finding new ways of influencing the minds and the hearts of the fighting men.

Practical action is the best measure of one's moral stance. This is what we must bear in mind when we discuss whether a certain Komsomol member is active. It is important to bear in mind how well he fulfills the requirements set forth in regulations and the oath, how well he performs in tactical drills and exercises and how successful he has been in the service.

The following is among the main tasks advanced by the draft "Main Directions for the USSR's Economic and Social Development for the Years 1981-1985 and Extending Through the Period to 1990," prepared by the CPSU Central Committee for the 26th party congress: "...in all areas of the building of communism the Komsomol is expected to lead the youth in the struggle to fulfill and exceed plan assignments, to develop in them Soviet patriotism, a sense of love for the socialist homeland, a desire to acquire knowledge and possess the achievements of science, technology and culture...."

The statement that life is a constant test is a valid one. In one's youth it is a double test, because the youth must take the test not only for civic maturity, but for military maturity as well, because they must demonstrate their loyalty to the homeland with concrete military deeds. And it is very important for all of us to make certain that when the young person takes this test, he does not make allowances for himself, neither large nor small, that his deeds and actions are nurtured by interest, enthusiasm and romanticism. After all, youth is the time of the most vigorous action, of constant questing and initiative.

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON VIGILANCE INDOCTRINATION

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 81 (signed to press 19 Jan 81), pp 87-88

[Review by Col (Res) N. Tyrin of the book "Vospitaniye bditel'nosti u sovetskikh voinov" [Indoctrination of Vigilance in Soviet Fighting Men] by A. V. Kalachnikov, Voyenizdat, Moscow, 1980, 152 pages]

[Text] A. Kalachnikov's book "Vospitaniye bditel'nosti u sovetskikh voinov," published by Voyenizdat, discusses the development of vigilance in Soviet fighting men. On the basis of instructions provided by V. I. Lenin and the CPSU on the importance of great political vigilance to the constant combat readiness of the Armed Forces, the author considers the substance, forms and methods of political-indoctrinational work aimed at developing this most important quality in the personnel of units, ships and subunits. The book is also valuable in the fact that commanders and political workers, party and Komsomol activists will find considerable practical instructive experience described therein.

Vigilance is a concept both multifaceted and concrete. In his discussion of the term the author mentions the fact that vigilance in the conventional sense means alertness, unweakening watchfulness. In the political sense, however, it refers to acute class self-awareness, a clear understanding of the contemporary international situation, the ability to recognize the enemy's treacherous intrigues and promptly put an end to them. In Soviet fighting men vigilance consists primarily in the ability to protect military and state security, in the unquestioning fulfillment of orders issued by commanders and chiefs, in constant readiness to defend socialism's great conquests.

By way of backing up the thesis that the greater the vigilance of every fighting man, the greater will be the combat readiness of the subunit, unit or ship, and in the final analysis, of our Armed Forces, the author takes a trip into our homeland's heroic past. During the harsh period of war the vigilance of Soviet patriots was one of the most important factors contributing to success in combat. The book describes the importance of purposive party-political work performed at the front to develop a high level of vigilance.

Today, the tasks performed by our Armed Forces have grown and the forces have changed, and the importance of vigilance has not only not decreased but has actually increased many times over. The book points out that vigilance demands greater knowledge and skills, improved organization and mobility of the troops, and has become a professional quality essential to the fighting men.

With this in mind the author describes the demands made of the fighting men during the performance of guard, garrison and internal service, in their work with classified documents and their personal correspondence, and describes specific examples of vigilance demonstrated in various services of the Armed Forces and branches of troops. The performance of guard duty--an important condition for maintaining and improving the combat readiness of subunits, units and ships--demands special vigilance on the part of Soviet fighting men. A special chapter describes the knowledge and skills, as well as the qualities essential to the exemplary performance of this combat task and describes ways of developing them in the servicemen in the process of combat and political training.

Good moral-political qualities and fighting efficiency, including vigilance, are developed in the personnel by the entire structure of army and navy life, by the entire system of training and indoctrination. An important part of this work, as the book points out, consists in studying and explaining V. I. Lenin's precepts, Communist Party decisions and the Constitution of the USSR. The development of communist ideological principles and political awareness in the servicemen is a guarantee of skillful counteraction against the intrigues of the imperialists and the foundation of the vigilance and combat readiness of Soviet fighting men.

That part of the book which discusses one of the most important aspects of vigilance--the ability of the Soviet people, especially the servicemen, strictly to protect military and state security--is certainly valuable.

The facts presented in the book demonstrate the fact that strict observance of regulation requirements and the proper protection of classified, service and personal documents is absolute law for every fighting man. Unfortunately, some servicemen still underestimate the danger of inadvertent disclosure of secret information, despite their familiarity with the demands for vigilance. Foreign intelligence agents apprehended by state security agencies of the USSR and those who have given themselves up have admitted more than once that they pumped information about the locations of units, their weapons and other facts out of overly talkative soldiers. Relaxation of vigilance on the part of certain soldiers and sailors must not remain unpunished by commanders and political workers and by the public. As the author points out, army and navy party and Komsomol organizations have great force in the struggle against negligence and gullibility.

Discipline on the part of military signalmen, as well as all those who use the telephone, telegraph and radio, is especially important for protecting military and state security. Any deviation from established procedure or regulations makes it possible to lose classified information. According to the foreign press

U.S. intelligence agencies alone have thousands of radio intercept posts and other radioelectronic facilities scattered over the planet. Forces hostile to us attempt to use these facilities to disclose the system of defense installations in the USSR and the other socialist nations, to determine the locations of industrial enterprises, military garrisons and other defense facilities. And the radio intercept equipment is not necessarily on the other side of seas or mountains: It is sometimes quite near. A foreign intelligence agent was discovered in the Baltic Military District, for example, outfitted with equipment for monitoring telephone conversations and recording them on a magnetic tape without being connected to the cable system.

Such examples remind the fighting men of the need for daily observance of discipline and secrecy in radio communications and the need strictly to guard military security also when using the telephone, in ordinary conversations, especially in public places, and in correspondence.

The book "Vospitaniye bditel'nosti u sovetskikh voinov" contains extensive, valuable information shedding light on this problem. It will be extremely useful not only to commanders and political workers, but also to a broad range of military readers, because it teaches them to perform their military service with vigilance, to be ready at any time to put a decisive halt to the intrigues of enemy agents.

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FLIGHT SAFETY PROCEDURES, PROBLEMS

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 1980 pp 22-24

[Article by Air Force Col-Gen V. Andreyev, Merited Military Pilot of the USSR]

[Text]

Airmen's combat training is a complicated and many-sided process, in which flights occupy a prominent place. An airman's, crew's or subunit's air training standard and combat readiness depend directly on the efficiency and quality with which the various flight training tasks are carried out. Flight safety is a factor of airmen's combat training which claims particular attention.

The Soviet Air Force has accumulated considerable experience in excluding potential causes of accidents during flights. Flight safety is ensured above all by daily purposeful prophylactic work, with great attention paid to strengthening discipline and enhancing organisedness of both flying and ground personnel.

Practice shows that to fulfil a combat mission successfully a pilot, besides a profound knowledge and firm skills, must have moral and psychological steeling and be able to assess critically his readiness for the forthcoming flight.

The pilot (crew) carries out most missions in the air independently. If he observes the regulations laid down in the relevant guiding documents, he can be sure of positive results. One of the commanders' most important duties in enhancing flight safety is therefore to inculcate in the personnel a high sense of responsibility for complying with all the requirements of those regulations.

In air units and subunits of the Order of Lenin Moscow Military District, airmen's training is organised in such a way that the question of flight safety is tied in with all other aspects of training first class airfighters. Commanders, political workers, officers of staffs and services, Party and YCL organisations spare no pains to improve the personnel's combat skills. Training is conducted without any slackness or oversimplification, pilots' and other specialists' actions are evaluated objectively. Any violation of the rules is immediately brought to the knowledge of the entire collective, thoroughly discussed and analysed. Commanders and Party and YCL organisations take all necessary measures not only to disclose shortcomings, but also to correct and avoid them in the future.

Officers' personal examples have always been most effective in achieving good and excellent results in flight training. In training and educating personnel the Air Force makes wide use of the principle: "Do as I do." This means that the commander must be a model for his subordinates, because they will imitate him in everything, both good and bad.

One day an instructor pilot was getting ready for a daylight flight in clouds on a dual-control aircraft. The simplicity of control and reliability of the equipment, and also his considerable experience, lulled the pilot's professional vigilance. He ignored the obvious rule that there are no trifles in the air; therefore, for a successful outcome of each flight most serious attention must be paid to individual training and the preparation and checking of the aircraft before the flight.

When he got into the cockpit the pilot did not check the position of the gyro horizon failure switch. This negligence led to another. Having detected gyro horizon failure after takeoff, the pilot continued the flight. He did not report the incident until he had flown past the homing station.

Luckily, everything ended well, but the subordinates learned about their commander's violation of the flight preparation procedure, who had consequently not fulfilled the assigned mission. Cases like this result in loss of prestige on the part of the commander and trainer.

It also happens that, trying to speed up airmen's training, certain commanders violate the requirements of guiding flight documents. For instance, in a unit mastering new aircraft equipment a young officer was appointed squad-

ron commander. He had a good flight training standard and sufficient experience. However, the first successes of the collective he commanded went to his head. When acting as flying control officer, he reduced the time allotted to preparing the aircraft for a repeat flight and admitted his subordinates to missions not envisaged by the schedule. Such an attitude of the flying control officer to the organisation of flights could not guarantee their safety and impaired the quality of the unit's combat training. Naturally, the senior commander had to debar the officer from flight control.

The analysis of potential accident causes shows that a definite percentage of accidents are the result of speeding up the process of pilots' and navigators' professional training. Some commanders fail to take into account the flying personnel's actual combat training level, particularly when passing on to a more complicated mission or to the next exercise. There are also cases when the strict and scientifically substantiated sequence of training is thoughtlessly violated.

Modern aircraft equipment makes high demands on the flying personnel's training, individual training above all. Neglect in checking on the flying personnel's knowledge and practical skills leads to a lowering in the level of flight training and flight safety in the subunit.

The analysis of pilots' mistakes prompts the conclusion that deviations or omissions in training and piloting technique generally occur at the initial stage in forming airmen's flying skills. Therefore, success in combat training depends largely on the first steps in the air. Unit and subunit commanders constantly call the attention of those who are entrusted with training and educating young pilots to this point.

Modern equipment provides considerable possibilities for preventing flight accidents and eliminating their causes. Today all planes and helicopters are provided with equipment for automatically registering flight parameters. The information obtained by this means allows solution of numerous problems bearing on the evaluation of combat use, completeness and quality of mission performance, flying technique, flying personnel's training level and the condition of aircraft equipment. Such information allows the cause of any mistake to be easily disclosed and eliminated.

In the event of superficial analysis of the data obtained with the use of flight monitoring equipment the causes of pilots' mistakes are likely to be determined inexactly. Therefore, evaluation of the flight and conclusions on eliminating shortcomings will be formal thereby failing to improve the pilots' proficiency.

Such a formal and stereotyped approach to establishing pilots' erroneous actions without considering the cause-effect relationship affects airmen's professional maturing and impairs the efficiency of measures taken to raise flight safety. To blame for this are firstly commanders and instructors who prove incapable of making use of all the available information to teach their subordinates piloting technique, competent and rational use of equipment or aircraft armament, or who do not think it necessary, for some reason or other, to discover the root cause of this or that mistake.

One of the basic formulas of ergonomics says that to ensure reliable functioning in the "man-machine" system, one must without fail fulfil the requirement: "know — be able — actually do — do in time."

It follows that in analysing a pilot's mistake the commander should proceed from the assumption: either the pilot has inadequate knowledge of the theoretical side of the problem, fails to distribute his attention correctly, cannot correct his mistake in time, or fails to comply with the preset time limit for performing the actions essential in the given situation.

As experience of many years has shown, flight safety can be guaranteed only on condition that the procedure and flying rules established by methods instructions are strictly observed. A major role in ensuring flight safety is played by prophylactic measures aimed primarily at timely detection of weak points in flight training organisation. It is most important to propagandise prophylactic measures and to drive home to the personnel that such measures are indispensable and obligatory, and not to be replaced by any others.

Disclosing, competently generalising and energetically implementing advanced experience goes a long way to enhance flight safety. All units and subunits must follow the advanced experience of others in their daily practice.

Actual evaluation, based on objective data, of the state of affairs in carrying out flight training tasks and ensuring flight safety should become the main source of information.

The experience of the best units shows that it is possible and necessary to fly without accidents or their potential causes. To this end, each airman must display a high training standard, discipline, conscientious attitude to his duties and strictly fulfil the laws of flying service. With this aim in view, commanders at all levels carry out daily purposeful educational and organisational work to preclude shortcomings, to disclose and eliminate their causes in time and to make their subordinates feel personally responsible for the fulfilment of their service duties.

Commanders play an important role in creating a healthy moral atmosphere in military collectives. The airmen's spirit and their desire to carry out the assigned missions successfully largely depend on the commanders, their prestige and experience as educators. To succeed in creating such an atmosphere, there must be no room either for rudeness, which is alien to Soviet people, or for indulgence, which gives rise to irresponsibility. Only genuine exactingness on the part of commanders and servicemen's strict responsibility for observing military discipline and the requirements of flight documents can ensure enhanced flight safety and prevent accidents and their potential causes.

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RUNWAY REPAIR METHODS DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 1980 pp 29-30

[Article by Col-Eng A. Zhuravlyov]

[Text]

To rehabilitate an airfield quickly after an enemy attack and to ensure effective combat operation of aircraft is a most complicated task, requiring high proficiency and organisation of engineer subunits.

There are different kinds of runways. Many aerodromes have several intersecting runways. Others have only one or two parallel runways. Some aerodromes are provided with broad taxiways which may be used as reserve runways.

The commander has to bear all these peculiarities in mind when faced with the task of repairing damage. It should be remembered that rehabilitating aerodromes with several parallel runways involves less expenditure owing to the possibility to use temporarily a reserve runway or a broad taxiway even in the event of a direct hit by an enemy missile, bomb or explosive shell.

To put an aerodrome out of action, the enemy, besides bombs, may also use tactical, guided and non-guided missiles. Nor is the use of more powerful modern weapons to destroy big aerodromes close to industrial centres excluded.

Hence the importance of timely training of personnel and preperation of material and equipment so that measures to rehabilitate the airfield may be taken promptly.

It is appropriate to recall the experience of rehabilitating aerodromes during the Great Patriotic War. In those stern years the repair of airfields and the search for new take-off strips, particularly in front-line areas, were of tremendous significance for conducting air combat operations.

These missions were assigned to departments of aviation deployment areas and attached subunits. They did extensive work to rehabilitate aerodromes. Not infrequently they had to work under heavy enemy fire.

The fighting men of the air engineer battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Perevoznikov, for instance, started to build advanced aerodromes long before the offensive. Two operational groups were detailed to choose sites for airfields. Attached to them were 6-8 prospecting teams, a mine clearing detachment, and medical personnel. The groups were provided with aircraft, motor vehicles and communication facilities.

Choosing the site began with a study of enemy aerodromes. Proceeding from air reconnaissance data and using large-scale topographic maps, the staff collected and processed information on the condition of enemy aerodromes and selected areas for building new airfields.

When the Soviet forces assumed the offensive, individual prospecting teams were assigned definite grid squares in which they surveyed the ground to determine whether it was suitable for building aerodromes. The results were communicated to an operational group for thorough checking of the sites selected, after which the command took the decision either to construct or rehabilitate the aerodrome.

On other occasions aircraft were widely used to reconnoitre the terrain, and this allowed the entire front-line area to be scanned, thus reducing the prospecting time.

Having selected the site, a sketch was drawn up and the volume of work specified. In those years transportation of the various mechanisms and units used for building and rehabilitating aerodromes presented considerable difficulties. The ground had first to be demined.

In spite of the difficulties, Soviet engineer battalions coped successfully with the assigned missions.

The first-priority task after an enemy attack is eliminating bomb craters, for even the smallest crater may be 110 cubic metres in volume. In combat situation all rehabilitation work is done according to standard technical and constructional designs. All operations are performed in a definite sequence permitting destroyed sectors of an aerodrome to be quickly restored so as to ensure normal take-off and landing for aircraft.

To repair damage, previously prepared and also local improvised construction materials are used. Aerodromes must be stocked beforehand with definite quantities of timber, cement, bitumen, sand, crushed stone (gravel), and also precast reinforced concrete and steel sections for aerodrome surfaces. Besides, earth, broken bricks and surface debris are also used.

Before beginning rehabilitation work, damaged areas should be thoroughly examined. After water has been pumped out and liquidised soil removed from the craters, dry earth is poured off layer after layer to fill the crater partially or completely, and then rolled. Earth should be poured in to a level 20-25 cm higher than the maximum ground water level. If precast reinforced concrete slabs or timber are available, they are used to cover the craters. The underneath of a girder covering should be at least 0.5 m higher than the maximum ground water level. Then soil is spread over and pressed down.

In medium and large craters the earth is pressed down by trailer-type rollers. In the case of small craters this is best done by ramming.

Damaged asphalt-concrete sectors may be replaced with simplified structures made from crushed stone, broken bricks and slag mixed with earth and cement, or from soil bound by different chemical additives.

In dry zones mixtures of large quantities of clay fragments are used, while in excessively humid areas sand is preferable.

Displaced and deformed surfaces are removed by bulldozers. When repairing foundations of damaged aerodrome sectors earth, sand, crushed stone (gravel) are filled in, levelled out by bulldozers or motor graders and pressed down by rollers. When the foundation has been repaired, soil is spread over the surface. Before using additives to improve interaction with the soil and obtain a homogeneous mixture, the soil is loosened and crushed, if need be. This done, a spreader is used to spread additives (sand, crushed stone, gravel, slag, cement and other materials) evenly.

The method and volume of work for repairing concrete precast, reinforced concrete and monolithic surfaces depend largely on the nature of the damage. Work begins with removing displaced and deformed surfaces, followed by repair of drainage and other engineering systems within the crater. After the crater has been filled, the surface foundation is repaired. In the event of temporary rehabilitation of a surface, simplified and also steel and other sectional structures may be used. These surfaces may be made of different materials. Steel plate sections are placed on a well smoothed and consolidated foundation. Metal surfaces are secured to intact cement concrete surfaces by fastening them with L-shaped metal brackets to a wooden bar laid along the perimeter of the destroyed area or with soft wire to metal (concrete) girders laid along the perimeter of the damaged foundation.

The construction and dimensions of sectional and reinforced concrete members used for rehabilitating destroyed sectors are selected in each individual case depending on what is available on the aerodrome.

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COMBAT ROLE OF ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS

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[Article by Col V. Buyar]

[Text]

Initially APCs were used in the forces as transportation vehicles. Then, as their characteristics were improved, the volume of tasks they were used for began to increase. Thanks to the use of APCs the striking power and mobility of motorised infantry subunits have been enhanced allowing combat tasks to be carried out in a shorter time. APCs' fighting efficiency however depends on many other factors besides their characteristics.

When preparing for action subunit commanders determine not only the total volume of fire missions, they also specify the objectives and targets to be neutralised or destroyed by APC fire. In an offensive, for instance, combat missions assigned contain data concerning the exact place of each vehicle in the battle formation, the direction of the attack and the order in which enemy fire weapons and manpower are to be destroyed. This makes the use of APCs more purposeful.

APCs have immense capabilities which can be used to advantage in any combat situation and at any stage of a battle. For instance, when accompanying a subunit advancing to the assault position, the APCs serving as transportation facilities can also be used effectively against low-flying aircraft and helicopters. APCs can deliver fire both when in motion and at short halts; the small-arms fire conducted by the men carried in the vehicles also adds to their efficiency in fighting air targets. Each vehicle carries at least ten small fire arms with an average rate of fire of 100 shots per minute. APCs can therefore reliably cover subunits against air strikes. It should be stressed that small-arms fire proves highly effective against helicopters.

In order to raise the APCs' fighting efficiency it is important that each man in the vehicle should know in advance what he has to do. He must occupy the specified place and possess the necessary skill in fighting both the ground and air enemy. Thus, it is expedient for light machine gunners to take place in the front part of the vehicle, installing their weapons on the vehicle roof. Riflemen are placed at the embrasures (three men on each side of the vehicle) and mortar gunners in the rear part of the vehicle, close to the sides.

As soon as the subunits reach the zone of effective fire, especially of antitank fire, they change over from the march formation to prebattle and then to battle formation. On reaching the dismounting line the men leave the vehicles and continue to advance on foot under cover of the advancing tanks, artillery and APCs. Each vehicle follows its section, delivering machine-gun fire.

IN THE OFFENSIVE

The immediate participation of APCs in the advance to the assault position makes the offensive more orderly and helps the simultaneous deployment of all the forces into battle formation.

Advancing behind the attacking subunits the APCs fire at the targets and objectives specified either in advance or in the course of the attack. Afterwards they move in leaps from cover to cover and continue to support the attackers.

Owing to the APCs' reliability for neutralising enemy defences and to their high cross-country capacity motorised infantry subunits can attack either on foot or in the vehicles. They will follow the tanks at a distance of 100-300 m. Such a distance will enable them to maintain fire coordination

with the tanks and also to deprive the enemy of the possibility to fire at the tanks and APCs simultaneously, i. e. without changing the range.

It is of great importance that section leaders or observers detect enemy fire weapons, especially antitank weapons in good time so that these weapons can be destroyed by skilful distribution of targets among fire weapons. Small-arms fire is used to destroy both the enemy in the open and fire weapons to a depth of 600 m. This fire range proves to be the most destructive.

When surmounting various obstacles including mine fields the tanks go first, the attackers then intensifying fire.

Along with tanks and artillery APCs also play an important role in neutralising enemy antitank weapons. Remaining under cover close to the passages they destroy the crews of antitank weapons on the forward edge and in the near depth of the enemy defences.

Following the tanks through the obstacles the infantrymen change over from a skirmish line into a column. As a result the fire density of the attacking subunits somewhat decreases, so in order to intensify it subunit commanders make wide use of APCs along with other means of attack.

During the attack subunits will have to repel enemy counterattacks, cross water barriers, pursue the withdrawing enemy and consolidate on the lines captured. Depending on the situation enemy counterattacks may be beaten off on the move and or in a stationary position. In any case the side which is the first to deal a blow will get the upper hand. By making use of the APCs' high manoeuvrability it will be possible to reach an advantageous line quickly and thus to forestall the enemy in deploying and opening fire.

To repulse a counterattack on the move the APC-mounted infantry subunits, using the accidents of the terrain for cover, get into position on the enemy's flank or in his rear and attack. Using the APCs as mobile fire emplacements, motor gunners destroy primary targets while machine and submachine gunners strike at the enemy personnel and fire weapons located in the open.

To beat off a counterattacking enemy from a stationary position, subunits occupy an advantageous line and the APCs, located nearby generally under natural cover, open up to cut off the counterattacking enemy infantry from the tanks. Besides, the APCs can be used to protect subunits' junction points and exposed flanks and also to give fire support to the forces which have to manoeuvre in the direction of likely enemy attacks.

When forcing a water barrier APCs are used to ensure subunits' immediate approach to the river and its crossing on the move. Tanks, which are the first to approach the river-side areas, cover with their fire the subunits approaching and crossing the river. Besides ferrying troops across, APCs can also protect them from bullets and shell splinters and allow them to fire at the antitank weapons which are the most dangerous for the APCs.

After forcing a river the APC-mounted subunits, supported by aircraft and artillery, advance quickly. If deprived of the possibility to manoeuvre, the men dismount and the APCs protected by natural cover, give fire support to the attackers.

When pursuing the enemy the advancing subunits strive to disorganise his withdrawal and subsequent consolidation on a tactically advantageous ground. This is due to the rapid advance of the subunits on the battlefield combined with high fire power. Operating in close cooperation with tanks and artillery, the APCs considerably enhance subunits' ability to achieve the complete defeat of the enemy.

IN DEFENCE

If used skilfully in assuming the defensive, APCs can substantially raise subunits' ability to repulse superior enemy forces, inflict heavy losses on him, hold tactically important areas and ensure favourable conditions for passing over to the offensive.

In defence the APCs are generally used to increase the efficiency and reliability of fire systems and to protect subunits' junction points and exposed flanks. APCs' ability to manoeuvre in battle is also taken into account with emphasis placed on the control of their machine-gun fire. APCs' fire positions are organised so as to protect the vehicles reliably and at the same time ensure their effective employment.

The experience gained during exercises shows that it is advisable to use natural cover for APC firing positions. This reduces the time required to organise both the terrain and fire system. Spaced at 200-300 m from each other, the APCs are positioned in company and platoon strong points on hill slopes facing the enemy and also on reverse slopes.

Combat training practice provides many instances illustrating the use of APCs in defence. Here is one such example. During an exercise an advancing subunit had to consolidate on the line it had reached in order to repulse superior "enemy" forces.

Using the accidents of the terrain the APCs gave fire support to the subunit to cover its passing over to the defensive. In this due consideration was given to the fact that the "enemy" would try to break through the defence by concentrating his manpower and equipment on definite directions in an effort to achieve overwhelming superiority there. Therefore, along with a manoeuvre by fire provision was made also for the APC to manoeuvre from the sectors not subjected to "enemy" attacks. As the vehicles' fire positions were not far from the forward edge, they had to be camouflaged, which was done by use of natural cover. When the "enemy" approached the forward

edge the APCs opened fire on the commander's signal, taking the attackers by surprise.

The subunit commander continued to make skilful use of the APCs' fire power and manoeuvrability. As a result, counterattacks by superior "enemy" forces were repulsed.

Raising substantially subunits' combat capabilities, the APCs help them cope with their missions both in the offensive and defensive operations.

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TANK MAINTENANCE PROCEDURES DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 1980 pp 34-36

[Article by Col-Eng D. Ryazantsev]

[Text]

All the responsibility for high-quality and timely maintenance of a tank battalion in the offensive lies on the deputy commander for technical service and all maintenance operations are carried out by company technicians and tank crews, APC and truck drivers and also by the battalion technical service section with the technical facilities attached to it.

Technical support is effected in two stages: before and during the offensive. We shall deal with the first stage.

The basis of technical support at this stage consists in the instructions given by the battalion commander to his deputy for technical service after he has specified the combat mission.

As a rule, steps are first taken to prepare the equipment, damaged vehicles are rehabilitated, technical service equipment is checked for perfect condition and necessary spare parts for the armoured vehicles and trucks are supplied to repair shops. The time and manner of doing this are determined by the battalion commander.

When the deputy battalion commander had familiarised himself with the combat mission assigned and the superior deputy commander's order, he briefs his subordinates on the maintenance work to be done and sets them the appropriate mission.

The amount of maintenance work may vary depending on the situation, vehicle condition, the mileage covered since the last servicing (maintenances Nos 1 and 2), the professional knowledge and skill of the personnel and the time available. The mileage still to be covered before the next medium or major repair is also taken into consideration.

To ensure faultless operation of the equipment during an offensive it is necessary to check the condition of armament, various assemblies, mechanisms and systems, to make sure that the control linkage is properly adjusted and the sets of spares, tools and cross-country devices are complete.

The subunit officers also take part in checking vehicle condition. Company technicians inspect all the tanks of their subunits and the deputy battalion commander checks several vehicles in each company.

After the vehicles have been checked they undergo the appropriate servicing procedure, maintenances Nos 1 and 2 being most advisable.

Defects which cannot be remedied by the battalion repair subunit are reported by the commander to the

higher headquarters, and the repairs are carried out by the unit repair section.

When being prepared for use some vehicles are given additional maintenance required by the specifics of the forthcoming action, terrain conditions, season of the year and time of the day. For instance, if vehicles are to perform a night river crossing, those in charge of vehicle maintenance must check the condition of their underwater driving equipment, concentrating on all the assemblies of its detachable and non-detachable parts; besides, they make sure that external and internal communication equipment and directional gyro are in good working order, that no covers and plugs of hatches and handholes are leaky, and that the vehicle hull and turret sealing is intact, and check the condition of oxygen breathing gas masks, life jackets, night vision and illumination devices.

The quality of maintenance operations depends largely on the deputy battalion commander's skill in using both organic and attached technical service equipment. This equipment should be used, in the first place, to help crews of vehicles with only a small mileage before the next repair and of vehicles which require more labour-consuming maintenance in order to eliminate faults affecting their combat readiness.

Success of the assigned mission depends on the combat readiness of the personnel as well as of the equipment. Time permitting, it is advisable to carry out practical training. Proceeding from the training theme specified by the senior commander, the men's technical knowledge and the prevailing conditions, the deputy battalion commander proposes questions for the training of tank and truck drivers and the personnel of the technical service section. The main purpose of this training is to improve practical skills in vehicle driving, their maintenance and removal of defects in the concrete conditions of the battle and the terrain.

If practical training cannot be arranged for the entire personnel, it is advisable to limit oneself to a demonstration lesson or a briefing.

To ensure faultless functioning of the battalion repair and recovery group during the offensive, stocks of the spare parts and other items most in demand for the repair of tanks and motor vehicles are laid in during the preparatory period. They are issued by the senior deputy commander for technical service at the battalion's request.

Having issued the relevant orders and organised work to prepare for the offensive, the deputy battalion commander marks the situation on the map, designating the location of recovery equipment and evacuation routes.

After assessing the situation the deputy commander takes a decision concerning the technical support of the attackers, prepares to report to the battalion commander and works out a technical support plan.

When assessing the situation the deputy battalion commander jointly with the chief of staff works out measures to establish a technical support communication system, specifies the place of a technical trail in the battalion column advancing to the assault position and the location of the repair and recovery group, and a technical inspection point.

The deputy commander's report to the battalion commander before the decision to give battle is taken may assume the form of answers to questions interesting the commander and which his deputy must always be in a position to answer: the battalion's provision with equipment, the technical condition of the vehicles, the possibility to make up deficiencies by rehabilitation using various repair facilities, the condition of the technical service section and of the recovery equipment attached, provision with spare parts and other items for repairing tanks and motor vehicles, and his own decision for the organization of technical support.

The deputy battalion commander, when taking a decision, specifies measures to ensure faultless operation of the equipment during the offensive, defining the amount of maintenance work to be carried out, the vehicle rehabilitation procedure and the priorities for supplying tanks and trucks with spare parts and other devices.

The deputy commander organises a battalion technical trail to help tank crews and truck drivers to repair their vehicles when advancing to the assault position. To determine its composition he considers the stocks of technical service equipment available and the condition of the route of advance. A technical trail usually includes a battalion maintenance vehicle, a tank tractor, an ambulance and a truck carrying spare parts, fuel and lubricants.

To determine the amount of maintenance work to be done during the offensive the deputy commander takes into consideration the probable mileage to be travelled by the vehicles. In so doing he takes into account the topography and manoeuvre factors which depend on the concrete condition of the terrain and the enemy defences. When advancing to the assault position the topography factor is assumed to be equal to 1.1-1.2 and, when attacking on the move a defending enemy, the manoeuvre factor is taken as equal to 2-2.5.

If before an offensive the battalion performs maintenance No. 1 (maintenance No. 2) it is advisable to subject all the equipment to daily inspection by the end of the first day of the offensive and to maintenance No. 2 (maintenance No. 1) after 5-6 days of combat action. In both cases maintenance is performed by the tank

crews and truck drivers at the time specified by the battalion commander. To facilitate maintenance operations the maintenance vehicle can also be used, the relevant instruction being given by the deputy battalion commander in advance.

One of the deputy battalion commander's duties is to organize the rehabilitation of disabled vehicles. To this end he must see that the technical inspection point and the repair and recovery group are ready to operate the moment the battalion reaches the assault position. The former is used to check the condition of the equipment and the latter to remove damaged vehicles from the battlefield, put them under cover and then repair them.

In taking his decision on the use of the inspection point and the repair and recovery group, the deputy battalion commander bears in mind that the former should be located at a distance allowing it to watch vehicles on the battlefield. Therefore he gives the order to position it on hill slopes or other places from which there is a good view of the battalion battle formation and the terrain in the depth of the enemy defences. A technical inspection point usually includes a deputy battalion commander, company technicians, 2-3 driver-mechanics from the reserve, a repair man and a sapper. The technical inspection point moves on the APC detailed for this purpose and provided with communication equipment.

A repair and recovery group comprises a technical support section, a tank tractor and a truck carrying spare parts. When adopting a decision the deputy battalion commander takes into account the specifics of the recovery group's operations. Thus, it should not spend more than 2-3 hours working at the same place so as to avoid being too far from the subunits and to be able to go to sections in time to help the crews with maintenance. Damaged tanks requiring intensive repairs are handed over to the superior repair parties in the priority specified by the senior commander. The technical inspection point and the repair and recovery group move behind the battalion battle formations, the deputy battalion commander controlling the repair and recovery group from the technical inspection point.

After reporting his decision the deputy battalion commander listens to the battalion commander's order for the offensive and his instructions on organising technical support. During on-the-spot reconnaissance conducted either by the battalion commander or independently, the deputy commander works out the details of his decision concerning the dispatching sections of the battalion route of advance to the assault position, the location of the recovery group and technical inspection point and the lines of their advance.

Then the deputy battalion commander gives the order to provide technical support for the battalion in the forthcoming action. To this end he sets missions to the company technicians and to the supply platoon and technical support section leaders. The battalion working maps must show the evacuation route, the location of the damaged vehicles collection area, the technical inspection point and the regimental and the battalion recovery parties.

The deputy battalion commander checks to see that, in addition to the technical service officers, the subunit commanders are also well acquainted with these maps.

The technical support decision illustrated by a map must be approved by the battalion commander.

On giving the order to provide technical support during an offensive the deputy battalion commander takes steps to check the preparedness of the personnel and equipment for action, rendering help to subunits in need of it.

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RADAR OPERATOR TRAINING

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 1980 pp 27-28

[Article by Maj G. Belostotsky]

[Text]



A radio subunit under the command of Colonel Vedrasensky (Air Defence Forces) achieved high results in combat training. These achievements were possible largely owing to the skilfully organized socialist emulation movement, radar operators' competitions being one of its forms.

Companies and platoons arrange radar operators' competitions on days fixed to coincide with the summing up of the results of the week's combat training. These competitions allow the commanders to determine the training standard of their subordinates and to make all the necessary corrections in the training process.

Contests of this kind arouse a competitive spirit in efforts to achieve high results in combat training and are an incitement to improve the training process itself.

At battalion level radar operators' competitions are usually held at the end of each month and of each training term. They help the commanders to make a comprehensive appraisal of the servicemen's theoretical knowledge and practical skills, their ability to prepare radar for operation quickly and correctly and to remove faults if necessary. Particular attention is paid to a radar operator's ability to make the utmost use of his equipment to meet the requirements of the situation and the mission assigned and also to purely professional skills such as precision in tracking a target, supplying target data in good time or tracking a maximum number of targets.

Here is an example of such competitions. The men were informed that it was to take place on a certain Sunday and were given advance knowledge of the conditions and the

way it would be carried out as well as of the theoretical questions and tactical problems to be dealt with and the prizes to be awarded to the winners. This provided an incentive for the servicemen to prepare seriously for the contest.

Preparations went ahead in each crew. Radar chiefs and experienced operators helped the young soldiers with complicated questions. The accent was on independent work, the men themselves knowing their weak spots and what questions required special attention.

Naturally, the servicemen's preparation for the contests went on simultaneously with their daily training. Current subjects of the training programme were worked up, the most important and difficult ones being practised on the locators. So the training process followed its usual rhythm. Preparation for the competition imparted greater keenness to the training, enhancing each man's desire to achieve the best results, nobody wishing to lag behind.

On the eve of the competitions a jury composed of the battalion chief of staff Major Dzyuba and company commanders Captains Lukyanchenko and Achkasov — high-class specialists — carefully checked the condition of the combat equipment. They made sure that the radar was properly adjusted, its parameters corresponded to the basic specifications and that it was provided with complete sets of control and measuring equipment, tools and spare parts indispensable for carrying out running repair and maintenance operations. The jury members also took into account whether the radar itself, the diesel generator, ancillary premises and site were kept tidy and in good order. As a result of this inspection each crew was given a corresponding mark, the maximum being five.

Then the jury tested the specialists' ability to cut in the radar and check it in operation within the prescribed time. All these operations present no difficulty for an experienced operator provided the radar is in good working order. But the servicemen's real training level is tested not in ideal conditions, but when they have to show poise, quick wits and the ability to apply their theoretical knowledge and practical skill. For this purpose various methods are practised in the subunit.

The operator cuts in the radar in the presence of the jury, who begin to count all his time when he starts preparing it for operation. As the operator proceeds to carry out his duties a narrative may be introduced at any moment changing the situation and requiring him to take quick and resolute action. Although his equipment has been well checked in advance, he may also detect some fault which will oblige him to take the necessary measures.

The narratives and "faults" of the equipment to be introduced should be thought out carefully in advance to avoid repeating a situation and to adapt it to the operator's qualification and the period of his service. This approach is also observed when testing the men according to other criteria. As a result, both the experienced and young specialists have equal chances of winning the competition.

Skilful use of a system of varied narratives and "faults" also makes it possible to determine the operators' real standard, to cultivate psychological stability and to help them cope with various surprises inevitable in real battle.

Then the servicemen's ability to prepare their equipment for operation (third test indicator) is checked. At this stage of testing they adjust the display equipment, control the radar and select optimum operating conditions according to the mission assigned. For this the relevant conditions are provided. For example, a low-altitude target, a medium-altitude target flying in the near zone, a target appearing at maximum range, passive jamming by the "enemy" and so on. Precise time standards are set for all extra actions as well as for those required by the narrative, and for removing "faults."

Then come the tests for the main training aspects — ability to track targets and to supply without delay accurate data on the air situation. Each operator must track all the targets. If there are too many of them, the operator is given one of the sectors to deal with. The information supplied by the operator is recorded by an experienced specialist. The latter operates simultaneously with a plotter who should also be proficient in his trade so as to be able to reduce to the minimum the possibility of mistakes in estimating the operator's skill. Should any of the records be wrong, the truth is established with the help of the tape recorder, cut into the reading-out line. Tape recorders are also used to settle other points of disputes.

The plotter enters the air situation on a tracing-paper attached to the plotting board. When work in the cabins is over, the radar operators and the jury gather in the classroom to bring the test to the end. They apply the tracing-paper illustrating the radar operator's work to that attached to the board and showing radar visibility zones at different altitudes. This allows comparison of the results of the operator's work (his marks showing the detection of a new target) with radar capabilities. The operator's work on each target is assessed according to the existing standards. After the results are added up the mean mark for the operator's work is deduced and, in view of the particular importance of this indicator is multiplied by the correction factor 2.

Servicemen's ability to detect simulated targets in time is estimated in a somewhat different way. The point where the target blip was to appear is known in advance and serves as initial data. Simulated target routes are plotted beforehand on so-called perfect tracing-paper and in the circumstances it does not take long to reach a grounded conclusion.

By applying this tracing-paper to the working one it is possible to determine the errors in target tracking and

hence accuracy in reading off the coordinates (fifth indicator).

The number of errors made in the reports (sixth indicator) and their discreteness (seventh indicator) are determined by using the writing-pad with target detection records, all the controversial points being clarified by means of magnetic recordings.

In the course of the competitions the jury check the radar operators' ability to respond to control commands (eighth indicator). To do this the period is timed from the moment of the command being given (to switch over the radar to another mode of operation, to specify the target characteristics and the like) to the moment of its execution. Before giving a mark to the operator the results obtained with a stopwatch are compared with the adopted standards. The time spent to transmit a report (ninth indicator) is determined in a similar way. Even though the operator has to deal with a considerable number of targets it is not difficult to determine how many reports each operator can make per minute (tenth indicator).

The operators' theoretical knowledge (eleventh indicator) is checked by means of a written work. The contestants are assembled in the classroom and given 30 questions to answer in writing. These questions correspond to the specialists' rated qualification and require no more than 30 minutes for a succinct answer.

All in all the radar operators are given eleven marks which are then added up. The serviceman who won the most points was declared the winner.

The subunit uses the same methods for competitions in other specialities. The above methodology for assessing radar operators according to various test indicators is also widely practised both individually and in complex during daily lessons and training.

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AIR DEFENSE FORCES

POLITICAL TRAINING IN A MISSILE BATTALION

Moscow KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 3, Feb 81 (signed to press 19 Jan 81) pp 40-44

[Article by Lt Col V. Pinenov: "With a Thought For the Homeland"]

[Text] The formation of soldiers stood motionless on the antiaircraft missile battalion's parade ground, which was swept by a biting wind. The missilemen listened to words they had heard many times before. They were excited in a new way each time they heard the formal order, however:

"Assume alert duty to guard our homeland's air borders"!

From that moment, the duty specialists on the crews bear particular responsibility. It is as though the fighting men cross over a line, beyond which begin new duties not to be compared with those performed prior to this. The performance of those duties demands maximum effort, considerable knowledge and skills. In short, all that referred to as military skill.

It is not an easy thing to hold up under this stress, to retain good combat morale while performing this duty. It is with good reason that alert duty is classified among those types of military work for which the moral-political and psychological conditioning of the fighting men is particularly important.

Where do the fighting men performing alert duty get their good spirits? What fans that spark in each soldier, which, figuratively speaking, could be called the spark of constant combat readiness? A complete answer to these questions would require a detailed account of the entire system of measures involved in the political, military and moral indoctrination of the personnel. Political training, however, is still the main means of influencing the specialists, of developing in them good moral qualities and fighting efficiency and a conscientious attitude toward the performance of their assigned tasks. The following comments will have to do with this training.

Border area is a term which describes the specific disposition of the subunits here. Limitations on the flight approach time, the remoteness from large centers of population and from superior headquarters, and the harsh climate have affected the rhythm of the service here and, naturally, that of the soldiers' political training.

In antiaircraft missile battalion "X" I had the opportunity to attend a session of independent preparation for a seminar for the subordinates of Captain N. Bogachev.

...Notebook pages rustled softly. The students copied down questions to be discussed in the seminar as the instructor dictated them. The seminar subject would be "The Draft Program of the CPSU Central Committee for the 26th Party Congress, 'Main Directions for the USSR's Economic and Social Development for the Years 1981-1985 and Extending Through the Period to 1990.'" The evening before the fighting men had heard a lecture presented by Captain Ye. Shchadrin. He explained to the soldiers the meaning and the significance of this extremely important document, which embodies the economic strategy of the CPSU, a strategy of communist creation. Other activities were conducted in the subunit as a means of discussing the Party's pre-congress document. The fighting men demonstrated great interest as they learned about the Party's plans for the 11th Five-Year Plan, plans which reflect the basic, vital interests of the entire Soviet people. The students in the group demonstrated the same level of interest during their independent preparation for the seminar.

While everyone was copying down the seminar plan I looked around the Lenin room where the class was held. Photographs told about the team's fighting history and its traditions. One of the traditions involves fulfilling all of the combat training firings only with an "excellent" rating. Display materials also told about this. One's attention was drawn to excerpts from an order issued by the commander of the Air Defense Forces on issuing awards to the best specialists for skillful and decisive action in the performance of a combat training task [illegible] demonstrating a high level of professional skill in the process. Separate boards held photographs of those who had excelled in the daily military work and of those excelling on duty alert.

All of the displays were attractively arranged, with imagination and taste. A display of the Party's pre-congress document, however, was especially colorful. It included a text of the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee on the draft program of the CPSU Central Committee for the 26th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. These were skillfully illustrated with drawings and diagrams.

The displays were an excellent aid for thoroughly explaining the Party's economic and social strategy to the students and for describing the tasks of Soviet fighting men in the national campaign to provide a fitting reception for the 26th CPSU Congress and the specific duties to be performed by each soldier at the site. As though confirming this idea, the instructor told the students:

"Comrades! Don't forget to use the displays in your preparations. They will help you to gain a better understanding of the seminar subject and to relate it to our immediate combat training tasks. I would direct your attention to these two posters prepared by comrades Sayunov and Ismatov: 'On the Path to Communism' and 'Giant Strides in Growth.' Read what it says: 'The national income increased by 400 billion rubles during the 10th Five-Year Plan, compared with

the Ninth; industrial output grew by 717 billion rubles; agricultural output increased by 50 billion rubles.' Let us think about these numerical comparisons...."

Nikolay Ivanovich continued to clarify. The soldiers listened attentively and entered things in their notebooks. I could not help thinking about how much more difficult are the tasks of the instructor of a political study group at a remote site. Let us imagine for a minute that the subunit referred to is located near a large city. Just think what additional possibilities Captain Bogachev would have for covering this subject with the students! He could schedule trips to outstanding industrial enterprises and visits to cultural centers and sites having to do with the revolutionary,combat and labor traditions of their fellow countrymen. He could also arrange meetings with leaders of local Party and soviet organs, scientists and outstanding workers. Many other forms of mass agitation and cultural and educational work could be used in such a situation.

The possibilities here are far more limited. However, Nikolay Ivanovich has convincingly proven that a great deal can be done to achieve smoothly organized political training for the personnel even at a site.

He has been in charge of the soldiers' political study group in the battalion for several years now. During this period, of course, there have been failures in the work of the unofficial propagandist. The officer has learned to gain lessons from them, however, and has acquired valuable experience.

Nikolay Ivanovich ordinarily begins preparing for each class by selecting and studying original sources, Party documents and other recommended literature. His home library is a great help. It contains dozens of books on political subjects, memoirs and fiction, reference books and dictionaries. He keeps at hand a workbook in which he glues excerpts from newspaper articles on the successes achieved by the Soviet people in the fulfillment of plans covered by the 10th Five-Year Plan. He also enters in the workbook statements from the Marxist-Leninist classics, instructions issued by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, especially apt folk sayings and proverbs, graphic facts and figures. Another notebook contains notes on brilliant examples out of the life of the collective, observations on the service of the men under his command and conclusions drawn from personal talks with them. He keeps a separate folder for information on international affairs.

Looking through the officer's notebooks, one can understand how he manages to come up with vivid, intelligible statements, to maneuver freely with facts and properly assess them. Nikolay Ivanovich trains his students to do the same. He frequently asks a certain soldier to give a brief review of the week's events at the beginning of a class. A class is sometimes begun with a report on the achievements of the republic in which the missilemen live and serve. Experience has shown that all of this increases the soldiers' sense of responsibility for independent preparations for each class.

I have to mention another feature of the propagandist's methods. His lectures and talks always include reports on the specialists' performance of combat alert and cover combat training matters which will be dealt with in forthcoming tactical

drills and exercises and comprehensive exercises, and the progression of socialist competition in honor of the 26th CPSU Congress.

The results of this well-conceived approach to the job are apparent. The group headed by this officer invariably winds up the training year with excellent ratings. Last year was no exception. I believe that there is a connection between the political conditioning of the missilemen and their combat fitness. During that period of time many of them became highly rated specialists and duty alert experts. Overall, Captain Bogachev's subunit retained its excellent ranking.

Naturally, Nikolay Ivanovich did not acquire his skill as a propagandist all at once. It is the result of the officer's painstaking and serious work to improve his knowledge. While giving due credit to the captain's industry and his constant dissatisfaction with what he has achieved, it still needs to be said that his senior comrades were the crucial factor in his development as an instructor for a political study group. The battalion commander, his deputy for political affairs and the secretary of the party organization give their full support to those who demonstrate initiative and engage in creative quest in the conduct of political classes. I want particularly to mention Captain F. Narinyan, a political worker. He teaches the unofficial propagandists to make fuller use of reserves for improving the political classes and making them more effective. And such reserves exist. It is difficult for the fighting men to make trips to the city, for example. But when Sergeant A. Kolyuchka's mother, a doctor by profession, came to visit her son, the political worker asked her to talk to the fighting men. She spoke about the great concern shown by the Party for the development of public health in our nation and about how much would be spent under the 11th Five-Year Plan to improve the welfare of the Soviet people. The missilemen also recall a talk by Private Sh. Ismatov's mother. She told how the workers on her kolkhoz were struggling to increase the cotton yield.

Correspondence between the soldiers and their parents has helped greatly with the organization of discussion and study in the collective of the CPSU Central Committee's draft program for the 26th party congress. These letters, in which the fathers and mothers admonish their sons to serve vigilantly and strictly according to regulations, are extensively used in talks conducted by the agitators on the alert duty crews. The impressions made by the reports from home, the talks made by the activists and accounts given by the fighting men upon returning from short leaves are something on the order of "visual aids," which each of the students retains and uses in his answers to questions posed in the seminars.

The battalion political worker devotes a great deal of attention to the activists who are assistant instructors for political study groups. Regular briefings are held for them, exchanges of know-how are held and they are given advice and recommendations. The military workdays in the battalion are completely filled with exercises and tactical drills. The signal to assemble, at which the missilemen rush to their stations, is frequently heard several times within a 24-hour period. Other urgent needs also sometimes prevent a certain specialist from attending a scheduled political training class. Absences from political training must be strictly accounted for in the subunit. The assistant instructors

perform extra work with these soldiers. They familiarize them with the main points in the lecture presented the evening before and with the list of recommended literature and help their comrades prepare for the next seminar.

The battalion party organization is actively involved in the political training for the personnel. Ways of improving the theoretical knowledge and methodological skill of the instructors are regularly discussed at meetings of the communists, and the unofficial propagandists render reports at these meetings. Some aspects of the work are still not organized as smoothly as we would like, however. For example, the viewing and discussion of the television programs "The Times," "In the World Today" and "I Serve the Soviet Union!" and others are still not always well organized. Television is an indispensible aid in the ideological work at the site, however, and it should be used more effectively for political training purposes.

The political section never neglects the needs of personnel stationed at the site. Under its supervision the fighting men are always provided with the necessary political and reference literature and technical propaganda means when they are needed. Film chronicles, documentary films and motion pictures are brought in according to a schedule.

The political section devotes special attention to the theoretical and methodological training of instructors for the political study groups. Assemblies and seminars are held for this purpose. However, the main emphasis is placed upon helping the propagandists as they perform their job at the sites. Captain Ye. Shadrin has done a great deal in this respect. Prior to the beginning of classes for explaining and discussing the CPSU Central Committee's draft program for the 26th party congress, he visited each of the battalions, presented informative reports and then held talks with the group instructors on the substance of classes for the study and discussion of the Party's pre-congress documents in the political classes and the methods to be used.

Captain Shadrin is not the only one involved in training the instructors, of course. Other officers from the political section and members of the agitation and propaganda team are also drawn upon for this work. In view of the enormous theoretical and practical importance of the CPSU Central Committee's draft program for the 26th party congress, for example, most of the members of the agitation team helped to explain this basic Party document to the personnel of subunits stationed at the sites.

The constant concern of the senior comrades for the organization of political training for the soldiers and sergeants, the monitoring of the instructors' work and providing them with practical assistance, the summarization and dissemination of accumulated advanced know-how--all of these things are favorably affecting the work of the unofficial propagandists. They adopt the know-how of the best methods experts like Captain N. Bogachev, as an example.

I should make the comment that Nikolay Ivanovich himself is not at all complacent. He strives constantly to see that the political information received by the soldiers in the classes contributes to the development of

communist conviction and political awareness in each of them and helps the soldiers do their best to maintain the subunit at a high level of combat readiness. This is what he had in mind when he told his men with a warm smile after a session of independent preparation:

"The seminar will show how much each of you has grown politically today. Most importantly, however, this will be demonstrated by your service, by the performance of alert duty, by the fulfillment of your commitments accepted in honor of the 26th party congress."

The more difficult the tasks performed by the fighting men stationed at remote sites, the more active and substantive must be the indoctrinational work performed with them and the more reliably must it temper their hearts. The communists who work in this extremely difficult situation are well aware of this. And they are sparing no effort to honorably fulfill their service and party duty and provide a fitting reception for the congress of our Leninist Party.

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AIR DEFENSE EXERCISE ON CRUISER

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 1980 pp 19-20

[Article by Lt-Col A. Yurin]

[Text]

The cruiser began its ocean cruise in difficult conditions. All through the night, before the start, some of the crew members were chopping off the coating ice which had formed during a hurricane that had lasted many hours. After the ship had left the bay exactly at the fixed time the coast-guard warning service notified it of a possible air attack. At that moment began another test of the crew's combat maturity, a test that summed up the enormous work of hundreds of people.

There was one more circumstance which every crew member remembered: the cruiser was expecting young reinforcements — envoys of the Komsomol organisation over which the cruiser exercised patronage. The crew wanted — and not simply wanted, but considered it its duty — to welcome the reinforcements with a report of excellent results of the combat test. None of the ship's officers, starshinas or sailors had any doubt of their success — they had behind them months of intensive daily training — but at the bottom of their hearts they were all understandably worried, because the ocean is not a classroom and anything can happen there. By the way, this was precisely what had been taken into consideration in making the preparations. Special attention had been paid to mastering related professions. On a ship going out into the ocean, this was more necessary than anywhere else. Thousands of kilometres away from its base the ship, when the need arose, would not be able to get quickly replacements for the sailors who might become casualties. So every crew member had to know and be able to do two and three times more than was required of him by the main ship's regulations. That was why for several months already the CO had been far from generous in granting shore leave to his subordinates and training alerts had so often called the sailors to action stations.

After being informed from the shore that four "enemy" planes were making for the ship, Captain 2nd Rank Baleshov gave the order for additional radar installations to be manned: the planes might appear from any direction.

The central station operators of the antiaircraft missile complexes took their positions. Theirs is the most important task — to determine the character of the target, to calculate its speed and course, and finally to destroy it. But this would not happen till later, when the "enemy" planes entered the strike zone.

In the meantime it was relatively quiet in the antiaircraft missile CC. Komsomol members operators Vladimir Sholokhov and Vladimir Garkusha were on the alert at the radar screens, glimmering in semi-darkness. They were the most experienced operators on the ship. Each of them had to his credit hundreds of detected targets: low- and high-altitude, high-speed and manoeuvring ones.

Two "enemy" plane signals appeared on the indicator screen exactly on the ship's course. But the planes did not close in with the cruiser, instead they started manoeuvring. And then, not giving the operators time to take their bearings, the planes started jamming. But this was not what worried the CO, for, after all, the operators could switch over to another wavelength or track the target by its trail; the point was that the second pair of planes had not been located. So Baleshov told the CC to intensify observation — the attacking pair could appear suddenly at low altitude. In principle these were not new tactics: a so-called demonstration pair or a flight of three planes manoeuvre in the ship's field of radiovisibility, attracting the attention of its air defence to itself and at the same time other planes suddenly appear at low altitude from a different direction and carry out bombing or torpedo attacks.

That is indeed what happened. The second pair appeared on the horizon, as though suddenly emerging in the east out of the depths of the sea. The operators of the antiaircraft missile complex CC had only split seconds to carry out the dozens of operations implied by the general notion of "action." Every second lost by the operators, any failure in the radiovisibility of the target was to the advantage of the "enemy," allowing him to get in a blow first.

Vladimir Garkusha was the first to report exhaustive information on the target. And immediately two flickering white points — impulses of missiles leaving the launching pads — raced to meet the planes, crossing the mat squares of the screens. Both targets were destroyed before they reached the assault position. But the encounter with the "enemy" plane was only a prelude to the encounter still in store for the ship's crew.

Air reconnaissance reported that somewhere on the approaches to the set area a submarine, lurking in the depths of the waters, was on the lookout for the cruiser. The CO took the necessary safety measures and the cruiser, with some time to spare, was moving at low speed, sometimes even stopping so that the noise from its screws would not prevent the sonarmen to sound the sea. Half an hour earlier Baleshov had given orders to change course and enter the area marked "West" on the compass. On hearing the ship, the submarine would logically go to intercept it, and that meant giving itself away.

Mitchman Anatoly Sangodzhiev and Komsomol member Senior Seaman Nikolai Yeryomin were operating the sonar. Turning the sound transmitter slowly Sangodzhiev was listening to the numerous sounds and trying to intercept the one which would point to the location of the submarine. But he could vouch there was no submarine in the sections of the sound field.

Half an hour later, Sangodzhiev was about to hand over the post to his relief when at last the typical sound of a submarine could be heard in the ear-phones. But it was not enough to intercept it, he had to determine its bearing, distance and velocity. He had only seconds to do that. Suddenly the pitch of the sound was reduced, which meant that the submarine was changing direction. Sangodzhiev firmly held on to the target, at the same time reporting the data to the main attack centre.

Then there was a pause, filled with a hardly audible rumble of engines. The submarine disappeared. But not for a second did Sangodzhiev or his mate divert their attention from the ear-phones. They were rewarded for their patience— the sub again betrayed its presence. In a few minutes it was destroyed. The course to the exercise area was open.

...Although the sailors were all fairly exhausted it was decided not to postpone the holding of the Party Committee meeting. In the evening all its members gathered in the ward-room. The first question on the agenda was the admittance of Starshina 1st Class Anatoly Katkov as a candidate member of the CPSU. He was not asked many questions. Katkov was known to be a very good specialist, leader of an excellent crew and the Komsomol organiser of one of the combat units. He was standing before the Party Committee members, erect and alert. And understandably so — nothing he had experienced before meant as much to him as this. From that moment on Katkov's military service was becoming also a Party affair, as all his future life.

That first day of the ocean cruise as, by the way, all the days to follow, the whole crew without exception demonstrated courage and excellent combat skill.

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CRUISE PREPARATION PROCEDURES DESCRIBED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 1980 pp 37-38

[Article by Capt 1st Rank V. Baranov]

[Text]

Sailors' combat training level, their moral and physical condition are best checked and their proficiency improved in fighting the elements on long sea cruises.

The sea is a strict and objective examiner. It calls for sound knowledge and conscientious observance of guiding documents, manuals and instructions. Successful execution of combat training missions on a cruise largely depends on the ship complement's comprehensive training, including training at base, on ranges and simulators.

The plan is a major factor influencing the quality of preparation for a cruise. It includes measures concerning the men's combat training and political education, work involving pre-cruise scheduled maintenance and repair operations, and a list of materials required. On the basis of the plan a schedule is drawn up, showing the time for fulfilling the items planned.

Training centres play an important role in enhancing commanders' proficiency and the quality of the men's training before a cruise. Simulators, training weapons and equipment, and also lessons in special classrooms enable the sailors to learn their specific duties in a short time. Complex simulators allow tactical methods of using weapons and equipment to be worked up without engine expenditure.

A modern training centre makes it possible to organise not only classroom training with the use of stands and models of weapons and equipment, but also to acquire practical skills in repairing and maintaining both separate working mechanisms and their complexes. During such training sailors work up training elements which cannot be practised on ship (e.g. actions in an emergency situation). A classroom offers the possibility to conduct complex training, instruct and examine specialists, commanders, executive officers, duty officers in ship control, navigation, use of equipment, damage control, etc. It should be emphasised that the personnel's knowledge and skills are checked here in conditions corresponding to those of the forthcoming cruise.

The Soviet Navy has accumulated considerable experience in training of ships' complements at training centres and classrooms. Each complement, particularly before a long cruise, gets training under the guidance of experienced instructors, formation staff officers and ships' specialists.

Pre-cruise exercises on tactical and special training and on questions of cooperation with other complements have proved most useful. They are also attended by commanders of ships with which the given complement will have to cooperate during the forthcoming tactical exercise. Commanders' personal contact has a beneficial effect on their subsequent actions.

When planning the complement's pre-cruise combat training, the commander sees to it that a maximum of preparatory work is done at base, each putting out to sea during this period being the final test.

Sea and ocean cruises, which have become a routine for Soviet sailors, have lent a new aspect to a number of

tasks carried out by ships during combat training and political education. At present fire missions are carried out in the course of tactical exercises organised during a cruise. Apart from purely professional training, the sea tests the complement's teamwork and proficiency, their ideological and psychological steeling. Tactical exercises on long cruises have acquired special importance for maintaining high combat readiness. For each exercise to serve the set purpose, it must be thoroughly prepared and carried out in conditions precluding indulgence and simplification.

It is much more difficult to organise a tactical exercise far from base, with limited possibilities of logistical support, than at base. This is due in part to the specific feature that the forces participating in an exercise are at considerable distances from each other. In a number of cases commanders' personal briefing becomes impossible. However, this must in no way impair the quality of a tactical exercise. On the contrary, in these conditions it is organised so as to produce maximum effect.

No matter how long a cruise lasts, the ship must always be ready for battle and for any emergency. Therefore, watch officer training acquires particular importance. On a cruise, the watch officer must assume entire responsibility for successful fulfilment of the assigned mission, if the situation calls for it. Underway watch requires him to display a high sense of duty, constant vigilence and readiness to take immediate and resolute action. To handle the ship competently, to be well conversant with functioning of all its systems, propelling facilities, power units and various complexes, one must have perfect knowledge of the ship's design, weapons and equipment, and also organisation of service. All this forms the basis of watch officer training. Good results are produced by thoroughly studying a new route on sectors falling to the officer's future watches.

Particular attention should be paid to training junior specialists and newly drafted sailors who are going on a cruise for the first time. The commander's task is to teach them the ABC of their speciality in a short time, assign action stations to them, and also familiarise them with the specifics of the ship's organization and the rules of servicing the weapons and equipment entrusted to them. During this period young sailors acquire first of all practical skills in daily servicing of material, starting and maintaining the equipment and in damage control at their respective action stations. It is very important for them to realise the role played by each of them in successful execution of combat training missions by the entire ship.

Socialist emulation also has a positive impact on the timeliness and quality of fulfilling all preparatory measures and, subsequently, cruise missions. Long before the cruise the personnel thoroughly consider their obligations and set the deadlines for improving their combat skills. The commander, political workers, Party and YCL organisations focus the complement's attention on this important element of the emulation.

Discussing the forthcoming work at meetings, they urge the sailors to fulfil completely the obligations undertaken. The theme of the emulation is thought out in good time. For instance, emulation under the motto: "For high efficiency of each cruising mile" aims at enhancing the personnel's responsibility for the quality with which cruise missions are fulfilled.

Much attention is given to organising emulation between small subdivisions for exemplary servicing of action stations and compartments, and for maintaining military order and discipline at a high level. When discussing obligations the sailors' attention is focussed on the fact that the main purpose of the emulation is to preclude mistakes and shortcomings. This vital requirement is a must for every sailor, for it incites high responsibility and constant vigilance.

Every cruise involves separation from base and parting with one's relatives and friends. Besides, low mobility, monotony of the situation, high loads in carrying out responsible cruise tasks and the like tell on the sailors' health. Unusual climate in cruising areas affect directly or indirectly the personnel's health and capacity for work. Therefore, commanders, political workers and medical personnel attach great importance to questions of the men's all-round moral, psychological and physical training, the hardening their health and enhancing their capacity for work during the preparatory period. Special sets of prophylactic measures have been worked out and tested. Their purpose is to eliminate or considerably reduce the adverse effects on the human organism of factors connected with long cruises. Along with providing ships with the necessary life support systems, the conditions of labour and rest make the basis of these complexes, with personal hygiene being given an important place.

Psychological training is a long and complicated process, the purpose of which is to develop a man's emotional and volitional stability in difficult and emergency situations, and thus enable him to maintain high efficiency in discharging his professional duties. Sailors' psychological training in damage control takes place in conditions closely approximating real combat. By training on simulators, fire ranges and in compartments in flood conditions they develop such qualities as self-possession, resolution, initiative and independence. This enables the sailors to take correct decisions in emergency situations, to act competently and resolutely, i.e. to be masters of the situation, ready even to risk their own lives for the common cause.

Preference in the general system of sailors' training is given to practical matters, particularly those of great significance on a cruise, e.g. towing, transferring (receiving) liquid and solid cargoes when the ship is underway, mooring to a drifting ship, throwing the line and so on.

After the complement has completed all pre-cruise training, the commander checks the serviceability of the ship's units and mechanisms and reports the results to the formation commander. Readiness for the forthcoming cruise is generally checked on a planned sortie wearing the ship's CO flag.

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SOCIALISM AND NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS DISCUSSED

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 1980 pp 6-9

[Article by Maj-Gen V. Kuchin, Cand. Sc. (Philosophy)]

[Text]

Life has proved that Lenin's thesis about the proletarian movement in capitalist countries being closely allied to the national-liberation movement in the colonies and semi-colonies is scientifically sound and is, therefore, of intransient practical value. V. I. Lenin accurately foresaw the interaction between the components of the integral revolutionary process which was taking shape according to the objective laws of social development. He assessed highly the potential of the peoples of the colonies and other dependent countries. He wrote: "The socialist revolution will not be solely, or chiefly, a struggle of the revolutionary proletarians in each country against their bourgeoisie—no, it will be a struggle of all imperialist-oppressed colonies and countries, of all dependent countries, against international imperialism."

The Great October Socialist Revolution in Russia in 1917 was a striking example of this. The world's first state of working people rendered whole-hearted support to the fighters for national liberation, thereby helping turn the masses of working people in the colonies into a potent factor in world history.

The October Revolution exerted a many-sided influence on the movement for national liberation. It struck powerful blow at imperialism and its colonial system. Tsarist Russia, a bulwark of reaction in Europe and Asia, was overthrown. The Soviet state abolished colonial oppression in Russia. In the world arena it vigorously supported the right of nations to self-determination, including the right to secede and form an independent state. This was the beginning of the struggle for establishment of new progressive principles in relations between peoples and states.

The Soviet Government rendered all-round support to the peoples of the East. It rescinded the treaties which the tsarist government had forced on Asian countries, exposed the secret deals the autocratic regime had concluded with the imperialist powers behind the backs of the colonial peoples and at their expense. These steps exerted a powerful influence on the minds of the colonial peoples, urging them to active struggle for their liberation.

During the Second World War (1939-45) the Soviet Union made a decisive contribution to the rout of German fascism and Japanese militarism.

Such factors as the victory over nazi Germany and militeristic Japan and the formation of a world system of socialism opened a new stage in the development of the alliance of the socialist forces with the forces of national liberation. World socialism became the bulwark of peace, democracy and social progress. The main instrument of its influence on the course of world development is its economic achievements. The increasing might of the socialist system is the most effective aid to the forces of democracy and progress. The economic potential and defence capacity of the socialist countries are a most formidable barrier to export of counter-revolution to countries in which the liberation struggle is developing.

The role of world socialism was particularly great as regards the achievement of independence by peoples who had to fight for their freedom

with arms in hand. This was the case in Vietnam, Korea, Algeria, Cuba and several other countries.

The national-liberation movement has scored indisputable successes. The process of national liberation of the colonies and other dependencies has been completed in the main. The colonial system of imperialism in its classical forms has been liquidated. Over 2,000 million people have thrown off the colonial yoke. Of the 160 states which exist in the world today more than 100 have won independence as a result of the collapse of the colonial system.

Thanks to the beneficial influence of the expanding world revolutionary process and of the growing might of socialism the anti-imperialist movement scored a number of major victories in the 1970s. These included the victory of the Vietnamese people, the reunification of Vietnam, the consolidation of people's power in Laos, and the liquidation of the pro-Chinese Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea. Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau have cast off the fetters of colonialism to become outposts of socialist orientation in Africa.

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen has gained a series of victories in the struggle for social progress. The dictatorship in Nicaragua has been overthrown. The revolution in Afghanistan has dealt a telling blow at imperialism. Afghanistan is currently carrying out radical changes to do away with the feudal-monarchist structure, to achieve real national-patriotic unity and social renovation of society in the interests of the people.

The revolution in Iran has wiped out the corrupt monarchist, pro-imperialist regime. It has had a positive effect on the struggle against imperialism in the region.

The patriots of Zimbabwe have triumphed. The Democratic Republic of Madagascar and the People's Republic of Benin have embarked on the road of progressive socio-economic changes.

In their fight for national independence the developing countries have won various degrees of freedom from imperialism and have achieved various levels of socio-economic development. However, they have been setting the tasks of securing economic independence and advancing social progress with increasing persistence, because they realise that, unless these tasks are accomplished, political independence cannot be considered assured. Socialism has become deeply rooted in many newly-free countries. Today there is a large group of socialist-oriented states in Asia and Africa having a population of about 150 million and an area of over 12 million square kilometres. Socialist-oriented states form the most revolutionary detachment in the national-liberation movement. The socialist countries are rendering them all-round assistance.

The CPSU and the fraternal Communist and Workers' Parties maintain close ties with the political vanguard of these countries, with the Communist and many revolutionary democratic parties and organisations, whose membership is steadily increasing.

The world system of socialism is playing a big role in the establishment of independent national economies in developing countries. Under the terms of inter-state agreements the USSR is assisting in the construction and expansion of 1,069 industrial enterprises and other economic projects, 600 of which have already been put into operation. The number of skilled personnel in the developing countries trained by various forms of instruction with the help of the USSR is increasing: every year from 70,000 to 80,000 specialists in various fields complete their training and the total number of trained personnel by the beginning of 1978 was nearly 700,000.

The other socialist countries are developing equitable cooperation with developing countries at equally high rates. By 1978 the CMEA member countries had completed or were working on 4,400 projects in 86 Asian, African and Latin American countries.

The CMEA member countries have been steadily extending their economic ties with the OPEC countries, especially in the expansion of their oil industries. The USSR and other socialist countries aided to develop the first centres of national oil economies in such countries as Iraq, India, Syria, Algeria, Ethiopia and Turkey.

An important sphere of cooperation between these two groups of countries includes the metal-making and engineering industries and the general industrialisation drive in India, Iran, Iraq, Turkey and Algeria. The socialist countries have also been helping the developing countries modernise their farming.

The alliance of world socialism with socio-political and governmental organisations, such as the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation, the non-alignment movement, and numerous regional organisations of national-liberation movements is being increasingly strengthened.

Today the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation unites the revolutionary democratic parties and national-liberation movements of 84 Afro-Asian countries. The national organisations of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation include various national patriotic forces. For instance,

in India, Sri Lanka, the Lebanon and Syria the solidarity organisations include national democrats, Marxists, Left Socialists, trade union and other organisations.

The initiatives of the countries belonging to the socialist community aimed at promoting détente, strengthening peace and the security of peoples have the support of the Afro-Asian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation. Peking failed to subject the Organisation to its own diktat and hegemonic strategy. Having m[illegible] as a result of trials the Afro-Asian People[illegible]rity Organisation rejected Maoist theo[illegible]ractices and condemned Maoism.

As distinct from the Afr[illegible]ian Peoples' Solidarity Organisation of these two continents, the non-alignment movement is a governmental organisation. Its highest forum is the Conferences of Heads of State and Government of the Non-Aligned Nations of Europe, Asia, Africa and Latin America.

The fundamental principles and orientation of the movement were formulated by the Bandung Meeting of 29 Asian and African countries held in April 1955. The First Conference of Non-Aligned Countries was held in Colombo in 1961. At present over 100 states are affiliated to the non-alignment movement. The overwhelming majority are united by common noble aims of struggle for final liberation from all forms of imperialist exploitation and oppression, for the establishment of principles of peace, freedom and equality in international relations.

Basically the non-alignment movement is an anti-imperialist movement. It emerged in protest against the attempts of the imperialists to draw the newly-free countries into militarist blocs, such as SEATO and the Bagdad Pact. Neither the USSR nor any other countries of the socialist community create or have ever created military blocs in Africa, Asia or Latin America. That is why the struggle for peace, against the threat of war and the arms race is one of the fundamental political aims of the movement. The non-aligned countries took action together with the socialist states on disarmament at a special session of the UN General Assembly in 1978. The non-aligned countries supported the results of the Helsinki conference. They voiced a resolute protest against the aggressive actions of the USA. It is worth noting that the latter has blatantly ignored the principles of the non-alignment movement under the pretext of "defending its vital interests." It has been attempting to open more military bases and establish new strong points in Egypt, Oman, Kenya, and Somalia. It is conducting a policy of provocations in respect of such non-aligned countries as Vietnam, Kampuchea, Iran and Afghanistan. The final documents published by forums of peace supporters and the solidarity movement held at New Delhi and in Malta in 1980 voiced anxiety in connection with the USA's expansionist ambitions.

The non-alignment movement is growing stronger and stronger. Several socialist countries are active in it. Its 6th Conference was held at Havana, capital of the Republic of Cuba, in September 1979. The Cuban government has been pursuing a consistent line on all outstanding issues of world politics. The conference helped establish the only sound course in present conditions—the course of collective opposition to the neo-colonialist and militaristic line of the imperialist circles.

The Organisation of African Unity has been active for more than 16 years. It has been making growing contribution to the solution of global problems in the sphere of international relations and of problems confronting the African continent. At its meeting in June 1978 the OAU Committee passed a resolution condemning the attempts of Western imperialists to implement their neo-colonialist line aimed at forcing "Africans to kill Africans and Asians to kill Asians" under the guise of "inter-African forces."

Since President of Egypt Sadat seriously damaged Arab unity, the National Front of Staunchness and Resistance has been playing a decisive role in the Arab national-liberation movement. Its members are Algeria, Syria, the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Libya and the Palestine Liberation Organisation. They are now in the forefront of Arab struggle against Sadat's policy of betrayal, against the criminal alliance of the USA, Israel and Egypt, for the liberation of Israeli-occupied Arab territories and the creation of an independent Palestinian Arab state.

The fact that world socialism and the national patriotic movements take different approaches to certain problems, differ on tactics and methods of revolutionary activity, does not prevent their alliance from growing stronger. Nor does the difference in levels of social development between the socialist countries and the newly-free states hamper the alliance. As the revolutionary process advances, as progressive national patriotic trends gain strength in the liberation movement, the gap between the levels will be bridged.

The important thing is that world socialism supports the national-liberation movements as regards the basic trends in their home and foreign

policy, their struggle against neo-colonialism and imperialist exploitation, for the developing countries' right to use their national wealth as they see fit.

This support increases as the overall balance of forces steadily changes in favour of socialism and all revolutionary movements in general. Today imperialism can no longer perform acts of aggression and count on success in military gambles. In working for détente and peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems, world socialism sees as its purpose to improve international relations in general, to rule out from inter-state relations all elements of inequality, dictating of prices, tariff and credit discrimination. The peace-loving Soviet foreign policy is at the same time a clear-cut policy of class solidarity and of true internationalism. It does not free imperialism from the class struggle in the capitalist countries or from the peoples' struggle for national liberation and social emancipation. On the contrary, by opposing the arms race, by opposing the settlement of disputes by armed force, Soviet foreign policy ensures favourable conditions for the class struggle of the working people and for national-liberation revolutions.

World socialism resolutely opposes neo-colonialism whose policy is aimed at keeping developing countries in subjection and steering their development along the capitalist road.

This is borne out by the intensified war preparations undertaken by the NATO countries headed by the USA, their efforts to turn the world back to the days of the cold war and to tip the balance of forces in their favour. Under the pretext of defending its "vital interests" and demagogic lies about a "Soviet military threat" US imperialism itself threatens the peoples of Iran, Afghanistan and the Arab countries that have embarked on the road of democracy and social progress, and the revolutionary movements in other Asian, African and Latin American countries.

In the context of the new aggravation of the international situation and the increased threat to peace and the security of peoples, world socialism headed by the Soviet Union is resolutely resisting imperialist expansion. World socialism is on the side of the Iranian revolution, it is rendering disinterested all-round aid to the Afghan people, it is giving whole-hearted support to the national-liberation movement of the Arab peoples, the peoples of South Africa and Latin America.

World socialism resolutely condemns Maoism, which is forming a bloc with imperialism and reaction. Peking has completely exposed itself as an enemy of national-liberation movements. There was a time when the PRC took part in the work of the Bandung Conference. But time has shown that Peking tried to use Bandung to impose its course on the newly-free countries and to draw them into the orbit of its great power policy. After these attempts failed the Maoists undertook acts of aggression against India, Burma, Vietnam and other states. World socialism supports the struggle of the peoples of South-East Asia, where Peking is pursuing its hegemonic and expansionist aims. World socialism supports the struggle of the peoples for disarmament, against the creation of aggressive military blocs and of military bases in foreign territories.

The policy of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries is consistent and clear. They do not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries and peoples. Their foreign policy rests on the immutable principle of respect for the sacred right of every people, of every country to choose its own way of development. World socialism renders assistance to all forces fighting for progress, democracy and national independence. This clearly defined line in socialist foreign policy has been consolidated in the Constitution of the USSR.

The Soviet Union and other countries of the socialist community, as it was underscored in the Declaration of the Warsaw Treaty Member-States adopted in mid-May this year always supported and continue to support the efforts of the developing countries "directed at strengthening peace and international security, the implementation of disarmament, the creation of peace zones, the liquidation of foreign military bases on the territory of others, impermissibility of any outside interference in the internal affairs of states, at ensuring the rights of peoples to free and independent development, at the liberation of countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America from imperialist, colonial and neo-colonialist exploitation, at the creation of a new international economic order on a just and democratic basis."

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VIEWS ON NATO'S STRATEGIC MOBILITY

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 1980 pp 39-40

[Article by Maj-Gen M. Belov, D. Sc. (Military)]

[Text]

Military transport aviation is a means capable of ensuring the speed of strategic manoeuvre necessary in modern conditions. The experience of the Second World War and subsequent local wars as well as the practice of the big troop exercises show that in a quickly changing situation, of all types of mass transport, only military transport aviation can in a brief time lift troops and cargoes to long distances.

It is also common knowledge that in comparison with the possibilities of military transport aviation land and sea transport depend more on the conditions of communications and their speed is many times inferior.

Military specialists in the USA and other countries consider as a disadvantage of land and sea transport the fact that they do not ensure the quick movement of invasion forces to remote parts of the world. In such conditions they consider that one battalion, lifted in 24 hours is better than an army in three months.

Taking into consideration the above mentioned factors, the big capitalist countries began to increase the mobility of their armies — to extend the possibilities of rapidly concentrating men and equipment in any area of the globe where a situation dangerous for imperialism may arise, for the purpose of interfering in the affairs of other peoples and also for taking timely advantage of the results of using global and other long-range weapons systems.

Striving to make the mobility of the land forces correspond to the possibilities of global weapons systems, to secure the possibility of a strategic choice in using these forces during crisis situations for imperialism, the leadership of Pentagon and NATO began in the 1960s to concentrate attention on creating a sufficient number of heavy military transport planes capable of taking on board all models of weapons and combat equipment of ground forces.

It should be noted that in carrying out the expansionist policy, the militarist circles of the USA and other NATO countries, as the American press reports, carried out armed aggression 115 times from 1945 to 1977; in 33 cases they threatened to use nuclear weapons. Military transport aviation was used on a large scale for strategic lifting of cargoes and troops. During 1966 alone, the US Command airlifted over 670,000 officers and men from the USA to Southeast Asia.

In a number of cases a strategic air manoeuvre was carried out by units and formations at regular strength with heavy weapons and equipment. A case in point was the lifting of a US infantry division from the FRG to Turkey and then to the Lebanon in 1958 for the purpose of direct military interference in the affairs of this country. In 1964 the 82nd Airborne Division invaded the territory of the Dominican Republic to save reactionary regime in the country and protect the interests of American imperialism. In 1971 this same division was used for an air manoeuvre on an intercontinental scale. It was lifted over the ocean to South Korea, a distance of 14,000 km. To carry out its global aggressive actions with the help of military transport aviation the Pentagon makes use of other NATO countries. Airfields of these countries serve as transit bases for American invasion forces.

In order to establish control over the oil-bearing areas of the Middle East and to preserve advantageous military-strategic positions in Africa, the Pentagon is forming a "rapid deployment force" comprising 110,000 officers and men. This will be a highly mobile grouping of land forces ready at short notice to travel thousands of miles by military air or sea transport and go immediately into action. The grouping now being formed, pointed out the "New York Times," is intended, first of all, for "intervention in the Persian Gulf."

Based on foreign press material.

But aggressive NATO circles assign the central place in the use of military transport aviation for ensuring strategic manoeuvre to airlifting groupings of their land forces in their plans for a new war against the USSR and the other socialist countries. And the character and scope of the use of military transport aviation, the methods and scale of the planned air operation are largely determined by military-strategic concepts adopted in the USA.

The concept of "strategic mobility," for example, presupposes creating a powerful strategic reserve on US territory, ensuring the possibility to switch this reserve in a brief period of time to any theatre of military operations and also from one theatre to another. Even today this concept, adopted early in the 1960s, plays a leading role in solving practical tasks in building up the armed forces of the USA and in elaborating the methods of their use. It emerges from the foreign press that the "strategic mobility" concept includes a whole complex of measures. The most important of them are: creation of military bases for various purposes in dependent countries; stocks of weapons and material for equipping formations and units lifted without heavy weapons; timely deployment of large groupings of US forces in key areas outside the USA; maintenance in continental USA of a strong strategic reserve capable of being transported across the ocean; extension of the possibilities of sea transport, building of high-speed landing and transport ships to be used as floating bases and dumps, improvement and development of the network of sea ports; broadening of the possibilities of air transport, improvement of speed and cargo-carrying capacity of military-transport aircraft, use of civil aviation, improvement and development of the network of airfields; timely establishment of communication centres and control points in various parts of the world, wide use of space vehicles for ensuring navigation, communication and control.

The "strategic mobility" concept is intended to provide the military-political leadership of the USA with favourable conditions for unleashing and waging war against the states of the socialist community, and also against the national-liberation forces of other countries and countries having rich sources of raw materials.

The "two-base" concept is closely connected with "strategic mobility." According to this concept the personnel of some US divisions planned for intercontinental airlifting are deployed on their own territory while their weapons and combat equipment are at depots located across the ocean near the areas of probable employment of these divisions.

The "short war" and the "1½ wars" concepts elaborated by the Pentagon and NATO are also based on strategic manoeuvre by air. The first of them presupposes the achievement of decisive purposes in a short but particularly stubborn war. This concept envisages constant readiness for using nuclear and most up-to-date conventional weapons on any scale, timely preparation for carrying out combat actions, particularly initial operations, which are of decisive importance. The lifting of material and manpower from the strategic reserve from the metropolies to the overseas theatres of operations to build up the ello of the first strategic echelon forces is an important component of the "short war" concept. In it a leading role belongs to military transport aviation.

The "1½ wars" concept envisages the readiness of the armed forces of the USA and its allies to carry out combat actions on the scale of a theatre of a war and simultaneously in a theatre of operation or in a limited area of it, any part of the globe. This concept accords with the "strategic mobility" concept on questions of ensuring strategic air manoeuvre with groupings of the land forces.

Concrete Pentagon plans envisage by 1983 maximum reduction of the time to lift formations and units of the land forces from the USA to Europe. By that time it is envisaged to ensure the lifting of five divisions in ten days. Simultaneously 60 squadrons of tactical aviation must be switched across the ocean.

Strategic troop lifts by the "two-base" system are carried out during annual manoeuvres of the "Reforger" type in which, besides divisions of the land forces, squadrons of tactical fighters, tactical reconnaissance aircraft, electronic reconnaissance planes and special purpose air units are switched from the USA to Western Europe.

The "Reforger" exercises in the main are identical in structure and include three stages. Usually in the first stage actual lift of the land forces and tactical aviation from the USA to the FRG is carried out, the troops lifted are provided with weapons and combat equipment at depots in the FRG, and then advance to the area of field exercises. The second stage includes measures for preparing exercises with the participation of the airlifted troops units of tactical aviation and forces of the other NATO countries and also carrying out the exercises proper according to the corresponding theme. The third stage includes measures for preparing weapons and combat equipment for return to the depots of the US forces in the FRG and the return lift of units and formations of the land forces and the Air Force.

The NATO Command pays great attention to the lifting of troops and cargoes within the limits of Europe. This is borne out by annual exercises carried out respectively on the Northern and Southern flanks of the bloc. An important feature of these exercises is that the forces are airlifted first from the USA, Great Britain and other countries to the departure area of the exercises and then to carry out concrete combat missions during the exercises.

Lifts of NATO mobile forces are worked out annually and every time they acquire a more and more provocative character with respect to the socialist countries. Together with the other troops lifts they are considered by the foreign press as training for the lightning capture of foreign countries, for quickly changing a course of developments undesirable for imperialism, in any part of the world. The choice of areas of concentration of the lifted NATO troops and field exercises carried out with them close to the borders of the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries reveal the aggressive strivings of the imperialist states.

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REVIEW OF BOOK ON THE U.S. MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX

Moscow SOVIET MILITARY REVIEW in English No 10, Oct 1980 pp 48-49

[Text]

In the capitalist world the arms race is militarising scientific research. Vikto Borisov's recent book "Dangerous Stake" * deals with the causes and methods of this phenomenon in the USA today.

Proceeding from a wealth of factual material the author exposes US militarism in the period of the scientific and technological revolution, reveals the influence of this revolution on the development of the US military-industrial complex, the inflation of military budgets and ideological preparation for war.

V. Borisov points out that the US ruling circles are building up their war potential. During the whole of the Second World War direct military spending in the USA, according to official US figures, amounted to 224,000 million dollars. Now in the fiscal years of 1980-84 it is intended to spend close on 835,000 million dollars on preparations for war. In the last ten years the USA's military spending ran up to the astronomical figure of 1,255,000 million dollars. In 1980 the allocations for the Pentagon will reach the unprecedented sum of 141,200 million dollars. It should be mentioned that this does not include the budgets of other departments backing basic research in various fields of science and technology and in one way or another related to the military business.

Basing himself on information that appeared in the foreign press, including the US press, the author draws the reader's attention to various research works for the development of new weapons of war. For instance, US industries have started to manufacture components for neutron ammunition. The means of delivery of neutron warheads are being improved and means of meteorological and geophysical warfare are being developed.

The world public is especially alarmed by programmes for the manufacture of advanced and new types of chemical weapons for subsequent deployment in Western Europe and other parts of the world. It is a matter of a new generation of chemical weapons, so-called "binary" weapons. The term "binary" means bombs or shells holding two separate containers with substances which separately are relatively harmless, but, when mixed they form a lethal compound.

US experts believe that spacecraft may be used to carry out important strategic missions. The USA is studying the use of space for military purposes along three lines. The first is development of satellite systems for support of operations by all the fighting services. These include "spy" satellite systems. The second line provides for development of strategic offensive space arms for the destruction of targets on the Earth and in outer space. The third line deals with systems for antimissile and anti-space defence.

The USA has already developed, manufactured and put into service space strategic reconnaissance systems, space communication, navigation, geodesic and meteorological support systems for the armed forces.

The book quotes facts showing that the development of new weapons and weapon systems is accompanied by improvement of conventional armaments. The means of delivery of conventional weapons and means of control thereof are also being perfected to increase the efficiency of the armed forces in conventional warfare.

In the last few years the US army has been equipped with fundamentally new types of ammunition, including artillery shells with arrow-shaped antipersonnel elements, small calibre spherical bombs filled with steel balls. US forces used these types of ammunition together with the chemical weapon (filled with defoliants) on a large scale in the war against the patriots of South Vietnam. The Israeli aggressors also used bomb filled bombs against the peoples of the Arab countries.

It follows that the Pentagon strategists are placing their stake on military power based on the latest scientific and technological

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* V. V. Borisov. "Dangerous Stake. The Scientific and Technological Revolution and the USA's Preparations for War." Moscow, Military Publishing House, 1979, 200 pp. (in Russian).

achievements. The aims have not changed, namely to secure unilateral advantage in armaments to return to the "position of strength" policy, to enable the US ruling circles to dictate their will to other peoples and countries, to establish US hegemony in world development and to crush world socialism.

The author writes:

"The idea of military-technical superiority is present in all US foreign policy and military-political doctrines, in the countless official, semi-official and unofficial concepts bearing on the employment of military power, which have been spread by US propaganda in the last decades."

There is still another aspect of US military-technical policy in relation to developing countries. The USA has become the principal manufacturer and supplier of modern armaments to capitalist and developing countries, especially states with reactionary antipopular regimes, such as Chile, Pakistan, South Korea, the former regime of the deposed Shah in Iran, and Egypt. It is worth noting that the profits of the US monopolies manufacturing weapons and other military equipment are especially high when tension centres appear in one region or another and when the states conducting talks on ways to improve the situation and curb the arms race are faced with obstacles and difficulties deliberately created by opponents of détente.

The sale of arms to other countries helps improve the US balance of payments and compensate the foreign currency outlays to maintain US forces overseas. The price of the weapons includes a special increment intended to repay some of the expenses on research and development of the given weapon system.

The book examines in detail various "scientific" concepts declaring the arms race and large scale military research "the motive force" of the scientific and technological revolution. Thus, the well-known US economist Oscar Morgenstern is of the opinion that the most interesting developments in science are in one way or another connected with war or preparations for war. Edward Teller, "father of the US hydrogen bomb," claims that the further expansion of military research is useful for all science, because it gives "by-products" in the form of other discoveries. Such ideas are advanced to make people believe that the arms race is a fatal inevitability which does not depend on man's will but is dictated by the "relentless logic of scientific and technological development." Of course, the advocates of these ideas do not mention that increased allocations for scientific and technological projects of military character in the USA mean smaller outlays for research in other fields of science and technology. Facts show that the emphasis on military research and development, far from stimulating general scientific and technological progress, limits it by "squeezing" it into a narrow militarist framework.

The book points out that if the most distinguished scientific and technological achievements have been incorporated in nuclear missiles and other weaponry, and not in highly-effective means and devices to improve people's life, it is the capitalist system that is to blame. In the context of the general crisis of capitalism, the capitalist countries' loss of colonial possessions, the triumph of socialism and the increasing attractive force of its ideas US imperialism is seeking to win back its former dominating positions and therefore engages in feverish preparations for war, using scientific and technological achievements above all in the sphere of war.

It is clear that it is the character of production relations and of the social system that determines the line in scientific and technological progress. Whereas the capitalist system has been militarising scientific research, socialist society has placed the scientific and technological revolution above all at the service of those economic sectors that help satisfy in the fullest possible degree the material and cultural needs of the people and advance society's all-round development.

And if the USSR allocates funds to develop science and technology for military purposes it is compelled to do so by the imperialists who have been forcing mankind to engage in the arms race and confrontation. In this connection the book quotes a statement by Marshal of the Soviet Union Dmitry Ustinov, Minister of Defence of the USSR: "US militarist circles have not yet abandoned the hope to achieve military superiority over the USSR through developing new types of mass destruction weapons. Life has repeatedly shown that such calculations are futile and that newly-developed weapons have not in fact increased the USA's own security. Those who seek to secure military superiority over the Soviet Union with the help of such weapons should remember that Soviet economy, science and technology have reached a level that enables us to develop, in minimum time, any weapon the enemies of peace would like to stake on. The Soviet Union has repeatedly declared that it does not wish to pursue this line. That is precisely why it has proposed to refrain mutually from developing new types of weapons and weapon systems."

The wealth of factual material given in the book and its scientific analysis leads the reader to the conclusion that the mechanism of scientific and technological progress contains no elements which make its use for military purposes inevitable. The author makes it clear that it is both possible and necessary to control the development of science and technology. The plans being hatched by the imperialists for using the latest scientific and technological achievements for the mass destruction of people run counter to the very essence of science, which embodies the greatest achievements of human reason and has developed into a most potent factor of social development. The basic interests of mankind demand that all should be done to ensure the use of scientific and technological achievements only for peaceful purposes, for economic and social progress in all countries.

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PERCEPTIONS, VIEWS, COMMENTS

REVIEW OF RYBKIN'S BOOK ON THE CAUSES OF WAR

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[Review by Col N. Khmara, candidate of philosophical sciences, docent, of book "Kritika burzhuaznykh ucheniy o prichinakh i roli voyn v istorii (Filosofsko-istoricheskiy ocherk)" [Criticism of Bourgeois Teachings on the Causes and the Role of Wars in History (Philosophical-Historical Outline)] by Ye. I. Rybkin, Nauka, Moscow, 1979, 240 pages]

[Text] In order to draw the attention of peoples away from the real causes of the exacerbation of the international situation and the increased danger of war occurring at the end of the 1970's and the beginning of the 1980's through the fault of the NATO military bloc, the aggressive forces of imperialism are resorting more and more frequently to blatant lies and slander against the Soviet Union, against the entire socialist commonwealth. In the increasingly acute ideological struggle the West's propaganda system is particularly zealous in spreading insinuations on matters of war and peace.

By fabricating and spreading falsified theories on the essence, the nature and the sources of wars, bourgeois ideologists hope to discredit Marxist-Leninist doctrine and impose upon the masses a distorted concept of just and unjust wars and their role in history, and of those to blame for increasing international tensions, the arms race and military conflicts. We must therefore work with great determination to expose the apologists of militarism and aggression and to bring out the antipopular, antihumane essence of their doctrine as stressed in the decree passed by the CPSU Central Committee "On Further Improving Ideological, Political and Indoctrinational Work."

In light of this one's attention is drawn to the book "Kritika burzhuaznykh ucheniy o prichinakh i roli voyn v istorii (Filosofsko-istoricheskiy ocherk)" by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences Ye. Rybkin, which is directly aimed at exposing bourgeois teachings on the causes and the role of wars in history. Unlike other works of its kind this book also describes the struggle taking place between the militaristic and pacifist schools in bourgeois ideology itself, along with giving a Marxist-Leninist appraisal of the evolution of these views.

Most of the monograph is devoted to criticism of modern bourgeois views on the causes and the role of wars. As a rule, these theories are a diverse and motley lot. The book also gives an extensive description of the lengths to which imperialism's apologists go to confuse the masses about the sources of military disasters and to draw the workers' attention from the struggle against those to blame for wars of predation. These include philosophical-religious views on war as "sent by God" to punish people for their sins, and G. Blainey's concept of a "psychological cycle" of peace, which attributes the causes of war to the "phenomenon of force." In today's situation the ideologists of imperialism are making a great deal of fuss about the concept "peace from a position of force" and attempting to depict the arms race as a means of ensuring peace. Because of this, it is unquestionably worthwhile to become familiar with criticism of the concept "phenomenon of force."

Certain new trends are becoming apparent in the mainstream of these fabrications. The author proves that other concepts exist in addition to the fatalistic and pessimistic assertions that the causes of war, allegedly created by the combining of people's instinctive aggressiveness with nuclear-missile weapons, are "ineradicable." One such concept maintains that although the causes of wars are to be found in the area of psychology, they can be eliminated, and in order to achieve this it is only necessary to reeducate man. The proponents of such views are thus attempting to divert public opinion away from recognition of the true causes of wars, to distract the proponents of peace from the struggle against the policy of imperialism's aggressive groups.

Criticism of the Freudian trends in the explanation of causes of wars is also of interest. Particularly, the unmasking of the views of the neo-Freudian Fromm, who attributes the existence of wars to a certain psychological sadism-masochism complex inherent in people. (Sadism is pathological cruelty, a need to torture others. Masochism is the opposite, a desire for personal suffering, for self-torture.) In this complex, according to the neo-Freudians, lies the ineradicable source of aggression. By attributing the vices of abnormal people to all of mankind, Fromm also distracts society away from the struggle against imperialism as the source of wars.

Even more dangerous than harmful, as the book demonstrates, are the preachings of H. Morgenthau, author of the so-called theory of "political realism," which maintains that the roots of war lie in "sober," reflective calculation: if a war can bring success in a given, specific situation, it should be started, if not, it should be rejected. It is not surprising that this blasphemous doctrine was born in the den of imperialism, the United States of America.

This monograph is the first in philosophical literature to provide a substantive criticism of the abstract-mathematical interpretations of the causes of wars. The proponents of such concepts, the book points out, have raised the mathematical theory of games and conflict situations as a shield for the militarists. These relations, removed from reality and reduced to formulas of force, allegedly lead inevitably to wars. The author demonstrates the fact that such absolute reliance on quantitative methods for analyzing wars is also harmful and can push near-sighted bourgeois politicians into military adventures. He reminds us that only the dialectical-materialistic approach provides a true understanding of the causes of wars.

The naturalistic theories also serve the aspirations of the militarists. The book discusses the most important of these: psychobiological, neo-Malthusian, geographic and racist.

The psychobiological concepts, based on speculations resulting from achievements in genetics, maintain that wars are programmed into human genes. The author provides a substantive criticism of their false conclusions, correctly pointing out the fact that war cannot be ended through the use of "vaccinations" which correct the genes.

The latest neo-Malthusian theories, in turn, "prove" that military conflicts are an essential and unavoidable means of limiting the number of people on Earth. These doctrines also have a clearly defined neo-colonial bent, primarily promoting war against the developing nations.

Also important is that part of the book criticizing the geopolitical theories on the origin of wars, which have now been taken up by imperialist propaganda. The center of geopolitical doctrines and schools has now shifted to the United States.

The concept of "expanding borders" stands out among the numerous geopolitical theories. It maintains that a state's borders must be expanded by force in accordance with the growth of its technological equipment and industrial strength. The so-called "power vacuum" and "divided world" concepts are on the same level.

The monograph convincingly demonstrates the fallaciousness and antiscientific nature of these concepts. After all, according to the "power vacuum" concept, if a national liberation movement has swept certain imperialists out of its countries, the United States "must" fill this "power vacuum" and perpetrate expansion, aggression and intervention in the liberated areas of the planet. But by what right and why by means of intervention must the "power vacuum" be filled? Naturally, imperialism's "theoreticians" do not provide the answer to these questions. Their concept serves as the basis for the aggressive policy of the United States.

A peculiar trend known as "polemology" has appeared in the stream of naturalistic theories of war. Its creators claim for it the role of a "new" science on war. The book convincingly exposes the views of the creator of this pseudoscience, Professor G. Butul', who ultimately attributes everything to man's individual aggressiveness, to his aggressive instincts, which are allegedly a result of the overpopulation of nations. However, this is nothing other than a rehashing of the old theories (the concepts of the psychobiologists and neo-Malthusians). As the "social factor" accelerating the development of aggressive instincts, this "doctrine" offers the overpopulation of the planet, and not just simply the increase in the number of people, as Malthus stated it, but the increased number of youth, who allegedly push society into a military conflict.

In an attempt to keep in step with the times, the creators of bourgeois doctrines, particularly the vulgar sociological theories, are attempting to link the causes of wars to scientific and technological progress. Structural and functional

analysis has become a "fashionable" trend in recent years. Its authors, American sociologists T. Parsons and C. Merton, attempt to depict society in the era of scientific and technological progress as a single system of interacting elements, among which certain ones contribute to its normal functioning, while others destroy the social structure. Naturally, the former factors include the bourgeois state and other elements of the political organization of the dominant class, while the latter include organizations of the proletariat and other opposition elements in the society. As the monograph points out, such concepts as these form the basis for bourgeois doctrine on the causes of wars, which depicts war as an essential function in the existence of social structures. Everything in it serves to prove the need to "organize society for war," that is, to justify the process of militarization, a process which is accelerating at an increasingly dangerous rate in the leading states of the aggressive NATO bloc.

Theories naming nationalism, which is allegedly inevitable and eternal, are also being intensively disseminated in the West. The proponents of these concepts naturally conceal the fact that nationalism is created by the bourgeoisie for setting peoples against each other and plunging them into carnage for the sake of monopolistic capital.

Recently, as a result of the aggressive policy pursued by the Beijing leadership, the bourgeois ideologists have revived thoroughly false concepts which declare the socialist system to be the cause of wars. The book rebuffs such suggestions. The adventuristic, militaristic course pursued by the heirs of Mao Zedong is a result solely of the petty bourgeois-bureaucratic rebirth of China's ruling elite and the gaining of ascendancy by nationalistic forces in the PRC.

The author did not succeed in covering to an equal degree all of the aspects of explaining such a complicated subject as bourgeois doctrines on the causes and the role of wars in history. The bourgeois theories and concepts analyzed in the book are mostly eclectic. Rostow's concepts of war, for example, are cosmopolitan as well as technocratic. Unfortunately, this aspect of the matter did not receive adequate coverage in the book. In a future work on this subject it would be desirable for the author to trace in greater detail the relationship between a specific theory and others when classifying the doctrines. It would also be of benefit to cover a variation like Zionism of the racist theories and its concepts of the origin of wars. In the monograph the stress was justifiably on exposing those religious doctrines which have a direct militaristic orientation. In today's situation, however, certain segments of the clergy and the theologians have been pressured by the masses of peace-loving believers to condemn war. There is obviously a need to discuss interpretations of the causes of wars by clericalism's pacifist groups.

Despite certain defects, on the whole the book reviewed will unquestionably help our military cadres to expose bourgeois theories on the causes and the role of wars in history.

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